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Abstract 
Growth and Innovation 
 in the Canterbury Dairy Industy 
 
by 
Marvin Clark Pangborn 
 
This thesis reports an investigation of factors that have influenced the growth and 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry over the period 1982-83 to 2009-10. 
The research initially utilised secondary sources of information to determine physical 
and financial growth parameters of the industry. In-depth qualitative interviews 
relating to the production sector were then undertaken with fifteen producers and six 
key informants. A further thirteen key informants were interviewed from the 
processing industry. A mail survey of farmers was also conducted to further identify 
key innovation and adoption influences. The research lens for these investigations 
was informed by industry development theory and innovation theory. 
  
The development of the Canterbury dairy industry has resulted in a major land use 
change. In 2009-10 there were nearly 200,000 hectares in dairy farming in 
Canterbury compared with fewer than 20,000 hectares in 1982-83. During this period, 
milksolids (milkfat + protein) production grew from 2% to 17% of New Zealand’s 
increasing production, which was a 25-fold increase. Farm size and cows per herd in 
Canterbury have grown to twice the NZ average, with Canterbury farms grazing 15% 
more cows per hectare. Milksolids production per hectare was 1.5-fold the North 
Island average in 2009-10, whereas in 1982-83 it was 81% of the North Island 
average. An analysis of profitability from secondary data showed that income and 
expenses per kilogram of milksolids were similar throughout the country, but because 
of higher levels of production per cow and per hectare in Canterbury, the operating 
surplus per hectare was greater. The same data suggest returns on capital were double 
the rest of the country from 1999-2000 to 2009-2010, averaging 9% versus 4%. The 
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analysis of a case study farm established in 1987-88 showed an average compound 
return on total capital in excess of 10%, and wealth creation of approximately 20% 
per annum (compounded in constant value dollars, 2010). 
  
Interviews with industry informants determined that there were three waves of 
development. In Wave 1 (1980s) farmers tended to be driven more by entrepreneurial 
motives and were often moving from another dairy region that was not as favourable. 
The ability to purchase larger blocks of irrigated land at a lower cost than in other 
dairying areas was the main driver of the move to Canterbury. There were also 
human elements, as Canterbury was perceived to offer desirable social aspects and 
many were attracted to the challenge of developing a new industry. Considerable 
entrepreneurial profits were achieved. In Wave 2, (1990s) many conversions were 
completed by corporate entities. Due to low operating profits the corporate farmers 
had largely left the industry by the late 1990s. In doing so, they sold many of their 
farms to their sharemilkers, thus creating a new generation of farm owners. However, 
there were also traditional sheep/crop farms converting to obtain higher levels of 
profitability in Wave 2. Wave 3 (2000s) farmers tended to be established farmers 
from other sectors, who converted to dairy farming for economic reasons. The rate of 
growth was influenced by aggressive lending to dairy farmers by the primary and 
secondary financial institutions. Wave 3 farmers tended to develop large, more 
intensive farms. This wave also saw investment from non-farming investors, 
particularly in equity partnerships. 
 
The research identified that factors involved in the development could be classified as 
drivers, enablers and facilitators – with some factors fitting into more than one 
classification. Drivers were factors that caused growth and included the lack of 
profits in other farming systems providing the opportunity for entrepreneurial 
individuals and corporations to purchase lower priced land to convert to dairy 
farming. Human reasons for becoming involved in the new industry were also a 
driver. The development of an underutilised water resource enabled the development, 
but also became a driver of growth as it encouraged the conversion of properties to 
the more profitable dairy industry. The majority of the drivers appeared in Wave 1; 
however increased farm profitability in Wave 3 was a driver of further development.  
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Enablers were factors that were necessary for growth and initially included 
government policies and economic conditions. The long history of dairy farming in 
New Zealand provided an infrastructure that enabled the rapid growth of dairying in 
Canterbury. The development of a successful processing cooperative was an 
important enabler as the processing of all milk produced meant that growth 
continued.  
 
Facilitators are factors that did not drive or enable growth, but had a positive 
influence on growth. These mostly occurred in Waves 2 and 3 and included new 
infrastructure and farms that provided supplementary feed for the industry. 
Innovation and new technology were both enablers and facilitators as innovations to 
traditional technologies were needed to farm large irrigated farms with large herds of 
cows. The financial industry was an enabler and a facilitator of growth in Waves 2 
and 3. Other facilitators included new business structures such as equity partnerships 
and family farms operating as corporations. The establishment of a demonstration 
farm in Wave 3 was facilitator through providing important messages about farming 
in the new area and offering a forum for discussing management issues. At the end of 
Wave 3, world trade liberalisation and increased demand for dairy products led to 
higher prices for dairy products, which was a facilitator of growth and influenced the 
driver of increased farm profitability. 
 
This research has built upon existing theory by proposing an enhanced framework 
that integrates a series of developmental waves and influences within Van de Ven and 
Garud’s instrumental, resource procurement and institutional subsystems. For those 
concerned with the development of industries, it is important to realise that the waves 
of development, factors and their alignment will be dependent upon the 
characteristics of the social system involved. 
 
Key words: Canterbury dairy industry, industry development, agricultural industry 
development 
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     Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Preview 
This thesis reports on studies designed to explore the factors influencing development 
of an agribusiness industry. Specifically, this study investigates the rapid growth of 
the dairy industry in the Canterbury Province of New Zealand (NZ). Although there 
is a volume of research involving industry development, there is very little pertaining 
to the development of agricultural industries in developed countries. Accordingly, the 
purpose of the research is first, to document the productive and business growth that 
has occurred. Secondly, factors that have contributed to the growth are examined. 
These factors are compared to the theory on industry development.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, an industry is defined as a “social system consisting of 
three loosely-coupled hierarchical systems involving the instrumental, resource 
procurement, and institutional subsystems” (Van de Ven and Garud 1989, pp. 206-
211). The instrumental subsystem consists of the firms involved in an industry, 
including firms that develop a product, vendors, suppliers of applied research and 
development, manufacturers, marketing and distribution. The resource procurement 
subsystem involves the basic scientific and technological research, finance, venture 
capital, insurance, human resources and accreditation. The institutional subsystem 
provides the industry governance structures, legitimisation and industry rules and 
standards. 
 
The thesis differs from most discussions on agricultural industry development, as 
previous studies generally refer to the importation of a completely different farming 
system to an area, or the development of an industry that has not previously existed 
elsewhere. In this case, although NZ has a long history of dairy production, the dairy 
industry in Canterbury was of minor importance prior to the mid-1980s. Therefore, 
the subsequent growth and development of the Canterbury dairy industry involves the 
development of an industry in a new location rather than the development of a new 
industry per se. However, it will be shown that the industry that has developed in 
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Canterbury has its own specific distinguishing features rather than just being a 
replicate of what exists elsewhere. Eliciting the factors responsible for this growth 
and development, and then linking the findings to industry development theory, is the 
aim of the research.  
 
The study is essentially a case study, based on a range of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. Authors of case study research are inevitably part of the research process 
and bring their own interpretive subjectivity to the research. This subjectivity is 
explicitly recognised here, recognising that the dangers of subjectivity can only be 
minimised by first recognising them. The author entered the Canterbury dairy 
industry as a sharemilker in 1987, progressing to farm ownership on a different 
property in 1990. The addition of irrigation enabled the farm to be converted to a 
dairy farm in 1993. Although currently employed as a lecturer at Lincoln University, 
farming interests remain the author’s primary occupation. From the perspective of a 
‘participant observer’, the author had already reflected informally on the reasons for 
the development of the industry prior to this thesis being undertaken. This thesis has 
provided the opportunity to investigate in a more formal context the factors of 
change, and the ways in which these factors have interacted to create the growth 
outcomes.  
 
The philosophy of this thesis has been to ‘give voice’ to the views and perspectives of 
industry participants. As such, the study is essentially etic (telling the story as an 
outsider) in its perspective, but does have emic (telling the story as an insider) 
elements. In particular, the author’s prior networks facilitated access to key industry 
informants. 
 
There are eight further parts to this introductory chapter. First, the background to the 
thesis is described. This is followed by the research questions and a discussion of the 
philosophical model and methods used. The remaining sections provide an outline of 
the thesis and the final section provides a brief explanation of the NZ dairy industry. 
1.2 Background 
Prior to the 1980s, farming in Canterbury was dominated by dry land sheep and 
cropping industries. Although a fluid milk industry (referred to as town supply) 
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existed around the cities, the export of processed milk products from the Canterbury 
dairy industry was minor in comparison to the dominant farming systems of those 
times. 
 
 The dairy farms producing for export (referred to as factory supply) prior to the 
1980s were on high water holding capacity soils, often with limited or no irrigation. 
The installation of drainage was often a higher priority than the development of 
irrigation. Additionally, the abstraction and delivery techniques available for applying 
water were labour intensive.  
 
 From the 1940s, the development of community irrigation schemes utilising river 
water led to the intensification of farming on lower water holding capacity soils in 
mid Canterbury, North Otago and North Canterbury. In the late 1980s, technological 
improvements encouraged ground water extraction for irrigation from deep wells (50 
metres plus), allowing additional areas to be irrigated and further development of 
intensive farming systems.  
 
From the early 1980s, a new type of dairy farm production system developed in 
Canterbury on the more prevalent lighter soil types with irrigation. The dairy farmers 
who established in Canterbury were generally from the historical dairy areas in the 
North Island. North Island farming systems, such as all grass wintering and being 
self-contained for the production of feed for all classes of stock, required adaption to 
the very different Canterbury environment. Additionally, the infrastructure to support 
dairy farming was not as advanced in Canterbury as the North Island. Initial 
development of a dairy industry was slow, but the conversion of traditional farms to 
dairying rapidly increased from the 1990s (LIC 1985-86 to 2009-10, Engelbrecht 
2010).  
 
The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (Schilling, Zuccollo, Nixon 2010, 
p. 23) estimated that the increase in dairy farming in Canterbury has resulted in the 
Gross Regional Product (GRP) increasing by $590 per person in Canterbury since 
1998-99. Further data (ibid, p. 2) show that the value of dairy production in the 
districts included in the Canterbury region was $471 m in the Ashburton district, 
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$270 m in the Selwyn district and $185 m in the Timaru district in 2009 (base year 
1998-99). 
 
The development of the Canterbury industry coincided with the restructuring of the 
NZ economy from a regulated economy, with a high level of government support, to 
a free market economy with a low level of government involvement in the 
agricultural sector (Rayner 1990, Evans 2004, Rae et al. 2004).  
1.3 Research aims and questions 
The Canterbury dairy industry has experienced spectacular and sustained growth for 
almost three decades since the early 1980s. A key issue is whether there are lessons 
that can be learned from the from the industry development in Canterbury that have 
relevance in other contexts. 
 
Accordingly, the aim of the research is first to quantify the growth of the Canterbury 
dairy industry, then to analyse the factors that have contributed to the development of 
the industry, and then to link this back to industry theory.  Utilising primary and 
secondary data, predominately inductive reasoning is used to allow the drawing of 
insights which are compared to industry development theory. The Canterbury dairy 
industry is a case study and the overall dairy industry is the unit of analysis. 
However, embedded within this analysis are other units of analysis such as the 
production and processing sectors and the institutional environment. In particular, the 
following questions will be answered: 
  
1) What were the characteristics of the establishment and growth of 
dairy    farming in Canterbury? 
 
2) How has the development allowed business growth and wealth 
creation   amongst participants? 
 
3) What factor conditions drove or constrained growth? 
 
4) How does the development of the Canterbury dairy industry follow 
theories of development in other industries? 
 
5) What are the emerging insights from the Canterbury dairy industry 
for industry development theory? 
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1.4 Philosophy of the investigations 
The philosophical approach adopted for developing the research questions and design 
was influenced by aspects of Van de Ven’s Engaged Scholarship (2007). Van de Ven 
argues (pp. 3-5) that “the central mission of scholars in professional schools is to 
conduct research that both advances a scientific discipline and enlightens practice in a 
professional domain”. However, Van de Ven (ibid) identifies a gap between theory 
and practical adoption. He proposes that research bodies and industries look at 
problems in different ways. Managers develop an understanding of a problem and 
then look for solutions, whereas science tends to build generalizations and theories 
that often take the form of logical principles or rules involving causal relationships. 
These differences can lead to knowledge transfer problems. Van de Ven (ibid) 
suggests that the aim of problem formulation is to “situate, ground, diagnose and 
infer the research problems by determining who, what, when, why or how the 
problem exists”. 
 
 The initial information on industry growth has been obtained from secondary data, 
with the results triangulated by primary data on the growth of a farm business from a 
specific case study farm. The material in the subsequent chapters which review 
industry growth theory, extension and the history of the NZ dairy industry further 
sensitised the author to issues that may have contributed to industry growth. This 
understanding was important to effectively discuss industry growth with key research 
informants. 
 
The research elicited the factors that contributed to Canterbury dairy industry growth 
through several methods. Experts who had witnessed the growth were interviewed for 
their specialist knowledge which is presented in Chapters 7 and 8, with secondary 
data providing additional evidence. Data obtained from a farmer survey helped 
inform the role of extension in promoting growth and the adoption of innovations. 
This is presented in Chapter 9. 
1.5 Research methods 
Van de Ven (2007, pp. 298-299) defines epistemology as the study of the nature and 
scope of knowledge, or the theory of knowledge. He defines ontology as the study of 
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the origin, nature and constitution of reality. In this thesis, the author has adopted the 
perspective of Woodford (1997, p. 15) that “an industry is a social system where 
decisions are influenced by the perceived economic conditions of management 
alternatives. In agriculture these alternatives are a function of the physical 
environment, animal biology, industry governance, consumer markets and the 
processes of production, processing and marketing. Epistemology defines the 
relationship between the researcher and the assumed reality.”  
 
The methods used for this research involved predominately qualitative research 
philosophies, with data from both published and unpublished sources as well as case 
studies. The decision to use qualitative research was based on the need to explore the 
experience and ideas of people intimately involved in the industry’s development. 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994, pp. 1-6) define qualitative research as being “multi-
method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject 
matter”. Qualitative researchers study problems in their natural settings in an attempt 
to make sense or interpret phenomena. Denzin and Lincoln (ibid) further suggest that 
this can “involve the use of case studies, personal experience, life stories, interviews, 
and historical, interactional and visual texts”. Patton (2002, p. 4) writes of three types 
of qualitative data: 
 
“interviews where open-ended questions and probes yield in-depth responses 
about people’s experiences, perceptions, opinions, feelings and knowledge; 
 
 field work descriptions of activities, behaviours, actions, conversations, 
interpersonal interactions, organizational or community processes, or any 
other aspect of observable human experience; 
 
 written documents from a wide variety of sources.” 
 
 
A grounded theory approach was used to collect information about specific historical 
events. This was used to develop theory which can explain the phenomena of growth 
in dairy farming in Canterbury. Grounded theory is defined by Strauss and Corbin 
(1994, p. 273) as: 
 
“a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data 
systematically gathered and analysed” 
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These authors also state that the major difference between grounded theory and other 
ways of thinking about qualitative research is its focus on theory development. In this 
case, the researcher will begin with an area of study and will allow the theory to 
emerge from the data. In other words, the researcher will not to try to prescribe in 
advance where the answers lie. Grounded theories, because they are drawn from data, 
are likely to offer insight, enhance understanding and provide a meaningful guide for 
action. Patton (2002, p. 11) said that qualitative inquiry is especially powerful as a 
source of grounded theory, because the theory emerges from a researcher’s 
observations and interviews in the real world.  
 
Inductive reasoning will be the main approach used to develop themes based on the 
data. Van de Ven (2007, p. 299) stated that “induction is an inference to a 
generalization from its instances. The claim in the conclusion goes beyond the claims 
enumerated or stated in the premises or instances.” Using inductive reasoning the 
author has made judgements and drawn conclusions without having previously 
generated hypotheses. 
 
The research strategy involves sourcing primary and secondary data, and conducting 
case studies and mail surveys. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the base data to affirm 
industry and farmer growth. The case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 and the mail survey 
in Chapter 9 contribute to eliciting the factors responsible for growth. Case studies 
have been chosen due to the potential for a significant number of factors for the 
development of the industry. To properly answer the research questions, it is 
necessary to obtain the opinions of those who have lived the development of the 
industry and to triangulate the data obtained from documents.    
 
Case studies are a form of research commonly used in the social sciences and often 
arise due to the researcher wanting to understand a social phenomenon; in this case 
the development of the dairy industry in Canterbury. This involved sourcing and 
analysing data for the issue in the context of a ‘real life’ situation. Although the case 
studies in this thesis are qualitative in philosophy, the data are a mix of numeric and 
non-numeric information. Being longitudinal, case studies have the potential to 
provide depth and insights not available from other methods. A further advantage of 
case study research is the potential for ‘richness’ in the information obtained. This 
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richness is possible due to the purposive selection of expert sources of information, as 
compared to the random selection techniques used in other research methods. Yin 
(2009, p. 11) stated “the case studies unique strength is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence—documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations”. 
 
Case study research is frequently criticised for lack of rigour, often because the 
researcher has allowed ambiguous evidence or biased views to influence the findings. 
Other concerns are that case studies provide little basis for scientific generalization, 
that they take too long to conduct and result in large, unreadable documents” (Yin 
2009, pp. 14-15).  However, as Yin (ibid) points out, although case studies cannot be 
generalised to populations, they are “generalisable to theoretical propositions”. The 
researcher’s goal (ibid) “should be to expand and generalise theories (analytical 
generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)”. 
 
Adler (1989, p. 41) noted that “it is the outlier, rather than the average firm, that 
provides the interesting strategic lessons”. Case studies are a key means of 
identifying and investigating these outliers.  
 
When conducting case study research, it is common to use ‘how’, ‘why’ or ‘what’ 
questions. However, it is believed that the literature is restrictive in its suggestions for 
the use of these question types. For instance, Westgren and Zering (1989, p. 416) 
state that case study research is superior to survey methods at answering the ‘whys’ 
and ‘hows’. Van de Ven (2007, pp143-145) proposes that there are variance and 
process models, with ‘what’ questions using a variance model or outcome-driven 
explanations for the input factors that statistically explain variations in some outcome 
criteria. ‘How’ questions entail a process model or event-driven explanation based on 
a story. These ‘how’ questions require “narratives explaining an observed sequence 
of events in terms of a plot or an event that happens in the real world and the 
circumstances or contingencies that occur when these mechanisms operate” (Van de 
Ven, 2007 pp. 143-145).  
 
It is proposed that during this case study research, all three types of questions (why, 
how, what) will be asked, as it is desirable to obtain a broader range of information 
that is only available through informants telling their story, whether it be through 
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why, how or what questions. This thesis starts with ‘what happened’ in Chapters 2 
and 3 and follows with ‘why and how’ it happened in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
 
In this thesis, qualitative information has been obtained through interviews, 
documents and the author’s participation in the industry. In addition, quantitative 
information has been obtained from industry personnel and archives, libraries and the 
personal records of those interviewed. Westgren and Zering (1998, p.419) suggest 
that in the case of agriculture this includes “data on production volumes, market 
prices, farm numbers and farm size in order to assess industry characteristics and 
performance”.    
 
Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 532-550) proposes the approach to be taken when embarking 
on case study research starts with defining the research question (although this can be 
tentative in case study research) and selecting the cases to study. Eisenhardt (ibid) 
propounds that where the aim is to build rather than test theory, then hypotheses are 
not necessary and can even be counterproductive. Case study research should include 
multiple data collection methods and if possible these results should be triangulated. 
As theories develop, it is important to compare the “emergent concepts, theory, or 
hypotheses with the extant literature”. Eisenhardt (ibid) further suggests that a 
“strength of theory building from cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory”.  
 
A checklist for case study research proposed by Westgren and Zering (1998, p. 421) 
has been reviewed to ensure that the case study research in this thesis is 
professionally acceptable. The list includes the “identification of the intent of the case 
study; the discussion of relevant theories and literature; the use of primary and 
secondary data; triangulation of information through the use of multiple sources of 
data; and being forthright about the limitations of the research”. 
 
This thesis is conducted within the constructivist-interpretivist paradigm. 
Accordingly, in presenting the perspectives of those who lived and observed the 
industry development, the researcher acknowledges that these perspectives include 
the subjective interpretations of both the informants and the researcher. The industry 
is in essence a social system, and as with all social systems there are alternative 
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perspectives on the realities of that system. In this thesis the aim is therefore to 
present the diversity of perspective that emerged from the interview process. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
Following this introductory chapter, there are nine further chapters in this thesis. The 
organisation of the thesis is unconventional, as it begins with an investigation of the 
growth which answers Research Questions One and Two. A review of literature 
proposed factors that may have contributed to this growth. The research then 
confirmed or expanded on the factors from the literature, with the final chapter 
discussing the previous chapters and presenting conclusions. Diagrammatically the 
thesis is organised as follow: 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A brief overview of each chapter is presented below. 
 
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the growth of the NZ dairy industry, in general, and 
the Canterbury industry, specifically. Statistics were obtained from published 
sources. The purpose of the chapter was to determine the extent of industry growth. 
The data show aspects of parallel growth in New Zealand and Canterbury, but also 
establishes where the growth in Canterbury diverged from the rest of the New 
Zealand industry. A second section presents data on the profitability of dairy farming 
in Canterbury and New Zealand.  The information in Chapter 2 informs the 
subsequent research questions.  
Chapters 2 and 3 
Empirical data 
Chapters 4-5 
Theoretical lens 
Chapters 6 through 9 
Application of theoretical lens 
Chapter 10 
Synthesis 
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Chapter 3 presents a case study of an individual farming partnership that entered the 
industry in the early years of the industry’s development. Physical growth and 
financial data from 23 years of farming were analysed to document business growth 
and wealth creation for this farm. Using primary data, the research involved a 
description of the steps in the business development process. An examination of 
annual balance sheets allowed the analysis of increases in net worth and the 
calculation of return on capital. Finally, since cooperatives dominated the processing 
and marketing sector of the New Zealand industry, an analysis was performed on the 
financial returns from investing in dairy cooperatives. The purpose of this chapter 
was to triangulate the information provided in Chapter 2 and to demonstrate the 
potential of growth and wealth creation as a driver of industry development. Whereas 
Chapter 2 was essentially a series of static snapshots at the level of the industry, this 
chapter captures the dynamics within a specific business. A limitation of this chapter 
may be that it is for one farm, in which the author has a financial interest. 
 
Having established the dynamics of the Canterbury industry, Chapter 4 contains a 
review of the literature on industry development. The chapter begins with several 
definitions of an industry, which is followed by a discussion of industry development 
and competitive advantage. An analysis of new industries in New Zealand agriculture 
is included. Entrepreneurs may have played an important role in the development of 
the industry; hence the literature on entrepreneurs is reviewed. The result of Chapter 
4 is a model which identifies potential factors that required consideration within the 
research. 
 
As shown in the literature review in Chapter 4, the development of a new industry 
can be initiated by a new technology or innovation. A question raised by the review 
of new industry development is in regard to the process by which new technologies 
and innovations are transferred within an agricultural industry. Due to the special 
conditions that exist in agriculture and the high transactions costs involved, the 
diffusion and adoption process is considered of enough importance to deserve a 
separate chapter. Thus, Chapter 5 reviews the literature on the subject of diffusion 
and adoption and the role of extension in the development of New Zealand 
agriculture.  
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New Zealand has a long history of dairy farming, but it was primarily based in the 
North Island. In Chapter 6, the theoretical concepts introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 
provide a lens for a review of this history, focusing particularly on national industry 
structures that subsequently facilitated the development to the dairy industry in 
Canterbury. This discussion not only further informs the first research questions, but 
also raises additional questions for consideration regarding the factors involved in the 
successful transfer of the industry to Canterbury. Chapters 5 and 6 also resulted in the 
amendment of the model proposed in Chapter 4 to include additional factors. 
 
Chapter 7 details the results from interviews with 22 key informants. The informants 
were selected based on their involvement as farmers, consultants or commentators 
during the time period under review. Farmers were asked to describe their 
involvement in the industry - what they did and why. Consultants and commentators 
provided insights on technical matters and areas of expertise. This qualitative 
information is grounded in the reality of the participants who ‘lived’ the 
establishment of the industry. The oral accounts provided by the informants not only 
confirmed or rejected the previous suggestions outlined in Chapter 6 but also added 
additional factors. This led to a revised model for industry development. Quantitative 
data (when available) are included to support the informant stories. 
 
Chapter 8 contains a case study of Alpine Dairy Products, the small processing 
cooperative that many informants in Chapter 7 discussed and considered instrumental 
in the development of the industry. Information was obtained from interviews with 13 
key informants associated with the cooperative, and publications. Without the 
development of a successful processor, the industry would not have been able to 
grow. The analysis of Alpine Dairy Products is not only relevant for understanding 
the problems of rapid growth in a developing industry, but also for understanding the 
successful role that the company played in the growth of farmers’ businesses and 
wealth.  
 
Chapter 9 details the influence of the Lincoln University Dairy Farm (LUDF) 
extension programme through a survey of Canterbury dairy farmers. As detailed in 
previous chapters, new industry development generally required innovation and 
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technology adoption. The diffusion and adoption process are key aspects for the 
incorporation of these advances. This chapter presents empirical data that details the 
rate of adoption of the technologies espoused by the demonstration farm and its effect 
on industry growth. As well, the chapter presents the demographics of farmers in a 
new industry and details where and how farmers obtain information.      
 
The discussion and conclusions (Chapter 10) begins with a chart of the interactions 
amongst the previously discussed factors. This is followed by a comparison of the 
research findings with the research questions. Emergent insights and proposals for 
agricultural industry development as compared to industry development theory are 
presented. Limitations of the research and suggestions for future research complete 
the chapter. 
1.7 Ethical considerations 
The research presented in Chapters 7 and 9 is based on case studies. Participants were 
contacted by telephone and asked whether they would be willing to be interviewed. 
All interviews were tape recorded with the interviewee’s permission and transcribed 
by the author. Tapes and transcripts are stored in a locked cabinet in the Agricultural 
Management Department of Lincoln University. An opinion was obtained from the 
Chairman of the Human Ethics Committee at Lincoln University that the research 
presented in these chapters qualifies for exemption under clause 6.2.3(2). Clause 
6.2.3(2) states that “activities ordinarily exempted from review include research 
projects involving interviews with and/or observations of public figures or 
professional persons in the areas of their duties or competence (for example, a farm 
manager/owner or a forestry worker, as part of a field trip), provided that this is in 
accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act.” Confidentiality was assured to all 
participants and any details that may reveal their identity are omitted, unless the 
participant agreed to be identified. All interviews were conducted with respect for the 
participant’s integrity and opinions.  
 
Chapter 9 contains a description of a mail survey sent to dairy farmers in the 
catchment of the Lincoln University Dairy Farm. Human Ethics committee approval 
was sought prior to the research and is included in Appendix F1. 
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1.8 Terminology and New Zealand dairy production systems  
The New Zealand dairy industry is based on the in situ harvest of pasture by cows, 
thus farming practices in the New Zealand dairy industry are different from those 
found in most other dairy industries in the developed world. With the exception of 
some parts of Australia, most milk production systems in the world involve a much 
higher level of dietary supplementation of herds, often with cows housed and milk 
produced on farms throughout the year.  
 
In New Zealand, the aim for most farmers is to match the demand from lactating 
cows with the supply of pasture (ryegrasses and white clover). This has traditionally 
been a low cost production system that has allowed the development of an industry 
that exports 95% of its dairy production. A ‘seasonal’ system of parturition of the 
entire herd in late winter (July-September) and the cessation of milk production in 
late autumn (May) has evolved.  
 
Because a high proportion of the milk produced is processed and then exported, milk 
volume is a problem rather than an asset (the water portion has to be transported, 
removed and disposed). The industry encourages the production of milksolids 
(milkfat + milk protein)
2
 through its system of payment. In addition the farmer’s 
objective of harvesting the maximum level of pasture encourages the grazing of high 
numbers of cow per hectare, which results in high levels of milksolids per hectare, 
but lower levels of milksolids per cow relative to biological potential. 
 
                                                 
2
 Milksolids will at times be abbreviated to ‘ms’ throughout this thesis, particularly to save space in 
tables and figures.  
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     Chapter 2 
Statistics for the New Zealand and Canterbury 
dairy industries  
 
“The ultimate elements in production are labour and the gifts of nature, or 
land.” (Schumpeter 1961) 
2.1 Introduction 
The development of industries is the cornerstone of economic growth as well as being 
crucial in a world where population growth, changing economic conditions and 
changing tastes all impact on traditional industries. The Canterbury dairy industry has 
grown rapidly over the past three decades. The purpose of this chapter is to document 
this growth, and to compare and contrast with the growth of the entire New Zealand 
dairy industry. In addition, data on the asset growth and profitability of dairy farming 
in the region are presented. 
 
The growth in both the New Zealand industry and Canterbury took place during a 
time of increasing milk prices. Inflation adjusted milksolids prices (constant value 
dollars 2010) show that although the price has fluctuated, the trend is for increased 
milk prices (Figure 2.1).   
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Figure 2.1 Milksolids prices (constant value dollars, 2010) for the NZ dairy industry 
1990-91 to 2009-10 
 
2.2 Methods and information sources for growth statistics  
Sections 2.4 through 2.11 contain an analysis of the growth in the Canterbury dairy 
industry from the early 1980s through to the present. The changes in production, both 
in absolute terms and also relative to the situation in other parts of New Zealand, are 
analysed. Aspects of growth include the area involved in dairying, total production, 
number of farms, farm size and cow numbers. In addition, the measurements of 
production per hectare and production per cow are included as improved productivity 
may affect growth. The figures and tables produced utilise reports from the New 
Zealand Dairy Board’s Farm Production Division for the period prior to 1984. From 
1985, statistics have been sourced from the Livestock Improvement Report and New 
Zealand Dairy Statistics (LIC). Before 1982, the South Island was treated as one 
entity for statistical reporting. The statistics used to derive the figures are found in 
Appendix A.  
2.3 Methods and information for profitability and investment 
section  
Sections 2.12 through 2.19 utilise two data sets to compare profitability and capital 
investment in the Canterbury dairy industry with the New Zealand dairy industry. 
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These include Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF)
3
 Farm Monitoring 
Reports (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - National 1990 to 1995, MAF Farm 
Monitoring Report South Central 1999, MAF Dairy Monitoring Reports 2000-2011). 
Further data was obtained from the Dairy New Zealand (DNZ)
4
 Economic Surveys 
(2006-07 to 2009-10) and S. Nicol
5
 (personal correspondence, July 11, 2011).  
 
The information provided is a series of non-linked static ‘snapshots’ of the industry at 
specific points in time. Therefore, results are only valid for internal comparison 
between years and regions within the specific data set. Caution is needed if 
comparisons are made between data sets. All values are nominal. Data included are as 
reported by the organisation conducting the research, except for the MAF 1999-00 
expenditure data which have been adjusted to remove interest from the operating 
expenses. 
 
The MAF Farm Monitoring Reports provided details of physical, financial and 
market factors for dairy farms on a regional and national basis. Budget models were 
prepared by the MAF from on-farm interviews with selected farmers and meetings 
with agricultural consultants. Results from these models have been used to compile 
Figures 2.13 - 2.20. The Ministry did not construct a model for national dairy income 
and costs for the years 1995-96 to 1998-99; therefore there is a gap in the data set. 
Further data outlining growth in asset values, debt, equity and return on capital for 
dairy farms were sourced from MAF Dairy Monitoring reports (2000 to 2010). This 
analysis only covers the period from 1999-00 to 2010-11, as Canterbury investment 
statistics were not collected prior to these years. 
2.4 Growth in dairy production area (hectares) in Canterbury 
For most of the 1980s, dairy farming accounted for approximately 20,000 hectares in 
Canterbury. The area in production increased about 10 times from 1982-83 to 2010-
11, with an overall annual compound growth rate of 11% (Figure 2.2). For the whole 
of New Zealand, the area in dairying has increased from 1,012,224 hectares to 
1,563,495 hectares or about 1.5-fold. 
                                                 
3
 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is the government department involved with issues 
surrounding agriculture, forestry, fisheries and bio-security in New Zealand. The Ministry merged with 
the Ministry of Fisheries in 2011. 
4
 DairyNZ is the industry good body for the New Zealand dairy industry 
5
 Sarah Nicol is an Economic Analyst with DairyNZ. 
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Figure 2.2 Growth in land involved in dairy production in Canterbury 
2.5 Trends in New Zealand milk production 
Prior to 1984-85, most Canterbury dairy farms produced fluid milk for town supply, 
with a smaller proportion producing milksolids (milkfat + milk protein) for export 
butter, cheese and powder production. Total production of milksolids in Canterbury 
in 1984-85 was 9.7 million kilograms or 2% of the New Zealand total. By 2009-10, 
Canterbury’s production of milksolids had increased 25-fold to 248 million kg of 
milksolids, or 17% of New Zealand’s total. Although growth in production also 
occurred in the North Island (an increase of 1.5-fold), the growth rate of the South 
Island was much greater at 13-fold. South Island production increased from 7% of 
total New Zealand production in 1984-85 to nearly 40% in 2009-10 (Figure 2.3).     
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Figure 2.3 Percentage of total NZ milksolids produced in the North Island, South 
Island and Canterbury 1984-85 to 2009-10  
 
Within the South Island, growth occurred in all regions but was most rapid in 
Canterbury, Otago and Southland (Table 2.1). There was also a change in the relative 
production by region, with Canterbury increasing from 20% of production to 44%. 
 
Table 2.1 Production in the South Island manufacturing dairy industry 1984-85 
compared to 2009-10.  
 
 1984-85 % of SI 2009-10 % of SI 
 kg ms production kg ms  production 
Nelson/Marlborough  8,678,772 31% 26,807,294 5% 
West Coast 9,264,423 33% 44,167,917 8% 
Canterbury 5,735,118 20% 247,843,540 44% 
Otago 2,076,039 7% 73,791,163 13% 
Southland 2,672,460 9% 172,285,585 30% 
2.6 Numbers of farms  
Between 1982-83 and 2009-10, dairy farm numbers in the North Island dropped by 
33%, but more than doubled in the South Island (Table 2.2). The numbers of farms in 
Canterbury increased by 3.7-fold and, in Southland by 5.6-fold.  
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Table 2.2 Number of herds in the NZ dairy industry for selected years from 1982-83 
to 2009-10
6
.  
 
 
1982-83 1987-88 1992-93 1997-98 2002-03 2007-08 2009-10 
North Island 13,368 12,630 12,930 12,659 10,865 9,050 8,998 
South Island 1,087 1,142 1,528 2,014 2,275 2,386 2,620 
Canterbury 226 229 409 534 624 729 846 
Southland  144 156 246 471 632 710 809 
NZ total 14,455 13,857 14,458 14,673 13,140 11,436 11,618 
2.7 Farm size 
There has been growth in farm size in all areas, although the growth has been much 
faster in the South Island, particularly in Canterbury (Figure 2.4). From 1982-83 to 
2009-10, Canterbury farms grew in size at an overall compound rate of 4.5% per 
annum compared to 3.9% for the South Island. The North Island grew at a compound 
rate of 2.2% over this time. The drop in farm size in Canterbury in 2009-10 cannot be 
explained. The unit of measurement used for agricultural land in New Zealand is the 
hectare (ha)
7
. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Trends in the size of farms in effective hectares from 1982-83 to 2009-10 
                                                 
6
 Data are for five year periods; however, the year 2009-10 has been added to provide the most current 
information. 
7
 A hectare (ha) is 10,000 square metres and is equivalent to 2.47 acres. 
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2.8 Herd size and numbers 
Cow numbers as a percentage of total New Zealand cows were static, at 
approximately 7% for the South Island and 2% for Canterbury from 1970 until 1990. 
However, since the early 1990s, the South Island industry has grown to contain over 
31% of the national cow herd in 2009-2010 with Canterbury increasing to 13%.  
 
Over 29 years (1980-81 to 2009-2010), the average North Island herd increased from 
131 to 345 cows. In the South Island, herd sizes increased from 100 cows per herd to 
565 cows per herd. Canterbury herds have grown from 89 cows to 730 over the same 
time period. By 2009-10, Canterbury herds were 2.1-fold the North Island average 
and 29% larger than the South Island average. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Growth in the number of cows per herd on NZ dairy farms, 1980-81 to 
2009-10 
2.9 Stocking rates 
A major influence on the rapid growth in herd size in Canterbury has been a stocking 
rate (cows per hectare) that grew faster than in the rest of the country (Figure 2.6). In 
1982-83 South Island farmers grazed approximately 1.7 cows per hectare compared 
to 2.2 cows per hectare in the North Island. By 2009-10, although stocking rates 
increased to 2.76 cows per hectare for the North Island, cows per hectare were 3.34 in 
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Canterbury. This is a doubling of stocking rates in Canterbury compared to an 
increase of 25% for the North Island.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Changes in cows per hectare on NZ farms 1982-83 to 2009-10  
2.10 Production per cow 
Milksolids production per cow in 1982-83 was highest on the NI. But, by 2009-10 
production in Canterbury was 378 kg milksolids per cow as compared to 327 kg 
milksolids per cow for the North Island or 16% higher (Figure 2.7). 
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Figure 2.7 Changes in milksolids production per cow (1982-83 to 2009-10) 
2.11 Production per hectare 
The combination of higher milksolids production per cow and a higher stocking rate 
has produced an increase in production per hectare in all areas (Figure 2.8). In the 
1982-83 season, milksolids production in the North Island averaged 561 kg 
milksolids per ha with Canterbury farms producing 453 kg milksolids per ha. Since 
the 1994-95 season, the degree of increase and absolute production per hectare has 
been greater in Canterbury. By the 2009-10 season, production in Canterbury had 
increased to 1,262 kg milksolids per ha (2.8-fold). In 2009-10, production in 
Canterbury was 1.5 times the NI average.  
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Figure 2.8 Changes in production per hectare in some NZ regions (1982-83 to 2009-
10) 
2.12 Gross farm revenue 
In the MAF model, ‘Gross Farm Revenue’ consists of the sale of milksolids and 
cattle, grazing income and other farm income. Gross farm revenue per hectare was 
derived by dividing the gross farm revenue by the effective hectares listed. This 
analysis shows that since the 1999-2000 season gross farm revenue per hectare has 
exceeded the aggregate of New Zealand by an average of 28% annually. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Comparison of MAF gross farm revenue per hectare 1988-89 to 2010-11  
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2.13 Cash farm expenditure 
Cash farm expenditure includes the costs associated with production such as wages, 
animal health, feed, fertiliser, repairs, administration, etc. An analysis of cash farm 
expenditure on a per hectare and per kilogram of milksolids basis is shown in Figures 
2.10 and 2.11. Prior to 1999-2000, expenditure per hectare was similar. From 1999-
2000, the cash farm expenditure on average was 32% per hectare higher in 
Canterbury. However, due to the higher milksolids production, the average cost in 
Canterbury subsequent to 1999-2000 was only 2% higher than the overall New 
Zealand cost on a per kilogram of milksolids basis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Comparison of MAF cash farm expenditure per hectare 1988-89 to 
2010-11 for NZ and Canterbury 
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Figure 2.11 Comparison of MAF cash farm expenditure per kilogram milksolids  
1988-89 to 2010-11 for NZ and Canterbury 
2.14 Cash farm surplus 
To obtain the ‘cash farm surplus’8, the cash farm expenditure was deducted from the 
gross farm revenue and divided by the number of hectares (Figure 2.12). Non-
working expenses such as interest, stock adjustments, depreciation, interest, tax, 
principal payments, drawings and development are not included. For the seasons 
1988-89 to 1994-95, Canterbury did not show a consistent advantage, but from 1999-
2000 the cash farm surplus per hectare averaged 24% higher annually in Canterbury 
than in the rest of the New Zealand dairy industry.  
 
                                                 
8
 Cash farm surplus is the term used by MAF for income less farm working expenses. Other analysts 
may use similar calculations, but refer to the measurements as EBIT or net operating income.   
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Figure 2.12 Comparison of MAF cash farm surplus per hectare 1988 -89 to 2010-11 
for NZ and Canterbury  
 
Although there were large differences at times in cash farm surplus per kilogram of 
milksolids for the areas up to 2003-04, there were similar levels of cash farm surplus 
for Canterbury and New Zealand from 2003-04 onwards (Figure 2.13). A number of 
climatic events have been identified as potential reasons for decreased cash farm 
surplus prior to 2003-04. Additionally, supplementary feeding in both areas became 
more prevalent after that date and could have contributed to more stable production 
and thus similar profit levels per kilogram of milksolids.  
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Figure 2.13 Comparison of MAF cash farm surplus per kilogram milksolids 1988-89 
to 2010-11 for NZ and Canterbury 
2.15 Operating Profit 
 An alternative calculation (operating profit per hectare) was obtained from the 
DairyNZ Economic Farm Survey and personal communication with DNZ personnel 
(2005-06 to 2009-10). Prior to 2005-06, the Economic Survey was prepared by the 
LIC for New Zealand as a whole; therefore regional comparisons are not possible. 
The ‘operating profit’ calculation includes all sources of revenue and an adjustment 
for changes in livestock inventories. The ‘operating expenses’ include the working 
expenses, as included in the MAF model, plus an adjustment for unpaid management, 
feed inventories, an adjustment for an ‘owned run-off’9 and depreciation. This data 
base allows the comparison of Canterbury with the key dairy areas of the Waikato 
and Taranaki as well as the North Island and the South Island. Under this method of 
analysis, the operating profit per hectare was reasonably similar for the areas in most 
years. However, in 2007-08 and 2009-10 when milksolids payouts were higher, 
Canterbury had an operating profit per hectare far greater than in the other regions. 
 
                                                 
9
 A ‘run off’ in New Zealand is land utilised by a dairy farm for grazing non-lactating animals, 
producing supplementary feed or wintering the herd. 
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Figure 2.14 DNZ operating profit per hectare for some NZ regions 2005-06 to 2009-
10  
2.16 Capital investment 
MAF data (capital investment) was utilised to determine investment per hectare. 
Assets are defined as farm, forest and building, plant and machinery and stock. The 
model does not mention shares held in agricultural cooperatives or companies. It 
must be noted that in this case, investment is the market value of the assets, not the 
amount that farmers actually invested in their farms. Investment was similar until 
2009 when dollars invested per hectare increased by 10% for Canterbury, with the 
margin remaining nearly constant through 2011. The price of all farms on a per 
hectare basis has dropped since 2008-09.  
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Figure 2.15 MAF model of total farm capital investment per hectare 1999-2000 to 
2010-11 for NZ and Canterbury  
 
However, due to the higher level of milksolids production per hectare, the capital 
invested per kilogram of milksolids has been 21% lower in Canterbury or an average 
of $28 versus an average of $36 per kg milksolids for the rest of New Zealand 
(Figure 2.16). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16 MAF model total farm capital per kilogram milksolids 1999-2000 to 
2010-11 for NZ and Canterbury  
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2.17 Debt per farm 
Debt per hectare has increased on all dairy farms, from $5,000 per hectare in 1999-
2000, to $26,458 in Canterbury and $19,707 for the rest of New Zealand, in 2011. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17 MAF model of debt per hectare 1999-2000 to 2010-11 for NZ and 
Canterbury  
 
However, the higher production levels achieved in Canterbury have resulted in debt 
per kilogram of milksolids being nearly the same as the rest of the country (Figure 
2.18).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.18 MAF model of debt per kilogram milksolids 1999-2000 to 2010-11  
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2.18 Farm equity 
The MAF models show farm equity (investment less debt) of $12,117 per hectare for 
New Zealand and $10,471 per hectare for Canterbury in 1999-00. By 2008-09, equity 
peaked at $36,516 per hectare for New Zealand and $33,758 per hectare for 
Canterbury. Since 2008-09, dairy land values have declined and in 2010-11 the 
model predicted lower levels of equity per hectare for all dairy farms.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.19 Comparison of MAF equity per hectare 1999-2000 to 2010-11 for NZ 
and Canterbury  
2.19 Return on capital 
Return on capital (ROC) was calculated based on the cash farm surplus as defined in 
the MAF model divided by the capital investment. Often an imputed ‘wages of 
management’, is included in ROC calculations. However, in this case because the 
objective of the analysis was to determine relativities, the inclusion of wages of 
management would not affect the result hence, it was omitted. The analysis shows a 
much higher ROC for Canterbury since 1999-00. 
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Figure 2.20 Comparison of MAF return on capital 1999-2000 to 2010-11 for NZ and 
Canterbury 
2.20 Discussion 
The statistics from to 2009-10 show a change in land use in New Zealand particularly 
in Canterbury and the South Island. The area involved in dairying in Canterbury has 
grown from fewer than 20,000 hectares to nearly 200,000 hectares or an overall 
annual compound growth rate of 11%. Milksolids production since 1984-85 has 
grown by 25 times in Canterbury. Obviously, growing from a low base produces 
impressive growth numbers. However, the fact that Canterbury production has 
increased from 2% of the New Zealand total to 17% in an industry that was growing 
on a national basis would indicate that there are special factors that encouraged 
growth of a Canterbury dairy industry. Although North Island production increased 
by 1.5-fold, South Island production grew from 7% to nearly 40% of New Zealand’s 
annual production of milksolids. 
 
Components of Canterbury growth have included farm numbers, farm size, 
production per hectare and production per cow. During 2009-10, these figures were 
greater than the levels achieved by the North Island and other areas of the South 
Island. Although the rapid growth in other South Island dairy areas would share 
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‘drivers’ similar to Canterbury, the notable extent to which production per hectare is 
higher in Canterbury would suggest some unique drivers in Canterbury. 
 
According to the MAF models, income and expenses per kg milksolids and, hence, 
operating surplus per kilogram of milksolids, were similar for Canterbury and the rest 
of New Zealand. However, because of higher production per hectare, these operating 
surpluses per hectare were greater than elsewhere in New Zealand for all years. In 
contrast, DairyNZ data indicated that per hectare operating surpluses were greater in 
only some years, and similar (or less) in other years. 
 
Debt levels in Canterbury were higher than elsewhere in New Zealand and this is 
consistent with development expenditure, which would require the injection of new 
capital. 
 
Returns on capital (debt plus equity) were greater in Canterbury than the rest of the 
country (9% compared to 4%) based on similar capital per hectare but with lower 
capital per kilogram of milksolids. However, this capital is measured at market value 
rather than being a reflection of the initial investment plus development costs. Hence, 
the capital can only be viewed as being the capitalised value of the initial investment 
plus the profits. What these market values fail to identify is whether or not there is an 
embedded capitalisation of developer profits within the market capital valuation. 
Alternatively stated, the total capital may include capital gain from capitalised 
entrepreneurial profits.   
 
Accordingly, although it can be stated that dairying in Canterbury has demonstrated 
strong and, in general, superior overall profitability compared to other regions, the 
question of wealth creation remains unanswered. This issue is now taken up in 
Chapter 3, through a longitudinal analysis of wealth creation on a specific farm.  
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     Chapter 3 
A case study of investment and growth in the 
Canterbury dairy industry 
3.1 Introduction 
Thus far, it has been established that there has been considerable growth in the 
Canterbury dairy industry in terms of size and productivity. It has also been shown 
that dairying returns per hectare in Canterbury have tended to be higher than other 
regions of New Zealand, and that annual returns on capital also tend to be high 
relative to other regions. However, what these analyses have not identified is the 
extent of capital growth in individual businesses and the presence of entrepreneurial 
development profits. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter it to investigate the 
growth of a specific farming business established during the period. The author has 
an ownership position in this farm business, giving access to detailed records. 
Consequently, whereas Chapter 2 was a sequence of static positions, in this chapter 
all monetary inflow and outflows are able to be documented for the case study farm 
to create a linked longitudinal series which captures the costs and entrepreneurial 
profits associated with the development. 
3.2  Organization of the chapter 
 In Section 3.3, the history of the farm and its growth will be introduced. Section 3.4 
is an economic analysis of the growth of the farm business from the 1987-88 season 
to the 2009-10 season. Section 3.5 presents a complementary study of investment by 
the business in a series of associated processing/marketing cooperatives. The methods 
used are described in each section. 
3.3 The case study farm 
3.3.1 Method 
Records have been kept of physical and financial performance since the farming 
enterprise began in 1987-88 through to 2009-10. Information available included 
diaries, balance sheets, stock reconciliations, development schedules and accountant 
prepared tax statements. Comparing the case study farm to the historical records 
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found in Chapter 2, shows that when the partnership began sharemilking there were 
229 factory supply farms in Canterbury. These farms milked 183 cows on 74     
hectares. Thus the sharemilking position allowed the partnership to milk a much 
larger herd on a property that was nearly three times the district average.   
3.3.2 The farming partnership 
The case study farmers began their active farming operation in 1987-88. Both 
partners were from dairy farming families, but had been employed in agricultural 
support industries prior to entering the Canterbury dairy industry in their early 30s. 
The partners obtained a 450 cow, 50-50 sharemilking
10
 job in Canterbury in mid-
season due to the financial failure of the previous sharemilker. The economic 
restructuring of the New Zealand economy in the mid-1980s and poor world dairy 
commodity prices resulted in low cow values and the herd was purchased for $425 
(nominal) per cow. The owner of the property provided finance for the cows for the 
first year at 12% interest (market rates were over 20% at the time), as an incentive for 
the partners to accept the job. The case study farming partners entered the business 
with about $100,000 (nominal) in equity based in cows, real estate and cash. 
 
The farm was underdeveloped as the previous owner had converted to dairying in 
1985, but did not have the funds to re-grass or raise fertility levels (Olsen P
11
 levels 
were 9). When the partners arrived in October 1987, only half the herd had calved 
and thus production for the year was low, at 72,000 kg milksolids. The 1988-89 
season was more productive with 88,400 kg milksolids being produced. The property 
was purchased by a corporate farming company in the spring of 1989.  
 
Industry growth, fuelled by the entry of the ‘corporate farmers’ led to increased cow 
prices. The partners elected to sell the cows for June 1989 delivery and agreed to stay 
on the property for the 1989-90 season as contract milkers
12
. With the sale of the 
cows, net worth increased to $192,335 (nominal). The funds from the sale of the 
                                                 
10
 50-50 sharemilking is a farm leasing arrangement which involves the lessee owning the cattle and 
machinery and providing management and labour for a dairy operation. The sharemilker receives 50% 
of milk proceeds, with the remaining 50% paid to the owner of the property 
11
 Olsen P is the test used to determine phosphate levels in NZ soils. It involves introducing a 
bicarbonate of  soda solution at 8.5 pH to soils to extract the element phosphorus. 
12
 Contract milkers supply all labour, some machinery and pay for milking shed running costs. In 
return they receive a set dollar amount for each kilogram produced. 
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original herd were used to purchase heifers and cows with the intention of obtaining a 
smaller sharemilking job for the1990-91 season. However, in November of 1989, 
there was the opportunity to purchase, for $42,500, the ‘improvements’ (including 
water rights) for a 70 hectare (ha) leasehold property that was administered by the 
Canterbury Regional Council.  Shortly after possession, a further 65 ha block of 
council land, referred to as ‘reserve land’ was offered with a three year lease at 
$25/ha per year. Both properties were poorly developed with Phosphorus (P) levels as 
low as 3 and unimproved grass species. Phosphorus and lime were applied, more land 
was irrigated and the farm re-grassed. An off-farm job was obtained by one of the 
partners and the development process initiated. During this time the partners traded 
stock and reared 300 calves per year to help fund development.  
 
A 26-aside herringbone milking shed was built in October 1993 (it was impossible to 
get a shed built earlier due to competition for builders in a rapidly expanding 
industry) and the first milk was sold from 125 cows on the 15
th
 of November. The 
nominal cost of conversion was approximately $150,000 ($217,371 in 2010 constant 
value dollars)
13
 for a cowshed, water system and effluent system. The partners used 
their own funds to purchase cows and borrowed $150,000 from a bank for the 
conversion. A few weeks before the shed was completed, a neighbouring property of 
80 ha was purchased for $85,000 in total. Production in the conversion season of 
1993-94 was 25,500 kg milksolids. In the winter of 1994, additional cows were 
purchased so that 220 cows calved in August 1994. Production increased in the 
1994/95 season to 70,000 kg milksolids (318 kg of milksolids/cow).  
 
Over the next 15 years the enterprise expanded through purchasing adjacent land, 
developing irrigation and increasing stocking rates. New technologies were important 
to development. The first irrigation well was drilled to 73 metres in 1995-96 and was 
the first in an area where water was considered to be ‘too deep’ to access. Water was 
initially applied through ‘long line laterals’ (a sprinkler on the end of 100 metres of 
alkathene pipe), which was replaced by the innovation of K-lines
14
 in 1997-98. Also 
in that year, 30 adjoining hectares were purchased and irrigated. In 2000-01 the 
                                                 
13
 Calculated using the NZ Reserve Bank inflation calculator, www.rbnz.govt.nz 
14
 K-lines are plastic pods with sprinklers inside that are attached at 15 metre intervals to an alkathene 
pipe that is generally 150 metres in length. 
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cowshed was expanded to a 36-aside herringbone with improved pulsation and a 
larger milk delivery line. This development allowed the herd, which had grown to 
450 cows, to be milked faster. In 2001-02 the farm began to remove weed species 
from adjoining land leased from the Canterbury Regional Council. With the addition 
of irrigation, approximately 18 hectares was gained for the milking herd. Also, in 
2001-02 an adjoining 20 hectares was purchased and irrigated.  
 
In 2003-04, the herd was sold to a 50-50 sharemilker. With increased supplementary 
feed and irrigated land, the sharemilkers increased stocking rates to the point that the 
farm milked 700 cows and achieved production of approximately 284,500 kg of 
milksolids in 2006-07. Growth of the business further increased through the purchase 
of a 145 hectare farm, six kilometres from the home farm. In 2009, the 145 hectare 
property was converted to a dairy farm, which led production to increase to 482,080 
kg milksolids from 1,150 cows in the 2009-10 season. The area of land on which the 
milking herd was grazed now totalled 336 ha with 80 ha of support land. A complete 
time line of the growth of the case study farm since the commencement of dairying 
on the original property in 1993 until the 2009-10 season is found in Appendix B1. 
3.4 Business growth for the case study farm (1987-88 to 
2009-10) 
3.4.1 Methods     
A series of balance sheets were compared (see Appendices B2 and B3) for the case 
study business from business initiation in late 1987 until 2010. From the 1987-88 
season to the 1989-90 season, the partnership operated as 50/50 sharemilkers. A farm 
was purchased in 1990 and converted to dairy farming in 1993. Accountant-prepared 
financial statements are not available for these years, thus the analysis was prepared 
using annual balance sheets provided by the case study farmer’s records. Some items 
such as machinery, plant, vehicles and real estate valuations were based on the 
farmer’s estimate of the market. Other valuations such as livestock and shares (non-
agricultural) were based on publicly available data.  
 
Dairy farming commenced on the owned property in late 1993; with the results from 
that partial season included in the 1994 accountant-prepared financial statements. All 
information on assets and liabilities from 1994 until 2010 was sourced from 
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accountant-prepared accounts, except for real estate values (see below). Asset classes 
analysed were as follows: 
 
 Cattle: the number of cattle on hand at the end of each financial year was ascertained 
from the cattle trading account or farmer records. All animals were valued using the 
National Average Market Value (NAMV) as published by the Inland Revenue 
Department (2010). Table 3.1 gives examples of the increases in values that occurred 
over the period.   
 
Table 3.1 National Average Market Values ($) for dairy cattle for selected years in 
constant value dollars (2010).  
 
 1988 1998  2008 
Friesian r 1 yr heifers 367 346 1,074 
Friesian r 2 yr heifers 616 680 1,922 
Friesian mixed age cows 604 859 2,227 
Jersey r 1 yr heifers 321 333   952 
Jersey r 2 yr heifers 538 665 1,762 
Jersey mixed age cows 447 844 2,154 
 
 Source: Inland Revenue Department (2010) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand CPI Inflation Calculator (2010). 
 
 
Plant/equipment/vehicles: the values used were the depreciated value of the items 
from the accountant-prepared accounts from 1994 onwards and the farmer’s records 
prior to that date. Depreciation systems used were a mixture of straight line and 
diminishing value, depending upon the type of asset. 
 
Real estate: A data set was derived from the historical records of the New Zealand 
Valuation Department and its successor, Property IQ NZ Ltd (QV). The data are 
based on the average sales prices for Canterbury dairy farms on both a per hectare 
basis and a per kilogram of milksolids produced basis. A significant feature of the 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry has been the growth in land values. 
Valuation information indicated that the per hectare price of Canterbury dairy farms 
increased on an inflation adjusted basis (2010 constant value dollars) from $6,369/ha 
in 1987 to $31,262/ha in 2010. On a milksolids basis, the inflation adjusted increase 
(2010 constant value dollars) was from $ 17.79 to $36.95 per kg milksolids.   
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The determination of the real estate values caused the greatest problems for the 
preparation of the balance sheets. These problems involved low sales volume in 
certain periods and the timing of sales reported by the valuation departments. To 
maintain consistency, data from each six month report were used rather than the 
dataset that compiled sales on an annual basis. This decision was due to 
inconsistencies being found in the annual sales data.  
 
Dairy Company shares: Values used for shares held in the cooperative dairy 
companies were reported in two ways. From the introduction of the ‘growth funding 
growth’ share by Alpine Dairy Products in1993 until the formation of Fonterra in 
2001, the values listed are as reported by the accountant-prepared financial 
statements. With the advent of Fonterra, the industry adopted the Fair Value Share 
(FVS). Suppliers own one FVS per kilogram of milksolids supplied to Fonterra. This 
share was initially valued at $3 per kg milksolids in 2001 and later valued on an 
annual basis by independent valuers. In 2009, the value of the FVS was frozen at 
$4.52 as the company examined changes to its capital structure. The values are listed 
in Table 3.2 and have been used to determine the value of the total shareholding.  
 
Table 3.2 Fonterra Fair Value Share values (2002-2010). 
 
Year Nominal Value ($) Constant Value (2010 $) 
2002 3.85 4.70 
2003 4.38 5.27 
2004 4.69 5.51 
2005 5.44 6.22 
2006 6.33 6.96 
2007 6.79 7.32 
2008 5.57 5.77 
2009 4.52 4.60 
2010 4.52 4.52 
 
Source: van Polanen NZ Agri 2010. 
 
Other agricultural shares: Values listed for investments in other agricultural 
cooperatives are based on the accountant-prepared financial statements. The 
investment of the case study farmers in other cooperatives has grown over the years, 
generally due to increased patronage.  
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Debt: Debt levels for the period from 1988 to 1993 are from the farmer-prepared 
balance sheets. Debt levels from 1994 to 2010 are from the accountant-prepared 
financial accounts. 
 
Calculations: 
 
1) The net worth was adjusted from nominal values by the rate of inflation 
reported by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2010), to give valuations in 
constant value 2010 dollars.  
 
2) The debt to asset ratio was calculated as follows: 
 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
 
3)  The percentage annual growth in net worth was calculated using the formula: 
 
Net worth year n – Net worth year (n-1) 
        Net worth year (n-1) 
 
Where n = 1, 2.........22. 
 
       4) The compounded annual growth in net worth (or growth factor) was determined 
using the formula: 
R = √   
     
 
Where R = growth factor 
              n= number of years 
        s = final wealth 
          p = initial wealth 
     
5)  To obtain a return on the partners own capital, an internal rate of return (IRR) 
was calculated using the net worth (constant value 2010 dollars) at the 
beginning of investment, the net worth at the end of the investment, and 
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incorporating inflows and outflows from the business. All profits were 
reinvested in the business; hence, the financial impact is included in the final 
balance sheets and does not have to be separately included. Wages of 
management were not withdrawn, and, therefore represented injections of 
capital from the owners which were separately incorporated. Modest drawings 
were taken from the business but these were considered a business expense (or 
wages to the owners). No separate entry was therefore needed for these 
drawings as, like other working expenses, their impact was already accounted 
for in the balance sheet equity. Financial payments (borrowings, interest and 
capital repayments) also required no separate consideration as their impact was 
automatically recorded in the balance sheets.  
3.4.2 Results 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the 22 years of balance sheets under both a per ha 
valuation method and a per kg milksolids valuation method, with all dollars inflation 
adjusted to 2010 constant value dollars. The spread sheets for the datasets that were 
used in the calculations are found in Appendix B2 to B5.  
 
Table 3.3 Results of Balance Sheet Analysis (1988-2010) in constant value dollars, 
2010. 
 
 Valuation of per ha 
basis 
Valuation on a per kg 
ms basis 
   
Debt/Asset range over all years 9% -72% 7%-72% 
Debt/Asset average 30% 26% 
   
Beginning NW (real) $180,512 $180,512 
Ending NW (real) $8,150,456 $15,240,446 
   
% compounded real growth in wealth (NW)  18.9% 22.3% 
   
ROC 11% 15% 
 
The debt/asset ratio varied significantly during the period analysed. The farming 
operation was highly leveraged (debt to asset ratio) at the beginning (72%) but at 
times was under 10% (Figure 3.1). The average debt/asset ratio on a per ha valuation 
basis was 30% and 26% under a per kg milksolids valuation. A number of factors 
affected the debt/asset ratio, including increasing the land area and cattle numbers, 
increased values for the real estate and livestock, paying down debt at times and 
acquiring debt during expansions. In Figure 3.1, there was no calculation of 
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debt/asset on a per hectare basis prior to 1990-91 as the case study farmer did not 
own land during that period. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Debt to asset ratio for case study farm 1987-88 to 2009-10 
 
Although different levels of net worth were obtained through using the two different 
methods for valuing real estate, the result on business growth was similar - as 
measured by net worth, the business has created wealth for the farming partners. The 
larger growth in net worth using the per kg milksolids basis as compared to the per ha 
basis ($15.2 m compared to $8.2 m) can be explained by the higher level of 
production per hectare obtained by this farm as compared to Canterbury averages. 
Figure 3.2 shows that since 1994 the case study farm has produced, on average, an 
extra 292 kg milksolids per hectare annually compared to the sale farms quoted by 
QV. In other words, valuing on a per kg milksolids basis attributes all of the 
economic returns to the physical factors of production, whereas per hectare values 
ascribe average values to the land unrelated to the managerial factors affecting the 
land, cows and buildings.  
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 Source: derived from Valuation NZ (1994-1998) and Property IQ NZ Ltd (1999-2010) 
 
Figure 3.2 Production per ha for case study farm as compared to QV sales data farms 
in Canterbury (1993-94 to 2009-10) 
 
A consideration when comparing a farming enterprise to a corporate enterprise is that 
a farmer does not usually receive a salary similar to what would incur in a more 
typical business. Farmers tend to take ‘drawings’ to provide for living and tax needs, 
with excess funds reinvested in the farming business. Therefore, a Return on Capital 
has been calculated for the case study which includes a wages of management charge 
of $50,000 per year. Drawings have been treated as wages. This analysis showed that 
the average ROC under the per ha valuation method was 11% and 15% under the per 
kg milksolids method. These figures are approximately 8% and 7% lower than the 
compounded growth in wealth calculated and reflected the growth advantages for 
businesses where the owners reinvest.  
 
Figure 3.3 presents the real growth in net worth for both options in a graphic form. In 
reality, the value of the farms would depend upon a number of factors including 
tenure, soil type, water rights and irrigation delivery systems, types of milking sheds 
and other improvements. Sales in Canterbury in 2010 reached $40,000 per hectare 
(Percy
15
, pers. comm.). If this value is used for the 2010 real estate valuation, then the 
net worth in real dollars would be $11,147,590 and the compounded annual growth in 
wealth 20.6%.  
                                                 
15
 Ray Percy is a valuer and rural lending officer for the National Bank of New Zealand 
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 Figure 3.3 Increase in net worth (constant value dollars 2010) for case study farm 
(1987-88 to 2009-10)  
 
From 1987-88 to 2009-10, there were years of growth in net worth and years of 
losses (Figure 3.4). The values ranged from -29% after the ‘world economic crisis’ of 
2008-09 to 160% in 1994-95. A variety of factors were involved in the years of net 
worth growth. The 1990-91 increase reflects the price of cows doubling in the 
previous year. Dairy land values increased in 2000-01 and 2007-08; the result of 
higher milk prices. The major increases of 160% in 1994-95 and of 62% in 2009-10 
were due to converting the farms from dry stock to dairying. The 2000-01 and 2003-
04 increases were partially due to purchasing neighbouring un-irrigated land and 
adding irrigation. This then allowed herd expansion and additional production. In the 
case of the conversions and the addition of ‘dry’ land, the importance of the ability to 
add reliable and economical irrigation water should not be underestimated. 
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Figure 3.4 Annual percentage growth in net worth (1987-88 to 2009-10) 
 
From Figure 3.4 there appears to be three periods which started with low rates of 
growth and ended with high rates of growth. The period 1987-88 to 1993-94 shows 
an IRR in excess of 20% for the period of business initiation as a sharemilker through 
to the conversion of the first farm. The period from 1994-95 to 1999-00 was one of 
consolidation, with an IRR between 5% and 10% depending upon the valuation 
method employed. In the period 2000-01 to 2009-10, the addition of land and the 
conversion of another farm to dairying have allowed the case study farmers to 
achieve an IRR between 10% (ha valuation method) to 14% (ms valuation method) 
for the period.  
 
Table 3.4 IRR in constant dollar values (2010) for selected periods. 
 
Time periods ms valuation method ha valuation method 
1987-88 to 1993-94 22% 24% 
1994-95 to 1999-00   10%  5% 
2000-01 to 2009-10 14% 10% 
 
A factor to consider in the development of the case study farm has been the use of 
debt to fund growth. Debt over the 22 years studied has increased in constant value 
dollars (2010) from approximately $264,292 to $6,500,000, a factor of 26 times.  
However, debt per kg of milksolids has increased from $5 to approximately $14, 
which is an increase of only three times (Figure 3.4). By the 2009-10 season the case 
study farm had debt significantly lower than the New Zealand industry average. The 
increase in debt per kg of milksolids, in 2008-09, was due to the increased debt 
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incurred to convert the second farm before milk production began in the 2009-10 
season. The decrease in debt in 2009-10 was due to the commencement of the second 
farm producing milk and thus the debt was spread over more kilograms of milksolids.   
 
 
 
 Source: derived from Dexcel (2000-01) and DairyNZ Economic Surveys (2009-10). 
 
Figure 3.5 Debt in constant value dollars (2010) per kg milksolids for the case study 
farm and the average New Zealand farm 
3.5 A case study of dairy cooperative investment     
3.5.1 Introduction 
A major difference between the New Zealand dairy industry and other agricultural 
sectors has been the high level of investment made by dairy farmers in their 
cooperatives. For dairy farmers who were established in the industry by the early 
1990s, it appeared that a significant gain has been made from these investments.  
 
The case study farmers established a dairy farm in 1993. A requirement of joining the 
nearest dairy cooperative was to purchase shares equal to production as the processor 
Alpine Dairy Products (see Chapter 8) instituted a ‘growth funding growth’ financing 
mechanism. Although the initial shares were in Alpine Dairy Products, subsequent 
dairy industry mergers led to shares being held in the South Island Dairy Cooperative 
(1998-99), New Zealand Dairy Group (1999-2001) and finally Fonterra (2001-2010).  
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3.5.2 Background 
When Alpine Dairy Products established a ‘production linked investment’, the 
existing ‘‘revenue reserves” [sic] (Alpine Dairy Products 1993, p. 13) were bonus 
issued to existing shareholders in July 1993, as 20 cent capital notes in a ratio of one 
capital note per kilogram of milkfat produced. At the same time a portion of the 
capital reserves were allocated as shares in a ratio of one 50 cent share per kilogram 
of milkfat. A further bonus issue of 30 cents per kilogram of milkfat was made in 
July 1994, to establish the value of capital notes at 50 cents. In July of 1995 a bonus 
issue of two 50 cent capital notes per kilogram of milkfat was issued. This brought 
suppliers total holdings to one 50 cent share and three 50 cent capital notes per 
kilogram of milkfat. In July 1997, the shares were converted to a milksolids basis, 
which valued them at 29.5 cents, but a bonus issue was made to increase this to 35 
cents per kg milksolids. Future shares were purchased by suppliers at 50 cents per kg 
milksolids. The three capital notes based on milkfat, converted to two capital notes 
based on milksolids worth 42.75 cents each, these were later to be bonus issued up to 
50 cents
16
.  
 
Alpine shareholders gained financially from the mergers of the late 1990s. The 
merger with the Southland Cooperative Dairy Company saw Alpine shareholders 
trade two 50 cent capital notes for one share in the South Island Dairy Cooperative 
(SIDC). The 35 cent shares were converted to a $1 share in SIDC through a bonus 
issue. The 50 cent shares were treated in the same manner. A year later when SIDC 
merged with the New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG), SIDC shares was traded on a 
dollar for dollar par basis for NZDG shares. When Fonterra was formed in 2001, the 
NZDG shares became the Fonterra Fair Value Share (FVS). At the formation of 
Fonterra, the FVS was valued at $3 per kg of milksolids. Shortly after the formation, 
a capacity adjustment vehicle known as Peak Rights was introduced. These were 
initially valued at 90 cents per kg of milksolids. In 2006 Peak Rights were 
incorporated into the FVS.  
                                                 
16
 The author acknowledges the assistance of former Alpine Dairy Products Chief Financial Officer, 
Paul Larking in the preparation of this paragraph. 
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3.5.3 Methods 
To determine the return on the investment in shares an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
was calculated. The base period for accounting for inflation was Quarter 2, 2010 
using the New Zealand Reserve Bank inflation calculator (Reserve Bank, 2010). 
 
When looking at the capital gains for the case study business from investing in dairy 
cooperatives, it must be remembered that this farming business will be different to 
that of other dairy farmers. All farmers invested at different times, in different 
companies, with different terms of investment and grew (or didn’t grow) their 
production at different rates. This analysis only includes the cooperative investment 
for the first farm (converted in 1993) as the investment for the second farm 
(converted in 2009) had not been completed during the time frame included in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 3.5 presents the growth in production and investment in shares for the case 
study farm from the 1993-94 season to the 2009-10 season. It must be noted that in 
the early years, the shares and capital notes paid in any one year, do not line up with 
production for that year. This is because they were payable over three years. 
To calculate the gain in capital value only, cash returns from interest paid on shares 
or notes (Alpine and SIDC) or dividends (Fonterra) have been ignored—the analysis 
is looking strictly at capital growth. Table 3.4 only lists the actual cash invested.  
Although production increased by 18,308 kg milksolids in 2007-08, no additional 
shares were purchased. In that year Fonterra gave shareholders the option of not 
purchasing shares, due to the effects of a major drought in the North Island. Since the 
valuers of the company indicated that share values would likely decrease in the 
following year, the case study farm opted to not purchase the additional shares in 
2007-08. 
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Table 3.5 Milksolids production and investment in dairy industry cooperatives 1993-
94 to 2009-10 (nominal and constant value dollars 2010)
17
  
 
Season 
 
Production in 
milksolids (kg) 
Nominal investment 
($’s) 
Investment in constant 
value $’s (2010)* 
1993-94 25,500 1,380 1,991 
1994-95 70,000 5,806 8,013 
1995-96 95,000 11,241 15,209 
1996-97 120,000 18,381 24,595 
1997-98 121,000 30,213 39,766 
1998-99 140,000 1,500 1,981 
1999-00 160,000 31,936 41,359 
2000-01 177,792 23,423 29,384 
2001-02 184,119 40,243 49,131 
2002-03 197,496 49,246 59,247 
2003-04 218,320 43,666 51,319 
2004-05 238,700 114,274 130,584 
2005-06 258,700 119,509 131,340 
2006-07 267,142 56,133 60,480 
2007-08 285,450 0 0 
2008-09 270,070 13,279 13,500 
2009-10 284,148 63,632 63,632 
Total  623,862 721,531 
 
*Constant values obtained using the Reserve Bank of New Zealand inflation calculator 
3.5.4 Results 
An IRR calculated on the investment in shares over the entire time period based on 
the 2009-10 FVS value of $4.52 yielded a nominal IRR of 10% or 8% in constant 
value dollars (2010). Further analysis compares the IRR from investments in the 
legacy companies versus investment in the Fair Value Share (FVS) since the 
formation of Fonterra. Up until the formation of Fonterra in July 2001, there had been 
$123,850 in nominal cash investments. The Fonterra FVS was initially valued at 
$3/share, increasing the value of the case study farm’s shares to $510,493 (after 
removing that year’s investment of $23,423). This produced a nominal IRR of 60% 
or constant value dollars IRR (2010) of 49%. Including the 2000-01 share purchase, 
the farm commenced membership of Fonterra with shares valued at $533,916 
(nominal). Since the formation of Fonterra an additional $499,982 (nominal) has been 
invested. The nominal IRR yields have been 3% with an IRR of 1% in constant value 
dollars (2010) since the formation of Fonterra.   
                                                 
17
 This analysis only includes the first dairy farm as share values were frozen at the time of the share 
purchases for the second dairy farm. 
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3.6 Summary of Chapter 3 
The case study farm has made significant financial progress since entering the New 
Zealand dairy industry in late 1987. Depending on the method of valuation used, the 
growth in net worth in constant value dollars has averaged between 18.9% and 
22.3%. The key factors in the growth in wealth have been in growing the assets using 
moderate levels of debt, increased asset values through increased productivity, 
investing in cooperatives and an increase in the value of farming assets in New 
Zealand. The case study farmers suggested several business practices that allowed 
this to occur, including:  
 
1) being prepared to sell assets at any time to take advantage of high prices, 
 
2) increasing the value of stock—purchasing poorer quality stock, but 
improving the herd through breeding and selection, 
 
3) belonging to a cooperative which focused not only on milksolids payments, 
but also on growing farmer wealth in the cooperative,  
 
4) only investing in productive assets such as land, cattle, irrigation, fertiliser 
and re-grassing, 
 
5) developing leasehold land and thus keeping initial capital investment low, 
 
6) funding development, at times, out of cash flow to prevent increased debt 
levels, 
 
7) a low level of investment in machinery, 
 
8) participating in extension activities which contributed to the farm obtaining 
higher than average production levels (after the early years). 
 
Investing in the cooperatives during the industry merger and acquisitions phase gave 
very high levels of capital gain as measured by the Internal Rate of Return. However, 
since the formation of Fonterra the FVS has provided a low rate of capital growth. 
There have been no gains in value since the share price was frozen by Fonterra in 
2007-08. 
3.7 Conclusions from Chapter 2 and 3  
Chapter 2 presented physical growth, profitability and capital structure information 
based on the analysis of secondary data (LIC, MAF, DNZ). Canterbury has larger 
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farms, with higher stocking rates, higher production per cow and a greater level of 
milksolids production per hectare. In addition, financial data show higher total returns 
and cash surplus per hectare. Although expenditure per hectare was higher, the 
greater level of milksolids production per hectare has meant that working expenditure 
per kilogram of milksolids in Canterbury has been nearly the same as the rest of the 
country.  
 
The answer to Research Question One has now largely been answered through the 
information in the last two chapters. The growth in milk production was due to a 
growth in stocking rate and production per cow, which taken together have resulted 
in higher production per hectare. However, further research will be needed to explain 
the factors that allowed these differences. 
 
The chapters also present data on profitability and financial growth. The MAF and 
DNZ information used two different methods of analysis to determine profitability. 
The MAF data shows a consistently higher cash farm surplus per hectare for 
Canterbury over the past decade. The DNZ data for five years (2005-06 to 2009-10) 
shows that Canterbury’s operating profits per hectare have been volatile, but much 
higher than other districts in years of high milksolids payments.  
 
The productivity and profitability results from the MAF and DNZ information were 
triangulated by the results from the case study farm in Chapter 3. Additionally, the 
examination of the financial records of the case study farm produced evidence of 
significant entrepreneurial profits gained through the establishment of a dairy farming 
business. It should be noted that the growth in net worth and the IRR calculations are 
in constant value dollars, thus nominal results were greater. These results answer 
Research Question Two, as the evidence suggests that there have been significant 
capital gains for participants.  
 
The maximization of physical growth, profit and equity growth should be sufficient 
reason for an industry to develop; but physical and financial growth has also occurred 
in the rest of the country. However, growth accelerated faster in Canterbury from 
about 1993-94. The results from the analysis of profit showed similar results for New 
Zealand and Canterbury dairy farms in the late 1980s and 1990s, but higher levels of 
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cash farm surpluses in Canterbury in the 2000s. More, importantly data available 
since 2000 show that Canterbury dairy farmers and the case study farmer have 
attained higher returns on capital than the rest of the industry. Equity levels per 
hectare were higher for the aggregate of the New Zealand dairy industry until 2007-
08, at which time Canterbury equity per hectare became similar. The case study farm 
exhibited volatile levels of equity per hectare. However, this volatility often reflected 
periods of expansion in pursuit of capital gains (entrepreneurial profits).  
 
This leads to the question of why early participants chose Canterbury, when the 
financial measurements showed no advantage for Canterbury over the rest of the 
country. Additionally, why have the production and financial results improved for 
Canterbury since 2000? The research in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will examine the factors 
that promoted growth as expressed by the participants who initiated and grew the new 
industry. 
 
At this point, a review of literature on industry development is necessary to gain an 
understanding of the theories behind industry development, innovation and 
entrepreneurship and to provide a framework for future analysis.  
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     Chapter 4 
Theories of industry development 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 contained a discussion on the growth, productivity increases and 
profitability of the Canterbury dairy industry since the 1980s. Chapter 3 presented 
details of a case study farm which identified the entrepreneurial profits attained 
through developing a dairy farming business during this time. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present a review of the literature on industry development that informs 
and guides the subsequent investigations reported in this thesis. Sections include the 
definition of an industry (4.2), industry development and competitive advantage 
(4.3), the forces behind industry emergence (4.4), the role of innovation and 
technology in the development of a new industry (4.5), constraints to industry 
development (4.6), the role of entrepreneurs (4.7), and a review of new agricultural 
industries in New Zealand (4.8).  At times secondary literature sources are used 
instead of the original research. This is because the original research was completed 
in a different discipline, with the secondary authors discussing the research in terms 
of industry development.  
4.2 Definition of an industry 
An industry as defined by Porter (1980, p. 5) is a group of naturally selected firms 
which are producing products that are close substitutes in the marketplace. However, 
Van de Ven and Garud (1989, pp. 206-211) proposed that an industry should be 
viewed as a social system consisting of three loosely-coupled hierarchical systems:  
“instrumental, resource procurement, and institutional”. 
 
Porter’s view is based on a belief that inter-firm competition is very important, 
usually manifesting itself as price based competition. Furthermore, because an 
industry consists of firms producing similar or substitute products, natural selection 
drives firms to become increasingly similar, overtime, within clusters of strategic 
groups by adopting some common key elements, such as technology, knowledge, 
organizational forms and/or practices.  
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However, Van de Ven and Garud (1989, 206-211) adopt a broader view based more 
on technological rather than price competition. Their definition depends on the 
industry components listed below. 
 
1) The instrumental subsystem consists of firms producing products that are 
close substitutes for each other. This includes the individuals and firms that 
begin the applied research and development that leads to technological 
innovation. The subsystem also includes the vendors and suppliers of applied 
research and development, manufacturing, marketing and distribution. 
 
2) The resource procurement subsystem develops the resources necessary to 
support activities. These include basic scientific or technological knowledge, 
financing, insurance, venture capital and a pool of competent human 
resources. 
 
3) The institutional subsystem establishes governance structures and procedures 
for the overall industry and legitimises the industry in relation to industrial, 
social and political systems. Rival firms will sometimes cooperate to 
legitimise and gain access to resources necessary for their collective survival.  
 
Other authors such as Woodford (1997, p. 20) have noted that industries are both 
cooperative and competitive: 
 
“individual firms compete with each other for customers and input suppliers, 
but also trade with each other. Moreover, it is only by cooperation that 
industry infrastructure and systems for governance can be developed” 
  
Thus we see that in reality there is no one definition that fits all industries. In some 
cases they will develop, grow and prosper through competition. However, for most, a 
level of cooperation is necessary.   
4.3 Industry development 
Schumpeter (1961, p. 66) defined the development of industries as the result of “new 
combinations”. These new combinations arise from the introduction of a new good, a 
new method of production, the opening of a new market, the development of a new 
supply of a raw material and/or the development/breaking up of a monopoly position.  
 
Van de Ven and Garud (1989, pp. 200-201) quote Gould and Eldredge (1977) and 
Piore and Sabel (1984) who suggest that new industry development is the result of  
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“punctuated equilibrium”, which is where a major technological change punctuates 
extended periods of continuous equilibrium. Van de Ven and Garud (ibid) also  quote 
(Astley 1985) as suggesting that development is an evolutionary process whereby the 
development of technology takes place through learning that is “context dependent 
and largely self-contained in the industry of its origin” (ibid, p. 199). 
 
However, Van de Ven and Garud (pp. 202-204) theorise that an industry and its 
development is, in reality, an emerging social system. This industry development 
relies on the development of research, financing and people to make the combinations 
happen. They further suggest that there are a number of phases in the development of 
a new industry which include the initiation of the business, the actual start of the 
business and the point where the business takes off as a commercial venture. Often 
this will follow an “S” shaped (sigmoid) growth curve of slow establishment, rapid 
growth, a levelling off period and, even, decline. Klepper and Graddy, (1990, pp. 27-
28) state that chance events and outside factors may influence the number of potential 
entrants, the growth rate of firms and the ease of imitation, which will influence the 
ultimate number and size distribution of firms in an industry  
 
Clustering is a concept often espoused as being important to the development of a 
new industry. Clustering refers to new industries being located in close proximity.  
Baptista (1996, p. 6) identified the important factors behind clustering to be: 
 
    “labour market pooling, or the creation of a pool of skilled workers”; 
 
“an increase in the number of intermediate input suppliers which should 
reduce costs”; 
 
“spillover, which is where information about new technologies, goods or 
processes flows more easily locally than over a distance.”    
 
As expected, new industries face a number of problems. Taking an idea and 
converting it to a marketable product has many potential dangers. Common problems 
for emerging industries include ‘learning how to do it’ or technological uncertainty; 
defining strategies for production, marketing, servicing and dealing with uncertainty; 
the high costs of the initial products; problems inducing buyers to purchase a new 
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product or service, and dealing with the problems of meeting demand for the new 
product while, at the same time, dealing with product problems (Porter 1998, p. 216). 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994, pp. 645-670) discuss a further constraint that faces emerging 
industries as the lack of cognitive and socio-political environments. These authors 
(ibid, p. 648) define cognitive legitimation as “the spread of knowledge about a new 
venture” and socio-political legitimation as “the process by which key stake-holders, 
the general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials accept a venture as 
appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws”. To gain legitimacy (ibid, pp. 
652-663), the authors propose that leaders or proponents of a new industry need to 
utilise “encompassing symbolic language and behaviours, communicate internally 
consistent stories regarding their activity, encourage convergence around a dominant 
product or service design, take collective action to protect the industry, promote their 
activities through third party actors (trade associations), be willing to negotiate and 
compromise with other industries, establish linkages with the education sector and 
organise collective marketing and lobbying efforts.” 
 
Van de Ven et al. (1989, pp. 221-298) also commented on potential problems 
involved in the business initiation process from a number of case studies. They found 
that new businesses tend to have a “gestation period” of up to four years. Often there 
were a number of products envisaged, with a plan to get the first product to market 
with the development of additional products dependent upon the success of the first. 
Additionally, financial, personnel and technological resources are often needed to be 
sourced from outside the new business. Common problems for new firms as reported 
by Van de Ven et al. (ibid, pp. 294-295) were: 
 
1) the development sequence deviated from initial plans as unforeseen 
problems and events resulted in “trial and error” adaptation; 
 
2)  the business plans prepared were mostly used to source external capital, 
but usually underestimated capital requirements and the time involved in 
getting products to market; 
 
3) failures occurred in a few critical components, which often resulted in 
falling behind schedule and budget overruns;  
 
4)   failures with the first product affected further product developments and 
jeopardised the survival of the business creation effort; 
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5)   “trial-and-error” problems were observed because participants could not 
decide which issues were important, leading to errors not being corrected;  
 
6)    cycles of problems were only broken with external interventions, which 
resulted in frequent revisions in the business idea and start up strategy; 
 
7)   multiple levels of top management involvement were needed to provide 
“checks and balances” between contradictory forces in the corporate 
hierarchies; 
 
8)   the process of business start up and take off involved many transactions 
with other firms and customers, and these transactions were found to be 
highly fragile and could produce unintended consequences. 
 
Porter (1998, p. 221) mentions that a crucial choice for competing in an emerging 
industry is the appropriate timing of entry. Early entry involves high risk but may 
involve low entry barriers and can offer a large return. However, a risk of early entry 
is that technological change may make early investments obsolete and allow firms 
entering later to have an advantage by having the newest products and processes. 
Porter (ibid) theorised that early entry was appropriate when the following general 
circumstances exist. 
 
1) Image and reputation of the firm are important to the buyer; the firm can 
develop an enhanced reputation by being a pioneer; 
 
2) Early entry leads to enhanced learning so that the firm has gained 
experience that will be vital when dealing with newer technologies; 
 
3) Customer loyalty will be high so that benefits will accrue to the firm that 
sells to the customer before competitors; 
 
4) Absolute cost advantages can be gained by an early commitment to 
suppliers of raw materials and distribution channels. 
 
Some of the entrepreneurial gains achieved by the case study farmers in Chapter 3 
were due to their early entry. They were able to buy the assets for production at a 
lower price, as well as secure large volumes of water for the future development of 
irrigation.  
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4.4 Forces behind industry emergence and competitive 
advantage 
Porter’s examination of the competitive advantage of nations (1990, p. 72) is useful 
for looking at the forces behind industry emergence. Porter’s ‘diamond’ (Figure 4.1) 
was developed to determine the ability of a nation to reach international success in 
selected industries; however, it also provides a model to explain why an industry 
emerges and succeeds both locally and internationally. The four elements of the 
diamond are: factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries 
and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. These elements are then affected by 
government and chance. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Determinants of national advantage (Porter 1990) 
 
The factor conditions in a country can contribute to an industry’s success (Porter 
1990, pp. 73-75). These conditions can comprise human resources, physical 
resources, knowledge resources, capital resources and infrastructure. Factors like 
location, climate, and mineral wealth are considered basic factors, whereas factors 
that require large and long term investments such as communication infrastructure 
and a highly skilled labour force are considered advanced factors. Other factor 
categories can be generalised or specialised. Lamotte (2007, p. 45) provides the 
example of a generalised factor being a country with a high level of university 
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graduates, whereas a specialised factor would exist if the country had a large number 
of graduates with a specific knowledge in a field such as engineering. 
 
Porter (1990, pp. 86-99) theorises that demand conditions in the home market are 
important as a firm tends to concentrate on this market first and thus allocate and 
develop suitable resources to satisfy the local consumers. However, Porter (ibid) also 
believes that the home market needs to meet the following conditions to be a positive 
influence on the creation of an advantage: 1) the demand is larger than that of 
overseas markets, 2) the demand is sophisticated and 3) the home demand anticipates 
overseas buyers’ needs or can influence them. Porter (ibid, pp. 100-107), states that 
related and supporting industries are necessary to facilitate access to inputs and 
increase coordination between firms and their suppliers. The presence of competitive 
supplier industries creates advantages to downstream industries through access to the 
most cost-effective inputs and through innovation and upgrading due to the working 
relationships between suppliers and industry. Porter (ibid, P. 101) uses the example of 
the Italian jewellery industry which (at least in the 90s) was sustained by the fact that 
two-thirds of the companies producing jewellery making machinery were located in 
Italy. 
 
A fourth determinant of national competitive advantage relates to the firm’s strategy, 
structure and rivalry or, in other words, the context in which firms are created, 
organised and managed (Porter 1990, pp. 107-124). It is theorised that competition 
between home based firms is important for innovation and competitiveness. 
However, these goals, strategies and ways of organizing firms vary between nations. 
Some of the most important aspects are the society’s attitude toward authority, the 
attitude of management and workers towards each other, as well as whether a society 
is individualistic or group orientated, and the society’s professional standards. The 
willingness of a firm to compete on an international level is potentially a result of the 
saturation of the home market demand and the development of international demand. 
However, managerial attitudes to international trade play an important role. 
 
The importance of the home market (domestic rivalry) is not universally accepted. 
Rugman and Verbeke (1993, pp. 71-84) argue that small economies rely on a large 
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host nation, or numerous host nations. They quote the work of Cartwright (1991), 
who stated that: 
 
“The lack of domestic competition in the home base of a New Zealand 
industry need not negatively influence the international competitiveness of 
this industry, if it had to cope with strong international rivalry in the first 
place. Such international forces may be as relevant for international 
competiveness and strategy formation as domestic diamond characteristics.”  
 
An example of a New Zealand company using a foreign nation as a host market is the 
dairy cooperative Fonterra, which treats New Zealand and Australia as one market, 
with the division offices for the New Zealand/Australian market and the largest 
section of the product development department located in Melbourne. Although 
geographically separated, the culture and eating habits of the countries are similar and 
a larger population gives Fonterra the ability to trial and develop products and 
systems to be used in both countries (Fonterra 2005).  
 
Chance events in Porter’s Diamond (Porter, 1990, pp. 124-126) can create 
imbalances or opportunities for the diamond, or for a single component of the 
diamond. Chance events can include acts of invention, major technical changes such 
as biotechnology, volatility in input costs such as oil price shocks, shifts in world 
financial markets or exchange rates, surges in world or regional demand, political 
decisions by foreign governments or wars. 
 
The effect of government, according to Porter (1990, pp. 126-128), is to encourage an 
industry to progress, but not to provide so much help that an effort to improve is 
avoided. Governments can influence factor conditions through subsidies, policies 
towards capital markets and education. Demand conditions can be influenced through 
the setting of standards and through government purchases. Government can also 
control an industry through regulation of the advertising media or regulation of 
supporting services. Furthermore, government policy can influence firms’ strategies 
and structures through tax laws, capital market regulation and anti-trust laws. 
 
Lamotte (2007, pp. 63-66) identified further reasons for industry emergence as the 
development of new innovations and technologies and “open environmental space”. 
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Innovation and technology will be covered in Section 4.6. Open environmental space 
refers to there being a physical or market space for a new industry to enter.  
4.5 Possible constraints to industry emergence 
Just like existing industries, the growth and success of new industries is affected by a 
number of factors. Porter (1998, p. 4) describes the forces driving industry 
competition as the buying power of buyers as well as the bargaining power of 
suppliers. The industry can also be affected by potential new entrants to the industry, 
or substitute products. The final force is the rivalry among existing firms. 
Diagrammatically these forces appear as in Figure 4.2 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Porter’s Five Forces of Industry Competition (1998)  
                                     
Porter (1998, pp. 7-28) believes that for a new entrant there are a variety of initial 
barriers, from the difficulty of obtaining economies of scale in production and 
purchasing, to the development of distribution channels. Government regulations on 
the use of resources, pollution control and safety requirements may also cause 
difficulties. Finally, they must also overcome the “brand loyalty” associated with the 
current products. After becoming established new industries must deal with the 
rivalry that develops with existing competitors.  
 
Porter (1998, pp. 7-28) also comments that it is possible that an entrant is not only 
competing against industry rivals, but also competing against another industry 
producing a substitute product. Problems will arise when a substitute industry has a 
development that allows them to reduce their price or improve performance. 
Industries may act collectively to protect themselves from substitute products. A New 
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Zealand example of collective action is when Beef + Lamb NZ
18
 cooperates with red 
meat producers in other countries to generically promote the consumption of red meat 
versus white meat. 
  
Further, Porter (1998, pp. 7-28) feels that the bargaining power of suppliers and 
buyers can have significant effects on entrants. Supplier groups are powerful if 
supply is dominated by a few companies and there are limited substitutes available.  
Suppliers can also gain power if the new industry is not an important customer of the 
supplier group or the supplier’s product is an important input for the buyer’s 
business. Finally, supplier groups can increase their bargaining power if there is a 
threat of forward integration or if they can make the cost of switching products 
difficult for the buyers. In contrast, a buyer group is powerful when the buyers are 
concentrated or purchase a large volume of the seller’s sales, the products purchased 
from the supplier tend to be commodities, if the buyer faces few switching costs, if 
the buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration, or the industry’s product is 
unimportant to the quality of the buyer’s products or services. 
 
Additionally, the literature suggests a number of other potential problems for an 
emerging industry. From a production point of view these problems can include an 
industry growing faster than its supplier’s ability to supply raw materials, which can 
lead to a rapid escalation in input prices and opportunistic behaviours. The absence of 
the infrastructure for processing, supply channels or personnel can lead to production 
problems, which can be compounded by the absence of product standards and erratic 
product quality. From a customer’s point of view, there can be a perception that the 
next generation of product will be better, along with confusion due to variations of 
the same product. If the product is subject to some form of regulation, then any 
slowness in the regulatory process can have adverse effects on the rate at which 
products reach the market. Finally, in the event of these problems arising the financial 
community will tend to re-evaluate their association with the industry (Porter 1998, 
pp. 221-224, Greer, Greer and Zwart, 2000 pp. 3-7 and 15-18). 
                                                 
18
 Beef + Lamb NZ is the industry good body in NZ that promotes consumption of  beef and sheep 
meats as well as fulfils extension functions with NZ farmers 
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4.6 Innovation and technology development 
Afuah (2003, p. 13) defines innovation as “the use of a new technology and perhaps 
also market knowledge, to offer a new product or service that customers want”. These 
innovations can originate from several sources. According to Rogers (2003, p. 12), an 
innovation is an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual or 
other unit of adoption. Afuah (2003, p. 31) commented that Schumpeter originally 
theorised that innovation came from small entrepreneurial firms, but changed his 
view to one where innovation came from larger firms with some form of monopoly 
power. Schumpeter’s latter reasoning was that larger firms have the size to invest in 
the commercialisation of a new product, they are more diversified and hence more 
willing to take risk, they have better access to capital and through having a monopoly 
position they do not have competitors and so they are more willing to invest. 
Hagedoorn (1989, p. 64) added that Schumpeter also believed that innovation was 
greater in monopolistic industries because the firm can prevent imitation and thus 
capture more profit, with these profits being used to finance more development. 
 
De Carolis (2010) listed a number of characteristics which influence technological 
innovation. These include the potential for innovation in an industry, the 
“technological dynamism” of the industry, the industry’s reliance on technical 
standards, the extent of collaboration among firms and government regulation.  
 
The role of private firms is important in the development of innovations. However, it 
is often public organizations which play a major role by conducting public good 
research (Van de Ven 1993a, p. 214). Van de Ven (ibid) reviewed the research of a 
number of authors (Mowery 1985, Thirtle and Ruttan 1986, Freeman 1986 and Dosi 
1982) and theorised that “the commercial success of a technological innovation 
reflects the institutional innovation embodying the social, economic and political 
infrastructure that any community needs to sustain its members”. Van de Ven and 
Garud (1989, p. 196) stated that, “Seldom can an innovation be developed by a single 
firm alone in the vacuum of a community or industrial environment”. They add, “The 
management of innovation must not only be concerned with micro developments of a 
particular technical device or product, but also with the creation of an industry 
infrastructure needed to commercialise the innovation”. 
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Rogers (2003, pp. 137-157) describes the innovation development process as a 
situation where a problem or need is recognised, which stimulates research and 
development activities for solutions. Commercialization then occurs through 
production, manufacturing, packaging, marketing and distribution of the product. 
Often there is an analysis of the results to determine if the original problem/need that 
began the process has been solved by the innovation. New problems/needs may arise, 
leading to a new cycle. This process can be diagrammatically described (Figure 4.3) 
by Dewey’s problem solving cycle (Roling 1988, p. 58). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Dewey’s problem solving cycle (Roling 1988) 
 
A society’s attitude to innovation is considered important. Adler (1989, pp. 35-36) 
writes that more advanced industrial societies have a bias towards innovations as 
compared to pre-capitalist society. Additionally, he comments that the values that 
encourage education indirectly encourage the emergence of innovators and raise the 
receptivity to innovation. 
 
Innovation often involves a wide range of society. Afuah (2003, pp. 37-39), has 
proposed that there are a number of “people types” necessary for innovation. These 
include: “idea generators” who find ideas that lead to new products or services, 
“gatekeepers” who take the idea and adapt it for the firm and outside world, 
“champions” who take an idea and do all that is necessary to guarantee its success, 
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“sponsors” who are coaches/mentors who provide the behind the scene support, and 
“project managers” who have a vision for the potential of an innovation and 
communicate this vision to the rest of the organization. Salomo and Gemunden 
(2010, pp. 263-267) formed a similar classification system which includes: “power 
promoters, expert promoters, process promoter, relationship promoter and 
technological gatekeepers”. However, a range of personality types alone does not 
lead to innovation and Van de Ven (1993a, p. 216) suggests that a pool of 
competence needs to develop among the “people types”. This is accomplished 
through: “1) the establishment of educational training programmes and accredited 
degrees at colleges and universities; 2) the recruitment and training of people in 
specific skills related to the innovation and the diffusion of these skilled people 
between institutes and firms in the industry, and 3) the sharing of knowledge among 
industry participants at conferences, technical committees, and informal 
communication networks.” 
 
A difficulty in the management of ideas is that by nature humans are inclined to focus 
on protecting existing practices rather than on moving in new directions. Van de Ven 
(1986, p. 594) feels this is because “people have a basic psychological limitation of 
not being able to handle complexity, of unconsciously adapting to gradually changing 
conditions, of conforming to group and organizational norms, and of focusing on 
repetitive activities.” A lack of innovation can be the result of a number of factors 
including a shortage of appropriately trained staff, an economic climate that 
discourages innovation, and firms and organizations that do not have the linkages that 
encourage the effective dissemination of results (Marsh 2006, pp. 6-8). Van de Ven 
(ibid, pp. 592-595) adds that the more specialised, insulated and stable an individual’s 
job, the less likely the individual will be to recognise the need for change or to pay 
attention to innovative ideas.  
 
Van de Ven (1986, pp. 346-359) has developed propositions on the successful 
emergence of innovation. The propositions suggested that the shorter time it takes to 
establish an innovation the greater the level of success, with “novel” innovations 
having a greater chance of failure, often due to the significant changes required to the 
social system’s functions. If the original design of an innovation becomes dominant 
then firms can constrain future developments. Entrepreneurial firms that “run in 
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packs” will be more successful than those that operate alone to develop their 
innovations. The greater the number of cooperative and competitive ties between 
firms, the more stable and flexible the overall system; however, aborted efforts at 
establishing cooperative relationships can turn out to become competitive 
relationships. 
 
Another consideration when considering innovation is the risk associated with the 
adoption of an innovation. Scheuing (1989, p. 309) identified the following types of 
risk. 
 
“financial---the potential loss of money, 
 
  functional---the product will malfunction or fail to perform, 
 
  physical---the product may inflict physical harm on the user, 
 
  psychological---potential psychological discomfort from a poor choice, 
 
  social---loss of face or respect in the eyes of relevant others” 
    
A number of authors have discussed the adoption of innovation by the agricultural 
sector. Nuthall (2010, p. 9) has suggested that a new technology must be easy to trial, 
lack complexity, be easily compared to benchmarks and easily observed. Flett et al. 
(2003, p. 2), quoted a number of studies that showed that economic models 
adequately explain farmer behaviour to technology adoption when the innovation is 
easy to adopt, the adoption has clear economic advantages, the innovation has low 
complexity and there are no other intervening considerations. Guerin and Guerin 
(1994), when reviewing adoption by Australian farmers, agreed with the above 
authors but added the further factors of financial cost, the farmer’s beliefs and 
opinions to the new technology, the relevance of the technology and the farmer’s 
attitudes towards risk and change. Flett (ibid) also found that the ease of use of a new 
technology was a separate factor from profit/production and supported the theory that 
there was more to adopting technologies than just economics.   
4.7 The role of the entrepreneur and motivation  
Landstrom (2005, p. 3) states “entrepreneurship is one of the oldest of activities. To 
discover or identify new business possibilities and to exploit these possibilities in 
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new ventures for economic gain has always been important in human life.” Although 
the word had its origin in France in the 12
th
 century, (ibid, p. 8) many discussions of 
entrepreneurs started with Schumpeter (1961, p. 61). He defined the carrying out of 
new combinations as “enterprise” and the individuals who carry them out as 
“entrepreneurs”. In a footnote Schumpeter adds that the entrepreneur is merely the 
“bearer of the mechanism of change”.  
 
When discussing entrepreneurs, Schumpeter (1961, pp. 92-93) dismisses Grossen’s 
law which assumes that entrepreneurs are driven by an insatiable craving for 
hedonistic satisfaction and proposes.  
 
“In entrepreneurs there is an indifference to hedonistic enjoyment, because, 1) 
there is a dream and the will to found a private kingdom, 2) there is a will to 
conquer, the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others, to succeed 
for the sake of success - the financial result is a secondary consideration and 
for 3) the joy of creating, of getting things done or simply of exercising one’s 
energy and ingenuity. The entrepreneurial function is not in principle 
connected with the possession of wealth, as analysis and experience teach, 
even though the accidental fact of the possession of wealth constitutes a 
practical advantage.” 
 
Schumpeter (1961, pp. 228-230) also theorises that entrepreneurs appear in clusters 
because the appearance of one or more entrepreneurs encourages the appearance of 
others. This is because: 
 
“the carrying out of new combinations is difficult and only accessible to 
people with certain qualities, more people become entrepreneurs with the 
successful appearance of an entrepreneur, the original entrepreneur removes 
obstacles for further entrepreneurs and as the process of development 
becomes familiar, the weaker the obstacles become and the less leadership is 
needed.” 
 
He added that: 
 
“this swarm like appearance of new combinations explains boom periods 
where there is increased capital investment, a decline in unemployment, a rise 
in wages, a rise in interest rates, an increase in freight, and increased strains 
on bank balances.” 
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 However, he also states (p. 233) that just as entrepreneurs arrive “en masse”, so do 
their products - “this appearance of new products causes a fall in prices, which 
terminates the boom, may lead to a crisis, must lead to a depression and starts a new 
cycle”.  
 
Van de Ven (1985, p. 594) countered Schumpeter’s exuberance for the qualities of 
entrepreneurs when he said, 
 
“Much of the folklore and applied literature on the management of innovation 
has ignored the research by cognitive psychologists and social-psychologists 
about the limited capacity of human beings to handle complexity and maintain 
attention. As a consequence, one often gets the impression that inventors or 
innovators have super-human creative heuristics of abilities to walk on 
water.” 
 
Van de Ven (1993a, pp. 212-213) adds that historical studies show that most 
innovations are collective achievements from the efforts of many participants 
working over an extended period of time.   
 
Langlois (2002, p. 1) quoted predictions by Galbraith in the 1950s of the demise of 
entrepreneurs, as innovation would become the “matter of routine in the large 
bureaucratic corporation”. Stewart, et al. (1998, pp. 189-214), however, found in the 
1980s that entrepreneurs were usually individuals with goals of profit and growth for 
their ventures and were notable for their use of strategic planning. Stewart’s 
psychological research compared entrepreneurs to small business owners and 
corporate managers. They found that those identified as entrepreneurs were higher in 
achievement motivation, risk-taking propensity and preference for innovation. 
Although small business owners showed a propensity to take risk, they tended to 
operate a business as an extension of the individual’s personality to further personal 
goals and to produce family income. 
 
Several authors have addressed the issue of entrepreneurship and motivation among 
the agricultural sector. De Lauwere (2005, pp. 229-238), found that agricultural 
entrepreneurs exhibited the traits of self-criticism, leadership, creativity, 
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perseverance, and initiative. From a practical point of view, DeWolde
19
 (pers. comm., 
October 2006) commented that agricultural entrepreneurs have the following 
characteristics: 
 
 “Long term perspective with helicopter views and hands on knowledge; 
   inquisitive minds and a lifetime commitment to self-improvement; 
analytical skills; 7 successful ideas out of 10 attempts isn’t bad - not all 
ideas have to be winners; the courage to be different.” 
 
Giera (1999, pp. ii) in a case study of New Zealand farmers, defined entrepreneurial 
farmers as “farmers who had reached the point of achieving most farm-based goals 
and had decided to pursue new challenges and goals for their farm business”. These 
challenges generally involved innovative production, processing or marketing of their 
products. Comparing the entrepreneurial farmers to conventional farmers, the 
management styles were quite similar. However, the entrepreneurial farmers tended 
to have higher levels of confidence, were prepared to accept higher levels of risk and 
sourced extensive levels of information from different sources. 
 
If in fact entrepreneurs are not interested in “hedonistic pleasures”, and are more 
inclined to pursue new combinations for the “thrill of the chase” as theorised by 
Schumpeter; then a look at motivation is appropriate. Nuthall (2010, pp. 36-37) 
looked at motivation of farmers and concluded that: 
 
“most people would consider motivation to involve not only an ability to 
think of, and initiate a project, but also to control the direction of its conduct 
and final completion including the persistence to finish off what is started, if 
this is indeed rational. Further motivation probably relates to a need, want or 
interest that a person has that propels them in a certain direction. All of these 
drives are internal with success leading to the person feeling better about 
themselves.”  
 
It has been suggested by several authors that motivation revolves around a need to 
feel achievement or mastery of an endeavour, a person having a competitive nature, 
the desire for power or for affiliation with an organization (Nuthall 2010, p. 38, 
Kanfer and Ackerman 2000, p. 470). The latter authors comment that in some cases 
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 Abe DeWolde is a New Zealand dairy farmer from the Southland Province. He won the Lincoln 
University Foundation Innovation Award in 2006 for incorporating a wintering barn and associated 
system changes into his dairy farming system. 
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the motivation can become an anxiety to complete a project. In a study of New 
Zealand dairy farmers, Valentine, Hurley and Glass (1993) stated that the commonly 
assumed farmer motivations of productivity and profitability did not describe farmer 
decision making as well as the achievement of long term goals. However, this is 
countered by a study by Solano et al. (2001 p. 154) of Costa Rican dairy farmers 
which found that economic goals were the most important goal for a majority of 
farmers.  
4.8 Development of new industries in agriculture 
The literature on new industry development in agriculture tends to be dominated by 
development in lesser developed countries and these tend to involve raising the 
standard of living of the lower income members of the population. Sonka (1995) also 
discusses new industries in agriculture, but his focus is on the development of 
strategic alliances in agribusiness or what is commonly referred to as vertically 
integrated supply chains. Instead, this section has concentrated on the development of 
new farming systems and related agricultural industries in New Zealand and Australia 
due to the importance of agricultural exports to the economies of these countries and 
their geographical isolation from the major markets for their products.  
4.8.1 Definition                  
From a theoretical standpoint, Woodford (1997, p. 21) cites Wollin’s theory (1995) 
that change occurs in rural industries due to an interplay between the industry’s 
 
“durable deep structure, its wider environment and the purposeful action of 
actors in both the industry system and the wider environment”  
 
Wollin (ibid) suggests that the change process stems from an “irregularity that acts to 
deconfigure [sic] some of the deep structure that variations then emerge, that a 
sorting process favours some forms of the new deep structure and eventually a new 
durable form emerges”.   
 
From a sociological standpoint, Mayell and Fairweather (2000, p. 5) quote the work 
of Granovetter and McGuire (1998) who argue that new industries develop not only 
out of technical and economic factors, but may also be “socially constructed by the 
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mobilization of resources and the existence of social networks”. These could include 
friendships, shared experiences, social connections, interactions between firms and 
public authorities and the engagement of research centres. They also suggest that the 
role of clubs, associations and, even, journalists can be important in the development 
of new industries.  
 
Considering agriculture specifically, Hyde (1998, pp. 2-3) suggests that new 
agricultural industries develop to create employment opportunities, to develop more 
sustainable farming systems, to improve standards of living and to fulfil an innate 
personal yearning to do something different or better. Wood, Chudleigh and Bond 
(1994, pp. 5-6) adopted Vinning’s (pers. comm.) proposals for what constituted a 
new cropping industry in Australia. These crops could be new to the country or 
region, new to the time of year, involved a new variety or technology, had not been 
grown commercially in the past, was a new product for customers or the new use for 
an existing product. Collins (2011) commented that success from a biological 
prospective was necessary but that economic and social factors were also necessary 
for success. 
 
These definitions are important for analysing the Canterbury dairy industry; because 
it could be argued that dairying is not a new industry, since dairy farming has always 
existed in Canterbury. However, aspects of Hyde’s definitions of developing more 
sustainable systems, improving living standards and fulfilling an innate need to do 
something different may apply. Vinning’s definitions of an activity being new to a 
region and involving new technologies may also add weight to the argument that the 
Canterbury dairy industry is a new industry.    
4.8.2 Research on new agricultural industries 
A number of authors have observed the success factors important to new agricultural 
industries. Most research stresses the importance of the identification and 
development of markets (Wynn-Williams 1985, Wood, Chudleigh and Bond 1994, 
pp. 79-86, Hyde, 1998, pp. 4-8, Greer, Greer and Zwart 2000, pp. 15-17). Clearly 
there is no benefit in developing the production techniques if there is no market for 
the product. Successful new industries identified markets, established marketing 
programmes and stressed product quality often through the development of product 
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descriptions and quality assurance organisations. Poor quality was a major constraint 
to industry development. A new industry must have close contact with customers and 
share critical information. For some industries the establishment of a brand or an 
emphasis on product characteristics such as ‘fresh’ or ‘clean and green’ has been 
helpful. The failure to dispose of all product at an economic price was mentioned by 
Greer, Greer and Zwart (2000, p. 16) as a likely impediment to success. 
 
 Production factors are equally important. Due to factors such as climate and 
agronomic performance it is important to conduct research in the country adopting 
the new industry; however, techniques can be adopted from overseas (Wynn-
Williams 1985, Wood, Chudleigh and Bond 1994, pp. 79-86). There can be a need to 
localise genetic material and mechanization techniques. Although, Wood, Chudleigh 
and Bond (ibid) suggested that the establishment of processing was important, it was 
not as important in predicting success as the production factors of climate and 
environment. It was theorised that this is because processing technology can often be 
imported from overseas. Greer, Greer and Zwart (2000, p. 15) noted that it is 
important to develop a skilled labour force.  
 
Production research and development (R & D) was considered important by Wood, 
Chudleigh and Bond (1994, pp. 79-86)—particularly plant improvement, cultural 
practices and the control of pests and disease. Mechanisation R & D was important in 
some industries. The lag period for the adoption of R & D averaged six years for 
plant improvement and four years for mechanization and agronomic R & D.  They 
added that the chances of success are greater if the crop can be easily incorporated 
into an existing farming system and the industry has the potential to expand in a short 
time frame.  
 
 Hyde (1998, p. 4) stressed the importance of an industry champion, with government 
playing a key role in setting the right economic environment to support research and 
to deal with market access issues. However, Wood, Chudleigh and Bond (1994, pp. 
33) only found a weak correlation between an “industry champion” and high growth 
rates and gross product values. They suggested the role of government in contributing 
to success was minimal, although there was some effect from the setting of quality 
standards and marketing incentives, as well as tax incentives. 
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Mayell and Fairweather (2000, pp. xi-xii) believe new industries with a formal 
industry council with extensive functions and professional, full-time, paid employees 
are more successful than grower associations with limited functions and unpaid 
volunteers. Furthermore, successful industries tended to have extensive involvement 
with outside groups, export markets, extensive research and development activities, 
multiple quality controls and considerable liquid funds in the industry organization.  
 
Hyde (1998, pp. 4-8) wrote of the need for financial management and he observed 
that new ventures required more equity capital and lower interest costs. Additionally 
they required significant levels of operating funds in the early years, as they tended 
not to be profitable at start up. Government incentives and tax concessions are 
important, but in the long run an industry must have some competitive advantage and 
prospects for long term profitability. 
 
Finally, Hyde (1998, pp. 4-8) commented on the “style of operation” of successful 
industries. They had a strong profit and quality focus, a strategic long term approach, 
value adding and vertical integration, compatibility of the new venture with other 
farming operations, imaginative marketing and trading arrangements, quick adoption 
of new technology and, in some cases, the use of joint ventures. 
4.8.3 The development of the deer, kiwifruit and wine industries in New 
Zealand 
There have been only a few new agricultural industries that have achieved success in 
New Zealand in the past fifty years. Examples are the farmed deer (Cervus elaphus) 
and kiwifruit (Actinidia deliciosa) industries. In addition the wine grape (Vitis 
vinifera) industry, which had long existed in a small way in the North Island, 
successfully established in the South Island in the 1990s. Other animal industries 
such as ostriches and rabbits have failed and a number of new horticultural industries 
have only achieved modest success (calla lilies and persimmons). A search of 
published literature has failed to provide credible case study examinations of these 
poorer performing industries. 
 
Deer were introduced into conservation areas in New Zealand for sporting purposes 
early in the settlement of the country and, over a number of years, the population 
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grew to become considered an animal pest. The export of venison sourced from the 
wild developed in the 1960s and 1970s, giving way to a domestically farmed system 
from the late 1970s. McDermott et al. (2008, pp. v-vi) reviewed the factors that had 
led to the success of the industry. Initially, the venison was able to be marketed as a 
‘game’ animal from New Zealand, for which there were traditional venison markets 
in Europe. The development of an industry to farm deer required the support of 
government to legalise farming, as deer’s status as a pest initially prevented farming 
of the species. Once established, deer farmers developed a comparative production 
advantage through the development of productive and efficient farming systems often 
borrowing expertise from other farmed animal sectors. Further, the industry utilised 
the existing economies of scale in the processing and exporting sector and cooperated 
in the development of a marketing strategy and collective promotional funding. At 
the time of the report, the authors considered challenges to the industry to be the 
reliance on one large market (Germany) and difficulty in establishing brands. This 
has led to price volatility at times.   
  
The kiwifruit (Chinese gooseberry) has been grown in China for many years. The 
first seed was imported to New Zealand in 1904 and the Hayward variety was 
developed in New Zealand in 1925. The first domestic fruit was marketed in the early 
1940s with exports beginning to the United Kingdom in 1952 (Kilgour et al., 2008, p. 
3). Most of the early history of kiwifruit revolved around the development of 
production and processing that enhanced orchard productivity. A later development 
involved the creation of a brand (Zespri) and international marketing strategies. The 
export of kiwifruit to the world (except for Australia) is managed by Zespri, a 
producer marketing board
20
. In 2008, Kilgour et al. (pp v-vi) identified success 
factors in the industry around industry champions and management. They felt that 
growers and processors had shown a high level of innovation, developed a successful 
industry structure and obtained economies of scale. Market power has been obtained 
through branding, differentiation, value chain developments, market research, 
responsiveness to the market and information dissemination throughout the chain. 
Challenges to the industry involved the maintenance of government support for the 
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 In NZ the government historically created ‘producer marketing boards’, which have compulsorily 
acquired the entire product from an industry and marketed the product overseas. Most of these 
statutory bodies were eliminated in the 1990s, with the exception of Kiwifruit.  
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marketing board, developing future leadership, continually updating marketing 
strategies (including varieties) and ensuring effective business and scientific research 
and development activities. A current challenge to the industry is the introduction of 
strain 5 of the PSA (Pseudomonas syringae pv. actinidiae) bacteria in 2010. PSA 
causes kiwifruit vines to die and its introduction was a bio-security breach, which is a 
potential problem for all New Zealand agricultural industries.   
 
Wine grapes (Vitis vinifera) have been grown in New Zealand since European 
settlement. Stewart (2010, pp. 31-35) describes attempts to establish an industry, 
initially by New Zealand’s first “Official British Resident”, James Busby, in the 
1830s and later by Governor Gray in the 1870s. An industry did develop; however, 
the production of wine was only a minor industry as land use became dominated by 
animal agriculture. In fact, production dropped from 1.58 million litres of wine per 
year in the 1890s to 300,000 litres by 1910 due to the temperance movement (Stewart 
2010, pp. 170-171). Although growth in hectares of grape vines increased slowly 
over the following decades, the potential entry of Britain into EEC in the 1970s led 
agriculturalists to begin looking for alternatives to pastoral production in the 1960s. 
Grapes suited the lighter soil types on the warmer and drier east coast of the country. 
Individuals and corporations began to experiment with wine production and the 
industry experienced considerable expansion. By 2000, there were 10,197 hectares 
planted in grapes and 80,100 tonnes crushed to produce 60.2 m litres of wine. The 
contribution to the New Zealand economy from wine exports was $168 m in 2000. In 
2011, there were 33,600 hectares planted in grapes, 328,000 tonnes crushed and 235 
m litres of wine produced with an export value in excess of $1 b (New Zealand Wine 
Statistics 2011, p. 28). The major contributing factor to industry growth was the 
development of world class Sauvignon Blanc wines from the Marlborough region. In 
2011, Sauvignon Blanc accounted for 69% of New Zealand wine production and 80% 
of New Zealand wine exports (ibid, P. 5). However, growth of this magnitude has 
caused oversupply problems and grape prices have dropped from a peak of $2,022 
per tonne in 2006 to $1,172 in 2011 (ibid). As well as the profitability of the industry 
in the first decade of the current century, the “romance” of owning a vineyard/winery 
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cannot be discounted as a reason for growth (Stevens 2011, pers. comm.)
21
. The 
industry has a strong governance structure through the organization, New Zealand 
Winegrowers. 
4.9 Summary of Chapter 4 
It has been shown that most literature refers to an industry as a social system 
producing products that are close substitutes for each other in the market. New 
industries develop (often in clusters) due to “new combinations” and emerge due to 
the generic desire of societies to improve the standard of living and the specific drive 
and enthusiasm of convinced stalwarts. The success of a new industry is dependent 
upon combining a market demand with the factor conditions (resources, knowledge, 
capital and infrastructure) that give the industry a competitive advantage in producing 
a product. The development of a new industry is dependent upon innovation, which is 
the use of technology and market knowledge to meet market demand. Entrepreneurs 
are often given credit for bringing innovations to market, but in reality some authors 
have suggested that the development of innovations is reliant on the actions of many 
individuals and firms. It is noted that many of the references on industry development 
date from the 1980s and 1990s. The inability to find more current references on the 
subject indicates that there have been few advances in new information since that 
decade.  
 
In New Zealand agriculture the successful emergence and growth of a new industry is 
rare; however, deer, kiwifruit and wine grapes have been successful examples in the 
recent past. The literature on the development of new agricultural industries stresses 
the need to locate, develop and establish supply chains for marketing. The new 
industry also needs to solve production and processing problems through research. 
The development of a well-run, professional industry structure was also seen to be 
important. 
 
The development of an agricultural industry has characteristics which make it 
different from the ‘generic’ industries discussed previously. Often farmers in new 
industries are geographically dispersed and operate in isolation, rather than in clusters 
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as suggested by general theory. In addition, the farmer’s work place is often his 
home.  
 
The successful new agricultural industries in New Zealand have shown the common 
characteristics of rapid growth and the development of industry governance 
structures. The deer industry has been able to build on farming and processing 
technologies from other pastoral industries. The kiwifruit industry has had the 
advantage of ‘single desk seller’ legislation which allowed the development of a 
marketing structure and brand that have enhanced revenues. The wine grape industry 
has experienced significant growth predominantly through the creation of a new 
appellation (Marlborough sauvignon blanc), which commanded a significant 
premium until market saturation was reached. A smaller premium does still exist for 
Marlborough sauvignon blanc as compared to other white wines produced in New 
Zealand.  
 
From the growth figures in Chapter 2, it was established that the Canterbury dairy 
industry has also achieved rapid growth. In a manner similar to the deer industry, 
borrowing from other pastoral industries, Canterbury dairy farming has benefitted 
from the technologies available from an established industry. Like the kiwifruit 
industry, strong marketing structures appear to have been in place. However, unlike 
the wine industry the dairy industry produces a number of products, the majority of 
which are of a commodity nature and basic to human nutrition. This fact presents 
different demand conditions than exist for wine and gives the dairy industry the 
ability to produce different products to suit changing markets. 
 
 The above review of literature and discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 have suggested 
factors that may have been components in the development of the Canterbury dairy 
industry. These proposed factors are outlined in Figure 4.4., which becomes the 
‘theoretical lens’ through which the Canterbury dairy industry will be analysed.  
These factors take into account the importance of the industry being a social system 
which is influenced by Porter’s factors of infrastructure, chance events and 
government. The figure also acknowledges the importance of entrepreneurs and the 
role of innovation. The increased productivity and profitability achieved in 
Canterbury certainly was a contributing factor to the growth of the new industry.  
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It is likely that the development was influenced by innovation and new technologies. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Proposed factors in the development of the Canterbury dairy industry 
 
If innovation and new technologies were a necessary component in the growth of the 
Canterbury dairy industry, then a method for passing new knowledge, skills and 
techniques to farmers was required. This area is considered of such importance that 
further examination is required. The diffusion of innovation in agriculture has 
historically operated in the realm of government agencies and is commonly called 
extension. Since the economic reforms of the mid 1980s, this role has increasingly 
been assumed by industry and private organizations. A discussion of diffusion 
through extension follows in the next chapter. 
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     Chapter 5 
Diffusion and adoption of technology 
“Agriculture is a human activity—so why do we keep ignoring 
humans?” (Botha, pers. comm., April 2011)22 
5.1 Introduction 
Given the large number of small firms within the production sector of many 
agricultural industries, there are particular issues associated with the introduction and 
transfer of new technologies and new knowledge. Accordingly, this chapter reviews 
the theory of innovation diffusion, followed by a discussion of agricultural extension 
and its relevance to agricultural industry development.   
5.2 Definition of diffusion 
Rogers (2003, pp. 36-38) describes diffusion as the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system. A social change is defined as the process by which alteration occurs in the 
structure and function of a social system. Rogers (2003, pp. 28-29) categorises these 
new ideas or practices as being either optional (up to an individual), collective 
(decision of a social system), authoritarian (made by people with power) or 
contingent (individual adoption after a system makes a decision). 
 
Communication is often through a change agent who operates through opinion 
leaders in a group. The process usually involves an individual or group that has 
experience with an adoption and another that does not. The communication channel 
simply connects the two entities either interpersonally or via mass media. Most 
effective communication occurs when two individuals are similar (homophilous); 
however one of the most distinctive problems in communication is that participants 
are usually quite different (heterophilous) (Rogers, 2003 p. 9).    
 
A social system is defined by Rogers (2003, p. 19) as a set of interrelated units that 
are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The structure of 
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a social system can facilitate or impede the diffusion of innovations. The change 
agent is the individual who influences a client’s innovation decisions in a direction 
deemed desirable by a change agency—the change agent uses opinion leaders who 
are often well trained professionals. In some cases they seek to secure the adoption of 
a new idea, in others they try to prevent adoption of certain innovations. Opinion 
leaders are the members of a social system capable of influencing the attitudes of 
others and tend to be the centre of interpersonal communication networks.  
 
Several commentators have discussed the rate of adoption. Scheuing (1989, p. 307) 
suggests the importance of the innovation’s relative advantage over competing 
products, its compatibility with the lifestyle of the prospective innovator, its 
complexity and ease of use, the ability to trial the innovation on a limited scale and 
the ease with which its benefits could be observed. Di Benedetto (2010, p. 113) added 
that a good experience by users will influence later users through ‘word-of- mouth’. 
 
To accomplish the diffusion of innovations which increase agricultural productivity 
or the development of new industries, social systems must provide information. In 
agriculture the systems that provide information are commonly referred to as 
‘extension’. 
5.3 Extension theory in agriculture 
Extension is about the transfer of technology. Roling (1988, p. 39) cites Zuurbier 
(1984) in defining extension as providing information to assist the individual to 
clarify and achieve their own goals, or to achieve change through empowering the 
poor. He defined extension as an activity with elements that involve: 
 
                 “1) an intervention; 
                   2) communication as its instrument to induce change; 
                   3) effective only through voluntary change; 
                   4) a number of different target processes and outcomes which                   
distinguish it from other communication interventions; 
                   5) deployed by an institution.” 
 
 Because of the perception of public good for many elements of agricultural 
knowledge and the high transaction costs involved, agricultural extension services 
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have been one of the most common forms of public-sector support of knowledge and 
innovation diffusion (Birkhaeuser, Evenson and Feder 1991, p. 608).  
 
The most common method in agriculture has been the ‘linear or technology push 
model’, whereby scientists define which aspects of farming should be studied and 
provide solutions which are passed on to farmers through a process of extension by 
specialist educators (Morris, Loveridge and Fairweather 1995, p. 4). Fairweather et 
al., (2011, p. 163) state that “since the linear model is like a pipeline from R & D to 
uptake, the assumption is that enhancement of R & D inputs will lead to an increase 
of innovation outputs”. However, Fairweather et al. (ibid) quote empirical evidence 
from Kline and Rosenberg (1986) that many innovations do not originate with 
scientists but from other participants. Fairweather et al. (ibid) refers to this 
phenomenon as ‘market pull’ or ‘user innovation’. This view is supported by Flowers 
(2011, p. 5) who states that “it is the users of a product (rather than its suppliers) who 
have the insights and ideas that lead to innovative products and services”.   
 
The linear model of extension was traditionally used by many government agencies. 
However, the economic restructuring of a number of world economies in the mid- 
1980s reduced the level of support for public extension in a number of countries 
(Scrimgeour 1993, p. 35). Feller (1987, p. 315) when speaking of the U.S. 
Cooperative Extension Service, pointed out that change had occurred both 
technologically and economically in US agriculture which resulted in questioning the 
role of public sector spending on agricultural extension. These changes included 
(Feller, ibid):  
 
“Increased complexity of agricultural production with; production being 
concentrated in a small number of farms; availability to farmers of multiple 
information sources; increased educational levels of farmers; and the 
bypassing of county agents
23
 by producers who seek direct contact with 
extension specialists or researchers.” 
 
Coutts (1994, p. 10) referred to Bennet (1992) who questioned the traditional role of 
extension agents as advocates of the adoption of innovations (in a one-on-one 
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situation) and suggested that they become facilitators of education. This new 
paradigm, as described by Coutts (1994, pp. 3-4), involves at one end of the 
spectrum, “persuasive extension” and at the other end “facilitative extension”. 
Persuasive implies that there is a predetermined “correct course of action” that needs 
to be taken by extension’s target. The role of facilitative extension is to influence 
voluntary behaviour so that the innovation is adopted. Facilitative extension is 
designed so that given the right conditions, information, mutual interaction and 
opportunity; people develop solutions for a problem. Roling commented (1988, pp. 
20-21) that as the “bottlenecks to agricultural production” are removed by improved 
marketing, banking, infrastructure, land tenure and input delivery; the growth of 
productivity becomes more technology driven. This is directly dependent on new 
extension methods that rely on “the synergistic functioning of research, extension and 
education”.  
 
Coutts (1994, p. 28) speaks of the need to maintain “commercial advantage” in a user 
pay environment for extension services and the potential to restrict the free flow of 
information. He comments that a problem with the privatization of extension services 
is that privatization forces staff to search for “knowledge products” which can be sold 
to farmers. Hoag (2005, p. 7) adds that a clear advantage of publicly funded extension 
is “a reputation for delivering high quality, research-based, unbiased information”. 
5.4 The historical context of extension in New Zealand 
Morris, Loveridge and Fairweather (1995, p. 6) state that the New Zealand 
Department of Agriculture was formed in 1892. Nightingale (1992, p. 37) quotes the 
department’s mission as being “to collect and distribute information on subjects 
connected with agriculture among the settlers by means of lectures and pamphlets, 
and generally to study and promote the welfare of the farming community”. Among 
its duties was the employment of instructors in farming techniques. By the 1920s, the 
extension service had grown large enough to allow face-to-face consultation with 
farmers as well as the provision of pamphlets and reports and this dominated the 
activities of the department (ibid, p. 62). However, an attempt to operate 
experimental farms in the North Island was abandoned in 1922 due to the expense of 
operating the farms and dissatisfaction with the extension results (ibid, p. 69). 
Scrimgeour, Gibson and O’Neil (1991, pp. 2-3) note that in 1973 there were 600 
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extension workers in New Zealand, 68% provided by government. The New Zealand 
Dairy Board provided a consultancy service through a levy on dairy farmer incomes 
and sheep/beef farmers had a variety of sources of information including the Ministry 
of Agriculture advisers. Dairy Board personnel spent about 20% of their time on 
‘face-to-face’ consultancy, with the balance of their time spent with discussion 
groups.  
 
During the restructuring of the New Zealand economy in 1984-87, the role of the 
government in agriculture was reduced (Scrimgeour 1993, p. 35). As a result, the 
Ministry of Agriculture was split into a number of new entities with the extension 
role changed to a ‘user pay’ system. This resulted in a reduction in the number of 
advisors and clients, as some farmers could not/would not pay for the service. The 
division was renamed Agriculture NZ and eventually sold to a corporation. 
  
A survey of 100 Waikato farmers by Scrimgeour, Gibson and O’Neil after the 
restructuring (1991, pp. 10-16) found that although 40% thought there should be a 
free extension service, 46% felt that it was inappropriate. Two thirds used non-MAF 
personnel, with most saying that MAF’s role should be in responding to adverse 
events, research, regulation and protection.    
 
The results of the restructuring were a change in the delivery of extension in New 
Zealand. Walker (1993, pp. 126-129) stated that there became four distinct, though 
inter-related, practices of extension which he summarised as follows: 
 
“facilitation - the achievement of government objectives through the 
identification and promotion of opportunities to intermediaries who 
then service farmers, 
 
extension - assisted learning through farmer groups such as the NZ 
Dairy Board, NZ Wool Board, NZ Meat Board, 
 
technology transfer - communicating new practices to farmers usually 
through mass media by Crown Research Institutes, Universities and 
local government.  
 
consultancy---advice to fee-paying clients by private organizations.” 
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This model was expanded by Botha and Coutts (2006, p. 10) to include: group 
facilitation, training, technology development, information access and individual 
consultant and mentor. 
 
The change from a publicly funded extension service led Paine (1997, p. 37), to 
comment that “although the linear model was the pre-eminent theoretical framework 
for extensionists in the early 1970s, it was found wanting when confronted with the 
management of extension services in privatised economies”.  
 
For the past 20 years, the majority of New Zealand’s agricultural and horticultural 
industries have made use of the Commodity Levies Act 1990 (Greer, Zwart 2010). 
Through the collection of levies, industries can develop structures for promoting 
research and development. These producer accessed funds are often used to attract 
additional public funding. Currently, dairy farmers pay a levy of 3.6 cents per 
kilogram of milksolids processed from a farm and meat producers pay 55 cents per 
head of sheep and $4.20 per head of cattle supplied to processors. 
5.5 Research about the adoption of innovation in the 
agricultural sector  
If it is accepted that innovation is necessary for an agricultural system to grow and 
develop and that this innovation is transferred through extension, then it is 
appropriate to review research on the adoption of innovation in agriculture. 
 
Botha and Coutts (2006, p. 11) suggest that “the adoption process is a series of 
different stages of mind that an individual goes through up to a point where they 
make a decision”. A potential adoptee moves from ignorance to awareness/interest. 
From this point they can test and/or perform comparisons, with the result being either 
adoption or rejection.  
 
Oreszczyn, Lane and Carr (2010, p. 12), have stated that farmers constantly cope with 
significant amounts of new knowledge. Their learning about new technologies occurs 
in a complex social learning system (or web), where they rely on their own 
experience while interacting with other farmers and a network of “influencers” which 
includes a wide variety of individuals and groups. For example, they found over 50 
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potential influencers on crop farmers considering genetically modified crops in 
England (ibid, p. 7).   
 
Massey et al. (2004, p. 2) found that adoption is likely to be faster with young, better 
educated farmers who are willing to break with tradition. Adoption will also be 
quicker on larger, profitable farms which are in a position to access economic 
resources and with successful adoptions in the past. To be successful the extension 
delivery system needs to include credible individuals who can communicate the 
advantages of an adoption. Farmers will pay for information, but they need to see a 
return. Massey (ibid) suggested that management intensive innovations are more 
readily accepted than capital intensive innovations. Gray, Parker and Kemp (2003, 
pp. 116-119) found that learning about innovations was most likely stimulated by 
either extreme conditions or the introduction of a new practice. 
 
Morris, Loveridge and Fairweather (1995, pp. 123-127) state that to reach farmers, an 
extension system must appeal to the farmer’s orientation (production, profit and/or 
monitoring) and demonstrate what is considered to be best practice, preferably with 
farmer involvement in demonstration farms or field days. However, Holmes (2006, p. 
47) suggests that commercial farmers are better than researchers and extension 
personnel at operating dairy systems. He adds that dairy extension officers should 
consult the most successful dairy farmers in their district, study their methods and 
pass on information about these methods to as many other dairy farmers as possible.  
 
A look at the characteristics of innovations is also helpful in explaining the different 
rates of adoption and is discussed by several authors (Nuthall 2010, p. 91, Flett 2003, 
p. 2). Issues such as the compatibility of the innovation with existing systems are 
important for adoption along with the past experiences and the needs of the potential 
adopter. A complex innovation is less likely to be adopted, particularly if the 
potential adopter cannot trial the product on a small scale himself. Equally important 
is the degree to which the results from an innovation are visible to others. These 
factors will sometimes cause non-adoption even though economic analysis suggests 
that it should be profitable.  
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Several examples illustrate this point. Nitrification inhibitors have been proven to 
have positive environmental and economic benefits to dairy farmers (Moir, Cameron, 
Di 2007). Despite a large investment in research and testing, farmer uptake has been 
slow due to the product being complex to use and the difficulty of measuring the 
results (Smith
24
 pers. comm., January 2011). Likewise, Alvarez and Nuthall (2006, 
pp. 48-60) commented that the adoption of computers as a key component in farm 
management had not been as significant as they expected. They suggested that 
adoption is dependent upon farmer attributes such as objectives, personality, 
education, skills, current information management processes and learning style. 
Additionally, they stress that software designers need to work with farmers in design, 
training and support (user innovation). Perhaps, in both examples, farmers could not 
readily see the potential to increase profitability and thus adoption was restricted. 
5.6 Effectiveness of agricultural extension 
Birkhaeuser et al. (1991) reviewed 48 studies on the impact of agricultural extension 
in crop farming in the U.S. They concluded that in the majority of cases there were 
significant and positive extension effects, although they noted that in a number of the 
case studies results were variable amongst different crops. Hoag (2005, pp. 3-5) 
promotes the attributes of publically funded extension on a number of fronts. First, he 
states that the public sector is more likely than the private sector to address issues like 
natural resources, information availability and risk. Secondly, he cites research by 
Alston et al. (2000) on the returns from research and extension which showed a rate 
of return for investment in research of 87% and 30% for extension. Finally, in the 
context of the United States, he notes that there is a multiplier of two for funds 
invested by the federal government in extension through productivity gains and the 
business activities of the local extension office.    
5.7 Summary 
In Chapter 4 the definition of an industry in general was considered as well as the 
importance of innovation and the role of entrepreneurs. The development of three 
new agricultural industries in particular, was also briefly reviewed. It was suggested 
                                                 
24
 Daniel Smith completed a Master of Applied Science at Lincoln University in 2011. His dissertation 
involved interviewing 100 dairy farmers in the South Island of New Zealand about their reasons for 
the adoption or non-adoption of the nitrification inhibitor, EcoN. 
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that for the Canterbury dairy industry to develop and grow there needed to be a 
significant level of extension to increase farmers’ knowledge, skills and techniques. 
Since innovation has previously been highlighted as being important to industry 
development, a review of diffusion/extension was considered important when 
discussing industry development in agriculture.  
 
The review of diffusion theory provided the definition that diffusion is “the process 
by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among 
the members of a social system” (Rogers 2003, p. 5). This has been discussed in the 
context of the history of agricultural extension in New Zealand. Originally driven and 
funded by government and featuring ‘one-on-one’ advising, the system now relies on 
extension personnel becoming educators, with ‘one-on-one’ methods being handled 
by the private sector. Research was also cited in regard to the adoptive capacity of 
New Zealand farmers. American research on the effectiveness of extension proposes 
a high return on investment. 
 
 Extension appears to be one of the factors that may have contributed to Canterbury’s 
dairy industry development and further develops the possible answers for Research 
Question Three. Important aspects of diffusion/extension theory adopted in the dairy 
industry are the use of change agents (consulting officers) working through opinion 
leaders (respected farmers). The role of the change agents has been to introduce new 
innovations and to communicate ‘best practice’. Historically, the change agency has 
been the New Zealand Dairy Board and, to some extent, the New Zealand 
government. The extension model currently operated by the farmer levy funded 
DairyNZ works in several ways. Discussion groups are a form of co-learning 
whereby farmers learn from each other through the facilitation of DNZ consulting 
officers. In addition, DairyNZ scientists and business managers conduct research 
which is transferred through consulting officers, demonstration farms, publications 
and/or websites.  
 
Questions that have arisen from this chapter are whether extension activities have 
become less prescriptive and more facilitative. Has the resurgence of demonstration 
farms in dairying areas increased technology transfer? And, how important have 
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private consultants been to the development of the Canterbury industry? All of these 
areas need further research.   
 
However, having the appropriate factors like extension services in place does not 
necessarily guarantee the development of a new industry. The emergence of the 
Canterbury dairy industry is also about a change in land use within an existing 
industry (agriculture). For an industry that existed in other locations, the existing 
knowledge and infrastructure could be a factor influencing the development. To 
proceed further it is appropriate to gain an insight into the history of New Zealand 
agriculture and the development of the New Zealand dairy industry. Insights gained 
through this review should provide more factors and illuminate possible drivers of 
growth. 
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     Chapter 6 History of agriculture and dairy 
farming in  
New Zealand 
“The history of economic development shows that few countries have achieved 
sustained economic growth without first, or simultaneously, developing their 
agricultural sector. In most developing countries agriculture is the most 
important economic activity providing income, employment and foreign 
exchange” (Birkhaeuser, Evenson and Feder, 1991, p. 607).  
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the nature, development and present situation 
for New Zealand agriculture, in general, and the dairy industry, in particular. A 
review of the past may provide additional factors influencing industry development 
and suggests drivers for the growth of the Canterbury dairy industry. The review is 
undertaken using the theoretical lens developed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
6.2 A brief history of New Zealand agriculture 
International trade has been a vital element in the development of New Zealand since 
the arrival of the first European settlers. Since the 1870s, the agricultural sector has 
been a major contributor to the export income of New Zealand. Wool was the first 
significant export and, after the introduction of refrigerated shipping in the early 
1880s, meat and dairy products were exported (Sheppard 1993, p. 1). 
 
Technological innovations have been a part of the growth and prosperity of farming. 
These changes have included the replacement of native vegetation by exotic grasses 
in the 40 year period leading up to the start of the First World War (WW1). The use 
of superphosphate, lime and trace elements allowed for the intensification of land use 
on flat land or low hill country between WW1 and the depression of the 1930s. After 
the Second World War (WW2), the application of superphosphate to hill country 
pastures was possible due to the advent of aerial topdressing
25
 (Sheppard 1993, p. 1). 
 
                                                 
25
 Aerial topdressing is the use of airplanes to apply of fertiliser to land that is not topographically 
suited to wheeled vehicles. 
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In 1960, New Zealand was debt free and enjoyed a standard of living ranked in the 
top three of OECD nations (Rayner, 1990, pp. 13-14). This position steadily declined 
as government economic policies protected farm incomes from declining export 
prices through subsidies; labour markets were regulated; and the government invested 
heavily in projects to reduce national dependence on expensive energy imports. Rae, 
Nixon and Lattimore (2004, p. 4) state that the producer support estimate (PSE)
26
, as 
measured for New Zealand agriculture peaked at 35% in 1983, and was almost 
identical to that of the European Union.  
 
By 1984, a number of economic problems had become acute for New Zealand. The 
fiscal deficit had reached 9% of GDP, servicing the public debt accounted for 15% of 
public expenditure, a current account external deficit problem persisted, the exchange 
rate (fixed) was over-valued and ‘loose’ monetary policy had led to excessive 
monetary growth. National debt servicing costs rose to 50% of GDP. Heavy selling of 
the New Zealand dollar, threatened to exhaust the country’s foreign reserves (Rayner, 
1990, pp. 13-24). 
 
A Labour government was elected in 1984 and immediately embarked upon a 
programme to deregulate the New Zealand economy. The new government faced a 
foreign exchange crisis as the country’s private and public debt had reached 95 per 
cent of GDP. This resulted in a downgrade of the country’s sovereign debt (Evans 
2004, p. 4). Initially, the new government devalued the New Zealand dollar by 20% 
and, in 1985, the dollar was floated. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was given 
the mandate to restrict inflation to within a 0 to 2% range (Rae, Nixon, Lattimore 
2004, p.5). Agricultural support was discontinued and export assistance programmes 
ceased. Other policies adopted over time were: the removal of wage and price freeze 
mechanisms, financial market deregulation, the rate of import protection was 
lowered, government trading entities were corporatised (including agricultural 
extension) and direct taxation rates lowered (however, a type of value added tax was 
instituted)
27
. 
 
                                                 
26
 The PSE measures the percentage of the value of (assisted) output that is provided by various 
governments’ agricultural assistance programmes. 
 
27
 New Zealand also abolished death duties (estate tax) in 1992. 
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 The effects on the agricultural sector were an appreciating exchange rate, interest 
rates in excess of 20%, a cost price squeeze, reduced land prices and thus reduced 
levels of equity. According to Rae, Nixon and Lattimore (2004, p. 5), the PSE for 
New Zealand agriculture reduced to 9% in 1987 and to 2% by 1994. Subsidies to 
agriculture reduced from $1.2 billion in 1983 to $116 million by 1993 (Paine 1997, p. 
1). From 1986 to 2001 the number of farmers decreased from 71,000 to 52,000 and 
the number of farm workers from 144,000 to 129,000 (Rae et al., 2004, p. 14).  
 
From 1986-87 to 2002-03 (following the reforms of 1984-85) the contribution of 
agribusiness
28
 to GDP rose from 14.2 per cent to an estimated 16.5 per cent and, 
combined with forestry contributed around 20 per cent of GDP (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, p. 5). The MAF (ibid) estimated that the total output gain in 
agricultural productivity was 2.1% per annum for the period 1985 to 2002, as 
compared to 1.1% for the period from 1972 to 1984. More current statistics from 
Federated Farmers stated that “inside the farm gate” agriculture contributes 5% of 
GDP and, if processing is taken into account, the contribution is 15% (Federated 
Farmers 2011).  
 
There have been changes in the relative importance of the major agricultural 
industries. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 provide a summary of data found in Appendix 
C1. Between 1991 and 2009, returns from the dairy industry have grown by 4-fold 
and the meat industry 2-fold, but the wool industry has decreased by 40%. These 
statistics point to an increasing dairy industry, but a decreasing sheep industry due to 
the loss of revenue from wool. From 1985-86 to 2008-08, tonnes of wool produced 
decreased by 43% and tonnes of lamb exported by 26% (Appendix C2). The lack of 
profitability in wool has led to a reduction in the importance of wool from 40% of a 
sheep/cattle farmer’s gross income to 14% (Appendix Table C3).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 In agriculture, agribusiness is a generic term for the various businesses involved in food production, 
including farming and contract farming, seed supply, agrichemicals, farm machinery, wholesale and 
distribution, processing, marketing and retail sales. 
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Table 6.1 Dollar value (nominal) of NZ exports by sector (1991 to 2009) 
 
 Wool 
(000,000) 
Meat 
(000,000) 
Dairy 
(000,000) 
Other 
animal 
(000,000) 
Livestock 
(000,000) 
Total 
pastoral 
(000,000) 
1991 963 2,612 2,420 682 179 6,855 
1994 1,253 2,663 3,257 853 141 8,157 
1998 915 2,941 4,302 711 140 9,008 
2001 886 4,260 7,128 886 154 13,313 
2004 740 4,532 5,992 697 182 12,143 
2009 569 5,668 10,026 741 163 17,166 
 
Source : Compilation from Meat and Wool New Zealand Economic Service (Gonzalez-Macuer 2010) 
 
 
 
Source: Compilation from Meat and Wool New Zealand Economic Service (Gonzalez-Macuer 2010) 
 
Figure 6.1 Income (nominal) from the dairy, meat and wool industries (1991-2009)   
 
When returns for agricultural commodities are converted to indices with a base year 
of 1980, it can be seen that all prices have dropped. However, lamb prices per kg and 
milksolids prices per kg have followed the same trend and dropped to a lesser extent 
relative to beef, wheat and wool. Beef prices have been volatile and, at times, the 
index price has been closer to lamb and dairy prices. Wheat trended downwards until 
the mid-2000s when prices rose, only to drop during the world economic crisis in 
2008-09. Inflation adjusted wool prices have decreased to approximately 25% of the 
returns achieved in 1980. 
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Source: Compiled from statistics available from Meat and Wool New Zealand Economic Service, Dairy 
Statistics and NZX Agri (2010).  
 
Figure 6.2 Inflation adjusted agricultural commodity indices (base year 1980) 
6.3 The development of a dairy industry in New Zealand 
“Dairy farming in New Zealand has emerged from a mix of changing cultural, 
economic and technological forces operating on the land and its people” (Paine 
1997, p. 79). 
 
The history of the dairy industry in New Zealand reflects the growth and 
development of New Zealand for some periods. Reviews by Ward (1975), Conforte, 
et al. (2008), Duncan (1933), LIC (1985-86 to 2007-08), Nightingale (1992), Nayga 
& Mtonga (1994) and the annual reports of the New Zealand Dairy Board (1975-00) 
and the New Zealand Dairy Board Dairy Products Division (1970-85) make this point 
clear. Furthermore, these authors and other reports, provide a synopsis of industry 
growth and development, as presented below. 
 
The Reverend Samuel Marsden is generally given credit for introducing dairy cattle 
to New Zealand in 1814 at his mission in the Bay of Islands, Northland. Over the 
next few decades cattle numbers grew and by the 1840s there were numerous small 
herds of Shorthorn (Durham) cows spread throughout the country. The first Jerseys 
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were imported in 1862 and Friesians in 1864. The Shorthorn remained the dominant 
breed until the 1920s, when post war demand for butter made the higher butterfat 
Jersey more popular (Ward 1975). 
 
Ward (1975, p. 3) cites Clark (1949) in saying that by 1857 there were 18 dairies on 
the Akaroa Peninsula and cheese and butter were being exported to Australia. 
Without refrigerated transport, the cheese was heavily insulated in hogsheads
29
 or 
boxes and the butter was packed in crocks or tubs in brine alone or heavily salted. 
Exports to Australia were 1,889 kilograms of butter and 2,347 kilograms of cheese in 
1859 (Ward 1975, p. 4). Over the next twenty years exports were sporadic, depending 
upon population increases, climatic conditions and the world economy.  
 
Initial manufacturing was concentrated ‘on-farm’. In 1871, the first cooperative was 
established near Dunedin as the Otago Peninsula Cheese Factory (Ward 1975, p. 5). 
By 1881 the government had become involved in the dairy industry offering a 500 
pound bonus for the first factory to export either 25 empirical tons of butter or 50 
empirical tons of cheese
30
. The prize was won by the Edendale factory near 
Invercargill, which exported 50 tons of cheese in the 1882-83 season. Edendale at 
that time was a proprietary company, but became a cooperative in 1903. Ward (1975, 
p. 5) states that early government policy was to, “Stimulate factory production at the 
expense of farm or home manufacture, where quality was less easy to control”. In 
1888, the Department of Agriculture appointed an ‘inspector’ to visit factories and 
offer advice on management (Nightingale 1992, p. 30). 
 
The government policy was to promote cooperative factories, although proprietary 
ownership was not to be discouraged. However, the Department of Agriculture 
actively encouraged cooperatives (Nightingale 1992, p. 45) as a “way of overcoming 
mistrust between producers and processors” and to help solve the industry’s 
“organisational and quality problems” (ibid, p. 48). This second stage of industry 
development (factories vs. farm manufacture) was assisted by the development of 
refrigerated shipping in the early 1880s. Companies soon learned that export markets 
demanded higher quality product than the domestic market and quality control issues 
                                                 
29
 A hogshead is a large cask of a liquid or food, usually of a specific volume. 
30
 an empirical ton is roughly equivalent to a metric tonne 
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became important over the next decade. Factories in the Waikato formed an 
organization called the Waikato Dairy Factories Association in 1885 and, in 1890; the 
New Zealand Middle Island Dairy Association was formed in Dunedin. These 
organizations were designed to “watch and promote common interests of the dairy 
industry” (Ward 1975, p. 7). The Middle Island Association was expanded to form 
the South Island Dairy Association (SIDA) in 1891 and a number of North Island 
associations formed the National Dairy Association (NDA) in 1894. These 
associations became the dairy industry representative bodies until their role was taken 
over by the Dairy Control Board in 1924.     
 
The Dairy Industry Act of 1892 regulated the manufacture of butter and cheese for 
export and provided for the purity of the milk used in its manufacture. The second 
Dairy Industry Act of 1894 gave the Department of Agriculture the power to inspect 
dairy farm and factory premises, to grade the product and to ensure the quality of the 
product and its packaging (Ward 1975). 
 
The influence of proprietary companies in the establishment of the industry was 
important. There were 124 dairy factories in 1894, with just under 40% cooperatively 
owned (Ward 1975, p. 8). The raising of capital to build a factory was a major 
obstacle; however, this was much more easily accomplished nearer to settlements by 
proprietary investors. In more outlying areas, cooperatives were more common, but 
often needed ‘dry shareholders’ from the local business community to commence 
business.  
 
Two prominent proprietors involved in the establishment of butter and cheese 
factories were Chew Chong in Taranaki and Henry Reynolds in the Waikato. Chong 
was a merchant and established a factory which stressed quality control. Reynolds 
also owned a factory and is credited with the establishment of the sharemilking 
system. Although both prospered in their early years, they eventually sold to 
cooperatives due to competitive pressures making it difficult to maintain supply. 
Ward (1975, p. 13) wrote,  
 
“While admitting the force of the cooperative movement and recognising the 
soundness of the principle underlying it, one should not forget that the 
industry owes much to the enterprise of the factory proprietors. While so-
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called cooperation had started the factory system and brought it to a standstill 
through bad management it was the syndicator who stepped in, bought up the 
discredited factories and built new ones, offered the public a fair price for 
their milk and put the industry on a sound financial basis.” 
 
Eventually, the financial position of the cooperatives was strengthened by 
competition for their product from overseas importing houses. Ward (1975, pp. 7-8) 
commented on farmer’s preference for cooperatives:   
 
“The dairy farmer preferred the in-built reassurance of a factory where he and 
his fellow farmers elected and controlled the directorate through their 
shareholding. The dairy farmer was cautious of outside help from authorities 
or commercial interests. He was suspicious, frequently unnecessarily and 
ungenerously so, of approaches from, or commitments to those interests. He 
was slow to make business friends other than those with whom he had worked 
and of whose integrity he could be sure. He developed a suspicion of city and 
urban interests as not being allied to his own, and believed they were seeking 
more than a fair share of his hard-won livelihood. Consequently he sought 
through his cooperatives and district association to secure as much of the 
selling price of his produce as was possible. He needed this for his own 
meagre living and for his farm’s future development.”  
 
By the turn of the century, cow numbers were 350,000 and Great Britain was taking 
85% (8,500 tons) of the butter and 75% (370 tons) of the cheese produced in New 
Zealand (Ward 1975, p. 18). This period saw a change in marketing from selling the 
product in New Zealand to be exported, to sending the product to Britain to be sold 
by importing houses (referred to as Tooley Street) on commission. The government 
became more involved, sponsoring annual conferences and setting up further systems 
for quality control. By 1910, cow numbers had reached 600,000 (Ward, p. 25). 
 
Innovation and technology development have long been a part of dairying. For 
suppliers to butter factories, the home separation of cream became a widely adopted 
technology, with 70% of suppliers owning separators in 1918 (Ward pp. 28-29). 
Although the innovation allowed the growth of a pig industry fed on the skim milk 
and reduced transport costs, it also contributed to quality problems. The adoption of 
milking machines (35-40% of the cows milked by 1913-14) increased quality 
problems due to poor maintenance of the machines on farm. Although herd testing 
schemes had been available to pedigree breeders from the turn of the century the 
service was not available to commercial herds until 1922-23. The production of 
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casein and lactose began in the ‘teens’ and in 1918-19 the first dried milk was 
produced. The adoption of these technologies allowed for larger, higher producing 
herds with the development of new products giving marketers a broader product 
range to sell. 
 
During the First World War (1914-18), the government of Great Britain 
“commandeered” the total supply of New Zealand dairy products - this lasted until 
1920 for cheese and 1921 for butter (Ward, 1975, pp. 33-42). The prices offered were 
usually lower than the market. Ward estimated that in 1915 alone the compulsory 
purchase cost NZ £250,000
31
 in lost revenues. However the system did provide 
security to New Zealand, as the price was ‘free on board’ (F.O.B) which protected 
New Zealand from the uncertainties of shipping during the war.  
 
Finance became an issue in the 1920s as the Associated Banks released a circular 
which stated,  
 
“Any new dairy factory being formed or any existing company requiring 
further accommodation in connection with its land, building and equipment 
must at the outset put up 24% in cash before a bank will make an advance. It 
was also required that capital should be subscribed equal to two thirds of the 
advance required, or of any subsequent advance; and that 1pence/ lb butterfat 
should be withheld from the suppliers annually; that full permissible 
depreciation be written off and the amount be applied in permanent reduction 
of the overdraft limit; and that all advances be secured by joint and several 
guarantees of suppliers and by security over all the assets of the company” 
(Ward 1975, p. 46).  
 
Due to market instability in September of 1922, the industry requested that the 
government form a “Control Board” to organise a compulsory pool for the export 
marketing of dairy produce. This was met by opposition from the proprietary 
companies, Tooley Street and even some of the cooperatives; however it had the 
support of the large New Zealand Dairy Association (NZDA). The Dairy Produce 
Export Control Act was passed by parliament in August of 1923. Initially sales in 
Great Britain were through the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) and some 
Tooley Street firms. This effort at ‘absolute control’ involved selling products at a 
                                                 
31
  Using the NZ Reserve Bank Calculator, this is equivalent to $33.3 million dollars in 2010 constant 
value dollars.  Sourced from: www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/0135595.html  
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fixed price and if the merchants were unable to sell the quantity shipped to them 
within a specified timeframe, the product would be transferred to another merchant. 
The policy caused sales to fall as merchants moved to other suppliers and a stockpile 
of New Zealand product developed in Great Britain. Eventually in March 1927, the 
Board instructed the London Agency of the Control Board to clear all stocks by the 
end of June. Ward (1975, p. 68) reported that “sales could not be made quickly 
enough” and in the first week 100,000 boxes of butter and 50,000 crates of cheese 
were sold to merchants and shops who had run their stocks to low levels. This 
marketing disaster led to the industry reverting to the ‘free market’ to establish prices 
until the early 1930s. The Control Board remained in existence until 1935, but only to 
conduct administrative functions. During this period most products were sold to 
Tooley Street merchants, although NZDA sold about 30% of the industry’s butter and 
12,000 tons of cheese through their own outlets (Ward, p. 74). 
 
A drop in prices of 50% occurred in the 1930s due to increased agricultural 
protectionism, increased production from New Zealand and the effects of the 
worldwide depression. However, other agricultural sector prices fell to a greater 
extent so there was an upturn in milk suppliers, increasing from 55,000 in 1924 to 
70,000 in 1933 with cow numbers increasing by 500,000 to approximately 1,800,000 
(Ward 1975, p. 82). Adding cows to an existing farming system was a much needed 
source of income for many struggling farmers. 
 
Duncan (1933, p. 1) recorded that in 1933 there were 534 registered factories, of 
which 499 were cooperatives and 35 proprietary. These factories exported 117,783 
empirical tons of butter and 94,635 empirical tons of cheese. Duncan (ibid) stated that 
the growth of the New Zealand dairy industry was due to “natural and climatic 
advantages, the application of mechanical refrigeration to ocean steamers, the 
application of science to the manufacture of dairy produce and the progressive spirit 
of the New Zealand dairy farming community”.  
 
In 1935, the Labour Party was elected to govern New Zealand. The party had 
campaigned on a policy of guaranteed prices for cheese and butter. With the 
government guaranteeing price, the government was also obliged to market the 
product - this was the launch of the first major state trading department. Some staff 
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members from the Dairy Control Board were transferred to the “Primary Products 
Marketing Department” (PPMD), with the Dairy Control Board becoming the New 
Zealand Dairy Board. The PPMD only handled cheese and butter, with the companies 
(primarily NZDA, which was now called NZCDC) handling powder, casein and other 
products. The New Zealand Dairy Board adopted an administrative role organizing 
the annual Dominion Dairy Conference, controlling the supply areas for the factories, 
sponsoring research, herd testing and herd improvement. 
 
Although similar to the failed “absolute control” programme of the 1920s; under the 
guaranteed price scheme there was no attempt to fix prices by the government. 
Tooley Street merchants were used as agents, but received their allocations from the 
PPMD. Under the guaranteed price scheme a milk price to farmers was set each year 
by the government in consultation with the industry. This resulted in annual 
negotiations to fix the price based on farm costs and relativities between rural and 
urban conditions.  
 
Ward (1975, p. 100) noted that economist John Maynard Keynes criticised the 
guaranteed price scheme, stating that: 
 
“The plan is unsound on the grounds that a domestic price for producers of 
goods selling on an international market should not be isolated—or 
insulated—from the effects of the market place, and from the relative incomes 
of groups of others exporters or traders. Under guaranteed prices this would 
tend to occur and would lead to subsidisation of one selected group of farmers 
irrespective of the desirable competitive forces of the prices in the market 
place.” 
 
After the Second World War was declared in September, 1939, conditions of 
marketing changed. The United Kingdom government became the sole purchaser of 
imported foodstuffs and the PPMD in New Zealand became the authority responsible 
for the purchase and shipment of dairy products. Prices to farmers were basically 
frozen throughout the war. After the war a ‘bulk purchase’ agreement for dairy 
products was signed by New Zealand and the United Kingdom. With guaranteed 
prices and bulk purchase, a system of cost adjustment and economic stabilisation 
developed. Under this scenario, the industry had an account with the Reserve Bank 
(Dairy Industry Stabilisation Account), which was either in credit or debit depending 
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upon the prices received and the amount paid to farmers. The effects of wars, bulk 
purchases and guaranteed prices although positive from a stability point of view - in 
fact led to only modest growth in production over the decades involved. The Labour 
government promised that ‘efficient’ dairy farmers would achieve a reasonable 
standard of living, however research by the Department of Science and Industrial 
Research
32
 in 1936 found that many dairy farmers lived in poverty (Nightingale, 
1992, p. 232). 
 
During the 1940s the Herd Improvement Department of the Dairy Board established 
a progeny testing service for young sires and the Ruakura Research Centre developed 
artificial insemination. Vaccine was imported to control ‘contagious abortion’ 
(Brucellosis). A Consulting Officer Service was initiated and the Society of Animal 
Production was formed. The dairy industry was instrumental in establishing 
Veterinary Clubs throughout the country (Ward 1975, pp115-118). 
 
In 1948, control of exports moved from the PPMD to the Dairy Products Marketing 
Commission. A seven year agreement (1948-49 to 1954-55) was signed with the 
United Kingdom for the sale and purchase of butter and cheese (Ward, p. 142). 
 
Prices for products during the 1940s and 1950s were often subject to debate. In the 
early years New Zealand was pleased to have guaranteed markets and safe shipping 
of product. Prices between New Zealand and the United Kingdom were generally 
negotiated annually, but were affected by world prices. The prices paid to farmers 
were negotiated with the New Zealand government, with most arguments around the 
‘labour return’ portion of the price. By the mid-1950s, agricultural protectionism 
dominated the world’s dairy industry. This led to over production and caused 
surpluses over and above domestic usage in a number of countries. These policies put 
pressure on the United Kingdom market for New Zealand products as other country’s 
surpluses were often ‘dumped’ into the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom 
reacted by establishing quotas for the import of product.  
 
                                                 
32
 The Department of Science and Industrial Research was established by the NZ government in 1926 
for research purposes. It became the Crown Research Institute company IRL in 1992 and concentrates 
on research for the manufacturing and industrial sectors.  
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Interventions and protectionism led to volatility in prices. Ward (1975, p. 174) 
commented that in 1958 the dairy reserve account was predicted to be in deficit due 
to low butter prices. The New Zealand government financed the proposed deficit of 
£7 m
33
 on the condition that the industry made the “utmost effort” to repay the deficit 
(the government considered this to be an accommodation loan, not a subsidy). In fact, 
butter prices increased to such a level that the reserve account showed a £14 m
34
 
surplus for the 1959-60 year. The increases in price led consumers to shift to 
margarine with a reduction in butter consumption. An industry adage developed 
“more money is lost in buying the market back than is gained on the way up” (Ward 
1975, p. 182).  
 
In 1959, it was suggested the Dairy Board and the Marketing Commission be 
combined and, by 1961, they had become the New Zealand Dairy Production and 
Marketing Board. Membership of the board entailed 11 producer members and two 
government representatives. The Prices Authority (who set the guaranteed price to 
farmers) was retained, with seven members (three from the Board/Commission, three 
from the government and a Chairman appointed by the government). In June 1966, 
all government divisions and farmer groups were merged and the name was changed 
to the New Zealand Dairy Board” (NZDB). 
 
In response to the establishment of British quotas on New Zealand butter in the mid-
1950s, the industry had been actively pursuing alternative markets. By 1961-62; 
22.5% of New Zealand dairy products were sold to over 70 countries as compared to 
just 3% in 1954 (Ward, 1975, p. 193).  
 
Despite Keynes concerns about the stabilisation scheme, it had in fact stabilised 
prices to farmers. An analysis of the dairy reserve account in mid-1965 showed that 
over the 30 years of operation the total cost to the tax payer had been £267,850
35
  
which had been written off in the first year of its operation (Ward 1975, p. 200). 
                                                 
33
 $296.7 million in 2010 constant value dollars 
34
 $558.9 million in 2010 constant value dollars 
35
 $27.7 million in 2010 constant value dollars 
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However, this did not mean that it operated flawlessly. For instance, low prices in 
1966-67 saw the reserve account reach -£5.6 m
36
.  
 
Finance for industry infrastructure remained an issue. Improvements to processing 
facilities had to come increasingly from the industry’s Dairy Industry Loans Council 
rather than through retentions. Because the council was limited by the stringent 
economic conditions administered by the Reserve Bank, the Dairy Board in the mid-
1960s raised $6 m from debentures (New Zealand adopted decimal currency in 
1967). These debentures were placed with the public, the Meat Board and Dairy 
Board internal funds (Ward 1975, p. 203). 
 
The 1970s again saw the NZDB actively trying to maximise sales in areas other than 
the United Kingdom, but this time it was due to the United Kingdom’s impending 
membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Leading up to entry, 
Britain had negotiated tariff quotas for New Zealand sheep and dairy products into 
the United Kingdom, but these were fixed and their future security was uncertain. In 
1968-69, Board officers visited 94 countries in pursuit of new markets (Ward 1975, 
p. 207). However, the market diversification generally entailed lower and more 
volatile returns than were available in the United Kingdom (Evans 2004, p. 3). Initial 
attempts to establish further processing/distribution facilities in Asian markets were 
abandoned as it was felt that the Boards activities interfered with local interests and 
were difficult to control from Wellington. A policy of remaining a distributor of dairy 
products at “first hand only” was established (Ward, 1975, p. 208). However, the 
industry was successful in diversifying the export destinations of dairy products as 
shown in Table 6.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 $88.3 million dollars in 2010 constant value dollars 
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Table 6.2 Percentage of NZ dairy exports to the United Kingdom and other markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: derived from NZ Dairy Board accounts 1977 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealand experienced high levels of inflation which 
had a significant effect on the dairy industry (Table 6.3). Although income levels 
were generally increasing, so were costs for inputs and for purchasing farms.  
 
Table 6.3 Change in income, farm values and costs for NZ dairy farms (nominal $’s) 
 
 
 Source: derived from NZ Dairy Board accounts (1974-75 to 1985-86). 
 
A major influence on the industry in the 1980s and 1990s was the effects of northern 
hemisphere government’s agricultural policies. Whereas, in the 1950s and early 
1960s, the United States was the most active country in subsidizing exports, by the 
late 1960s and early 1970s they were succeeded by the European Community. The 
accounts of the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB 1984, p. 8) note that: 
 
“However of all the factors that influence dairy export price levels, the export 
subsidies set by the European Community continue to have the most 
Years United Kingdom % Other % 
1967-68 63 37 
1968-69 59 41 
1969-70 53 47 
1970-71 47 53 
1971-72 43 57 
1972-73 40 60 
1973-74 24 76 
1974-75 37 63 
1975-76 32 68 
1976-77 27 73 
 
 
Average net income ($) Ave. price for farms 
sold ($) 
Dairy cost price index 
(%) increase 
1974-75 9,000   
1975-76 9,720   
1976-77 11,400 127, 952  
1977-78 10,200 125,876 11.4 
1978-79 13,000 153,009 12.4 
1979-80 13,742 175,000 19.2 
1980-81 15,400 253,488 20.4 
1981-82 19,200 255,252 20.8 
1982-83  357,140 10.4 
1983-84  327,475 1.9 
1984-85  373,243 11.3 
1985-86  378,519 12.1 
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immediate impact on dairy export price levels. It is most significant therefore 
that during 1983-84, faced with an already chronic but worsening surplus 
production problem, and a resulting budgetary cost crisis, the community 
agreed to the introduction of quota controls on production, reinforced by 
severe penalties for over-quota production.”   
 
In 1986, the government price stabilization scheme was removed. After lengthy 
negotiations with the government, the industry came to an arrangement which 
provided the industry with a government guarantee for income stabilization 
borrowing. However, this came with the requirement that the industry move from 
Reserve Bank financing to the private sector (NZDB, 1986, p. 3). 
 
During the period in which the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) was the monopoly 
exporter, the main goal for the industry was to sell all of the milk that New Zealand 
produced. The single desk exporter status of the Dairy Board gave the industry 
marketing economies of scale and a certain degree of market power. The NZBD 1989 
accounts (p. 4) comment on the earnings objective of the NZDB as follows:   
 
“Unlike a typical company, the key objective of the Dairy Board is to pay the 
most it can afford for its main raw material, milk. This maximization of 
payout means that the concept of profit in the normal commercial sense is 
largely irrelevant. Aside from the milk price payout, the main financial focus 
of the board is the maintenance of reserves to sustain its operations and to 
provide a buffer against any sharp changes in its trading environment.”   
 
Table 6.4 gives details of the New Zealand dairy industry in the 1970s and early 
1980s. This period reflects the period when the United Kingdom entered the 
European Union and before the New Zealand economy was restructured. Although 
the number of suppliers dropped, herd sizes increased by 32% and per cow 
production increased by 26%. Butter production increased by 38% and cheese 
dropped by 17%. However, the major growth was in the production of powders and 
casein. 
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Table 6.4 Dairy statistics from 1973-1986 
 
Year No. of 
suppliers 
Herd 
size 
Cows 
in 
milk 
Mf/cow Butter 
tonnes 
(000) 
Cheese 
tonnes 
(000) 
SMP* 
tonnes 
(000) 
WMP* 
tonnes 
(000) 
Casein 
tonnes 
(000) 
1973 19900 106 2.2m 122 kg 149.8  94.9  161.6    
1974 18500 109 2.1m 118 kg 138.0  68.8 215.5    
1975 17700 112 2.1m 128 kg 140.0  70.0  113.7   23.3 15.1 
1976 17400 115 2.1m 137 kg 171.3  80.8    96.7   34.9 48.6 
1977 16800 117 2.1m 140 kg 172.9  79.1  158.4   65.8 73.5 
1978 16000 120 2.1m 131 kg 165.6  73.7  167.2    60.7 63.5 
1979 15800 123 2.0m  142 kg 151.7  58.6  130.1   64.5 72.7 
1980 15500 126 2.0m 151 kg 175.7  66.8  146.5   77.0 62.7 
1981 15020 129 2.1m 147 kg 157.5  76.2  164.6   73.4 47.5 
1982 14845 133 2.1m 144 kg 168.0  96.9  155.7  116.8 58.5 
1983 14800 137 2.13m 143 kg 206.2  78.5  201.1   94.1 53.1 
1984 14900 140 2.2m 154 kg 146.1  83.6    94.1  106.0 68.1 
1985 14700 143 2..26  151 kg 244.4 87.4 172.3 133.8 73.7 
1986 14650 150 2.35m 153 kg 284.3     
 
Source: derived from NZDB annual accounts (1973-1986). The commodities listed are the tonnes reported as 
exported annually. However, there are discrepancies as some reports are for calendar years and others for the year 
ending in May. 
* (SMP) Skim milk powder, (WMP) Whole Milk Powder 
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of rationalisation at the processing level 
(Table 6.5) During this time period, the NZDB (1989, p. 8) had moved from the 
policy of being a seller at “first hand only” and was growing larger, listing 78 
subsidiary companies (at least 50% owned), 28 associate companies (25-50% owned) 
and a large investment in a publicly listed company. Investment in subsidiaries 
increased from $19 million, in 1980, to $414 million in 1988. In 1988, 80 per cent of 
the subsidiaries sales were generated from milk produced in New Zealand (Conforte, 
et al. 2008, p50.).  
 
Table 6.5 Number of dairy cooperative companies in NZ. 
 
 May 1970 May 1980 May 1991 
North Island 59 29 9 
South Island 36 13 8 
Total  95 42 17 
 
Source: Nayga & Mtonga (1994) 
 
The mid and late 1990s were turbulent times for the New Zealand dairy industry. The 
decade started with improved milk prices and financial stability after the restructuring 
of the New Zealand economy of the mid-1980s. During the 1990s there was a 
movement towards larger farms, a larger national herd, more cows per farm and 
increased production in the South Island. The figures in Chapter 2 detail this growth. 
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These significant increases put pressure on many aspects of the industry, particularly 
processing and marketing.  
 
Evans (2004, p. 8) stated that “from the 1970s demand grew to rationalise the 
structure of the dairy industry as companies sought further economies of scale and 
better coordination of production and marketing”. He added that a difficulty with the 
‘single desk export’ system was that farmers were being given mixed market signals 
due to the bundled price that they received for milk. The price did not distinguish 
between the production cost of raw milk and the return on milk processing capital, 
leading to over production.  
 
Although the NZDB was in pursuit of adding value to the basic commodities being 
produced, the financial performance of the manufacturing cooperatives was directly 
related to the manufacturing cost models (make allowances) developed by the NZDB. 
Through mergers, companies reduced their product-mix risk by establishing large 
diversified processing plants. These large plants were often able to be more efficient 
than the cost model and gave the large companies a competitive advantage against 
smaller cooperatives (Conforte et al., 2008, pp. 51-53). 
 
Other issues that lead to a changed environment were international trade liberalisation 
through the Uruguay Round of GATT, a push to develop fast moving consumer 
goods (FMCG) and global pressure on businesses that were considered to be ‘state 
owned trading enterprises’. In late 1998, the National-led government suggested that 
the state sanctioned producer export boards had outlived their usefulness and that 
industries should consider deregulation. The NZDB annual accounts for 1998 (p. 3) 
contain the following statement from the Chairman of the NZDB: 
 
“The announcement by government that it intends to work towards the 
eventual removal of the Dairy Board’s statutory powers, which have been so 
crucial to the industry’s success, is particularly unwelcome. As it has always 
been the National party’s policy that the future of the legislation is a matter 
for producers, farmers are particularly affronted that government has neither 
sought their view, nor indicated how farmers will benefit from removal of the 
legislation. There is overwhelming agreement on the fundamentals. The 
industry will remain farmer-owned and vertically integrated, selling through a 
single marketer owned by the shareholders, the cooperative dairy companies.” 
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Despite the Chairman’s statement, there were indeed a number of problems that had 
developed between the NZDB and the cooperatives. These problems were detailed by 
Evans (2004, p. 10), as follows: 
 
“1) the pooling of product returns into a single price for milk (so companies 
did not receive the market price for products they produced); 
 
2) the cost of reimbursement (so companies did not share in the commercial 
success and failure of products); 
 
3) large penalties on downgraded product (creating incentives for companies 
to sell product outside the Board if possible); 
 
4) the Board’s marketing priorities differing from those of dairy companies.” 
 
Additionally, as the NZDB moved away from ‘make allowances’ to the ‘commercial 
pricing model’ for payment to farmers, there became very strong business drivers for 
companies to produce a wide range of products (see Chapter 8). This in turn led to 
amalgamations and the eventual dominance of the industry by two large companies.  
By 1998-99, the Kiwi Cooperative Dairy Company (Kiwi) and the New Zealand 
Dairy Group (NZDG) controlled 95% of New Zealand’s milk production. Under this 
scenario the NZDB became largely redundant. 
 
Despite the industry’s initial objection to restructuring, by 1999 a proposal was 
developed to merge the two largest companies with the NZDB. The first proposal 
was rejected by the New Zealand Commerce Commission in 2000 due to the 
perception of a reduction in competition. The industry proceeded to negotiate with 
the government and successfully by-passed the Commerce Commission. This 
allowed the formation of the Fonterra Cooperative in 2001. However, to get this 
agreement, the industry accepted the following conditions, as outlined by Evans 
(2004 pp. 17-18): 
 
“1) open entry to any prospective supplier and open exit from the cooperative 
by shareholding farmers; 
 
2) supply of up to 400 m litres of raw milk on demand to independent 
processors on competitive terms; 
 
3) divestment of 50% of the domestic market; 
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4) appointment of a milk commissioner to arbitrate grievances between 
Fonterra and suppliers.” 
 
Two smaller cooperatives (Westland and Tatua) opted not to join Fonterra. Since 
2002, there have been a number of proprietary dairy processing companies 
established (Open Country Cheese 2004, NZ Dairies 2006, Synlait 2007).  
 
By 2007, Fonterra sold products to customers in 140 countries; collected 13 billion 
litres of milk and manufactured 1.8 million tonnes of product. It had 20,000 staff in 
40 countries (Conforte et al. 2008, p. 60). Since the economic restructuring of the 
New Zealand economy (1984-85) milksolids production in the New Zealand industry 
has grown 2.2 times. In contrast, Chapman (2011, p. 36) reports that Australian milk 
production decreased by 2.2 billion kilograms of milksolids from 2001-02 to 2008-
09.  
 
Schilling, Zuccollo and Nixon, (2010, pp. C-D) reported in 2009 the dairy sector 
contributed 26% of New Zealand’s total goods exports ($10.4 billion), was 2.8% of 
GDP ($5 billion) and employed 35,000 workers (excluding up to 10,000 self-
employed contractors). These authors (ibid, p. 19) also reported that New Zealand’s 
GDP increased by $690 million from growth in the dairy sector compared to the 
projected GDP growth in New Zealand if the industry had not grown during this time 
period. 
 
A significant change in New Zealand’s overseas markets has been the emergence of 
China has a major purchaser. Historically, China has purchased limited quantities of 
New Zealand dairy products; however, by 2011 purchases amounted to $2.2 billion 
(Statistics NZ, 2011). 
 
Conforte et al. (2008, pp. 49) interviewed key industry participants on their opinions 
of the critical success factors of the dairy industry on a national basis. Participants felt 
that on-farm production has increased due to improved farming technology, other 
technological improvements, the use of nitrogen, labour saving technologies, the use 
of the results from science investment in the 1960s and 1970s and the exploitation of 
the lack of success of other land based industries. The same group stated that the 
industry’s success in international marketing could be attributed to legislative 
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support, effective connections to market demand and reduced global subsidies. The 
group suggested that other positive developments were farm consolidation which had 
led to economies of scale, the development of ‘family corporates’ which served as an 
improved mechanism for raising capital and the development of innovative share 
milking agreements and equity partnerships. 
 
The same participants suggested that industry success off-farm had been due to 
economies of scale and political support for the development of international 
markets. Within New Zealand, the evolution of an industry structure to facilitate 
growth while maintaining farmer engagement was important. Also important were 
continuing technological advances and New Zealand’s disease free status, which 
reduced trade barriers and compliance costs (Conforte et al., 2008 pp. 63-64). 
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the average size of New Zealand dairy farms grew from the 
mid-1980s to 2009-10. Not only did production increase, but dairy farms also 
increased in value on a per hectare basis. Figure 6.3, details this growth. It is 
speculated that the growth in real estate values relate to higher milk prices, increased 
production and farmers pursuing capital gains. The decreases in real estate values in 
2008-09 are attributed to world economic conditions and their effect on milk prices.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Value of dairy land in NZ (constant value dollars 2010) on a per hectare 
basis (NZ Dairy Statistics 2011) 
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Painter (2007), in providing a commentary on the state of the industry, stated, “New 
Zealand dairy farmers, operating in a free and competitive market with no 
government subsidies, have become the world cost leaders in the production of milk 
and have diversified along the value chain into the processing and marketing of dairy 
products. Through Fonterra, their dairy processing and marketing cooperative, they 
have captured 40% of the world dairy export market with branded New Zealand dairy 
products. As a result, New Zealand dairy farmers have good incomes and have 
accumulated significant net worth, compared with the average net worth of all 
families in New Zealand. Their success can be attributed to good farm management 
and a willingness to take risks.”  
6.4 Discussion  
Table 6.6 has been prepared to identify factors and drivers that have been important 
in the development of the dairy industry in New Zealand. 
 
From the material reviewed in Chapters 5 and 6 it is clear that as one of the first 
industries to emerge in the development of New Zealand, the dairy industry has a 
long history of growth, innovation and extension. It has struggled with pricing 
mechanisms, industry ownership, funding, and government policies both 
domestically and internationally - not to mention the vagaries of climate and animal 
production systems. Since the economic restructuring of the mid 1980s the dairy 
industry has seen continued growth – in part through land use change and associated 
investment. This growth has resulted in the creation of wealth in real terms (see 
Chapters 2, Section 2.18, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2 and Figure 6.3.)  
 
Physical resources such as climate and suitable soil types have given the industry a 
competitive advantage. Additionally, chance events like world wars, inflation, global 
economies and markets have affected industry growth and development over the 
years. 
 
 However, commentators have suggested that the success of the industry was also due 
to the development of international marketing expertise which would not have been 
possible without political support and the development of processing/marketing 
structures that maintained farmer engagement. A key driver in the early years was 
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government intervention through promoting the industry, setting quality standards 
and providing price stability. Demand was driven initially from the United Kingdom, 
particularly during the war years, where New Zealand was seen as the United 
Kingdom’s farm. 
 
 From the end of the Second World War, the industry has been affected by 
international protectionism as well as changing New Zealand government policies 
(subsidies and deregulation). International protectionism had the effect of forcing 
New Zealand farmers and their cooperatives to constantly become more efficient and 
focus on low cost farming and processing systems through innovation and the 
adoption of new technologies. The controlled economy present in New Zealand from 
the end of the war until the economic restructuring lead to inefficient business models 
in other farming sectors. When these systems were challenged by deregulation, land 
use change to dairy farming occurred. These growth dynamics have continued into 
the new century.   
 
Larger more productive farms with improved business structures for raising capital 
have been important. Additionally, the development of the sharemilking system has 
allowed the industry to develop a system for succession and the entry of new farmers.  
 
    
  
1
1
3
 
Table 6.6  Growth and development of the New Zealand dairy industry  
 
Time period Events Factors contributing to growth Drivers of growth 
 
Settlement to 1880s First cows & farm manufacture  
First exports of cheese and butter 
First cooperatives 
NZ climate Need for food & income 
Proprietors 
Farmers wanting control 
1880-1899 Industry organization formed 
Factory manufacture 
372,000 cows & 5,500 suppliers in 1900 
Government set standards 
Refrigeration, on-farm cream 
separation, new grasses 
Government encouraged production  
Increased level of cooperatives 
Demand from United Kingdom 
1900-1919 United Kingdom commandeer of NZ 
products  
Exit of proprietors 
World depression 
783,000 cows & 35,604 suppliers in 1919 
Milking machines 
Herd testing  
New processed products  
Superphosphate 
Wartime demand from United Kingdom 
Absolute control by dairy board and 
then reversion to market prices 
Need for income in depression 
 
1920-1939 United Kingdom bulk purchases—WW2 
1,719,000 cows & 63,900 suppliers in 1939 
Stability of prices and shipping Wartime demand from United Kingdom 
Stable prices due to govt. guarantees 
1940-1959 Agriculture protectionism 
1.9m cows & 39,900 suppliers in 1959 
Rotational grazing, artificial 
breeding, veterinary clubs & 
brucellosis vaccination 
International protection decreased 
demand, but guaranteed prices allowed 
modest growth 
1960-1979 Consolidation of NZDB 
High inflation 
New markets developed 
International subsidies 
2.3m cows and 24,628 farms in 1969  
Large herringbone & rotary   
cow sheds 
Investment in research to 
improved technology 
Inflation 
Inflation caused need for growth 
Dumping by US and Europeans 
Consolidation of NZDB board  
1980-1999 Industry rationalization 
International trade liberalization 
3.3m cows and 14,362 farms 
Increased farm size, less farms 
Growth of SI industry 
NZ economic restructure 
Increased values for dairy farms 
Lack of profitability in other farming 
systems 
2000-2010 Formation of Fonterra  
Increased productivity growth 
4.3m cows and 11,618 farms in 2009 
Improved supply chains 
Availability of finance 
Increased productivity 
Government support for trade  
reforms  
Continued SI growth 
Growth in demand from Asia 
Increased production & profit  
Lack of profit in other farm systems 
Business structures 
Disease free status & product quality 
Re-entry of proprietary companies 
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The material reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 led to the development of Figure 4.4, 
which indicated that a developing industry was influenced by existing and new 
infrastructures, government and economic conditions, innovation and adoption and 
entrepreneurs. Chance occurrences can also be important if they lead to new 
opportunities or cause problems for a new industry. 
 
The review of New Zealand agriculture and dairy farming in New Zealand has led to 
an expanded version of Figure 4.4, as shown in Figure 6.4. This figure now includes 
the additional conditions of extension, lack of profitability in other areas of land use, 
economic conditions and incentives, and the history of the industry. To determine the 
validity of these propositions, the results from interviews with informants involved in 
the development of the Canterbury industry are discussed in Chapter 7.  
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 Figure 6.4 Proposed factors for the development and growth of the Canterbury dairy 
industry 
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     Chapter 7 
Factor conditions in the development of the 
Canterbury dairy industry (1982-2010) 
“A nation which depends on agricultural sales abroad to pay for most of its 
imports must encourage any technical and social developments which emphasise 
greater production per ha and hence greater total production” (Morton, 1978) 
7.1 Introduction  
Figure 6.4 in Chapter 6 was created from the review of literature and data in previous 
chapters. It presents a number of possible conditions for growth in the Canterbury 
dairy industry. The purpose of this chapter is to examine these factor conditions from 
the point of view of participants in the industry.  
 
The research discussed in this chapter came from interviewing a number of industry 
participants who were involved during the period examined. The interviews were 
designed so that the informants suggested factors that they felt were important. All 
informants have been assigned a number for reference purposes; for example 
informant number 1 will be referred to as (In1). The findings are compared to Figure 
6.4 and will further inform Research Questions One to Four. 
7.2 Methods 
A group of 22 key informants were identified through purposive selection. Thirteen 
informants had been practising dairy farmers during the entire period. Two 
informants had been dairy farmers in the latter half of the period. Four consultants 
were interviewed either because of their involvement during the development or 
because they had provided expertise on a particular topic. One source was an 
observer of the dairy industry from another farming system, with the final informant a 
manager of a corporate farming entity. These informants were selected based on the 
author’s knowledge of industry participants along with input from several key 
industry sources.  
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Interviews followed grounded, case study methods. All the semi-structured 
interviews were conducted towards the end of 2010.  
 
The interviews began with the presentation of the graph (Figure 2.1) that depicted the 
growth in hectares involved in dairy farming in Canterbury. The interviewees were 
then asked to ‘tell their story’ of involvement with the industry. As the personal 
histories unfolded, the researcher listened for reasons for industry growth. The 
responses were compared to the proposed factor conditions listed in Figure 6.4; if a 
condition proposed by the literature review was not mentioned by the respondents 
then a question was asked to try to elicit a response. For instance, if the respondent 
did not suggest that there was an involvement by government, then the question was 
asked: “How has government effected the growth of the dairy industry in 
Canterbury”. A number of new reasons for growth were proposed by the respondents. 
Notes were taken during all interviews and the interviews recorded after receiving 
permission from the participants. The notes were typed and reviewed through 
listening to the recordings
37
.   
 
Section 7.3 details the history of the industry in Canterbury with data obtained from 
primary and secondary sources. Section 7.4 reports on the opinions of the informants 
about the factor conditions as listed in Figure 6.4. Section 7.5 details additional 
conditions identified by the informants and Section 7.6 is a discussion of the social 
implications of the development as outlined by the informants. Finally, Section 7.7 
presents a summary of the chapter. 
 
The statistics used to prepare Figures 7.1 through 7.5 are found in Appendix D.  
7.3 Results 
This section provides a brief history of Canterbury dairy farming and compares the 
answers of the informants to the conditions proposed in previous chapters, as listed in 
Figure 6.4. 
                                                 
37
 All recordings are stored in a locked cabinet in the Agricultural Management Department of Lincoln 
University. 
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7.3.1 Background of the Canterbury dairy industry 
There has been a manufacturing dairy industry in Canterbury since the late 1880s (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3). However, until the early 1980s the dry climate and light soils 
were considered more suitable for sheep and cropping, with the exception of parts of 
Banks Peninsula and the pockets of heavier soil types near Christchurch and Temuka.  
 
In the late 1940s in Canterbury, there were 11 cheese factories producing 2,500 
tonnes annually and five butter factories producing 3,500 tonnes annually 
(McPherson 1952, pp. 225-229). Most of the milk for these plants was produced by 
small herds of cows milked on sheep and cropping farms. At this time, many of the 
farmers were servicemen who had been settled on farms upon their return from 
World War Two. These farmers were on tightly managed budgets with the New 
Zealand Government’s State Advances Division (later to be called the Rural Bank). 
However, they were allowed to keep the proceeds from cream sales without prior 
approval of State Advances. Therefore, it was common to find between 4-10 cows on 
otherwise traditional sheep and cropping farms (ibid). These funds supplemented the 
farmer’s allowable drawings from their State Advances managed account of 8 pounds 
per week (In6) or $416 per week in constant value dollars (2010). 
  
Commencing in 1946, the possibility of commercial dairy farming was investigated 
by the Department of Agriculture’s Winchmore Irrigation Research Farm near 
Ashburton. The research was initiated on 150 acres (60 hectares) at the request of the 
Ashburton Rehabilitation Committee (McPherson 1952, pp. 225-229). The 
committee’s view was that if the venture was successful, dairying would provide 
another means of settling returned serviceman on flood irrigated farms. The 
significance of this research was that it established larger scale commercial dairy 
farming as a viable farming system in mid Canterbury. McPherson (ibid) reported 
that the farm was developed to milk 80 cows for separated cream production with the 
skim milk fed to pigs. The results from a five year trial showed that the farm was 
successful in milking 80 cows as planned and production reached 18,500 pounds of 
butterfat (approximately 14,715 kg milksolids or 245 kg milksolids/ha.). These 
results contradicted common perceptions that Canterbury winters were too severe for 
dairy stock and established that there were no serious stock diseases. Additionally, it 
found that winter feed could be grown and young stock reared successfully.  The 
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conclusions were that “although light land with the aid of irrigation has possibilities, 
while the returns from sheep products remain so high dairying is unlikely to be 
undertaken on this class of country” (ibid, p. 229). 
 
As the returned servicemen became more settled on their farms, budgetary 
restrictions were lifted and the cows began to disappear. As the supply of cream to 
the factory diminished, the Midland Dairy Company of Ashburton began to look for 
new supply; one of the first converters to ‘fulltime’ dairying (In6) did so in the late 
1950s and recalled the following:  
 
“One day the Chairman and Chief Executive from the Midland dairy company in 
Ashburton came by and asked if we would be interested in milking cows. I laughed—
yes, we would be interested in milking cows but we couldn’t buy a cow’s tail. We’ve 
got no money and would be lucky to hang on to this place. That’s why we came they 
said, we’ll buy the cows—you milk them, we’ll take the cream and you can have the 
skim milk and we’ll keep half the cream cheque until the cows are paid for. He asked 
whether we could build a cow shed, I said yes, because we had worked for builders 
before immigrating to New Zealand. Of course, we had no money but there were 
ways round that. They noticed that there were 12 big pine trees and suggested that we 
cut some down - two would build a cow shed, six would buy the concrete. It was all 
done with a cement mixer and that’s what happened. We built a four cow walk 
through shed. They bought us 14 cows and kept half the milk share. There were three 
barbed wires for a yard with no concrete. The company organised an irrigation turn 
out for 70 pounds, but we didn’t have the money. We took on a job to build 10 miles 
of fence for an old boss—who paid for some of it in advance so that the Ministry of 
Works would start. He also provided a two stand milking plant to put in the shed. By 
1969 we had built a 12-a-side herringbone and were milking 70 cows. Since then we 
have helped a number of young farmers build sheds.”  
 
The history of one of the first converters tells much about the future of the industry. 
The new dairy farmers often started with limited means, included many immigrants 
(from overseas and the North Island) who worked hard and often had significant help 
from other farmers. Additionally, the cooperatives were innovative in attracting and 
financing future supply. However, McPherson was correct in that even though it was 
proven that dairying could succeed in the province, the profitability of traditional 
industries provided a more attractive farming system to most and, in fact, the industry 
did not grow dramatically for over 30 years.  
 
Historically, there have been two dairy industries in Canterbury, town supply (liquid 
milk) producers around the cities and a factory supply (manufacturing) industry in the 
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rural areas. The town supply producers, although part of the industry, had a separate 
body to allocate town milk quota and set prices. Milk surplus to the quota was sold at 
factory supply prices. Annual surveys of the cost of production were carried out and 
prices for the new season set. This industry was very profitable (In17) and although 
based on pasture involved more supplement than traditional factory supply grass 
based systems. Informant 17 felt that the town supply producers held back the 
development of a factory supply industry in Canterbury as they had successfully 
convinced the rest of the industry that dairying must operate on heavy soils due to 
limited irrigation, and with intensive systems. Besides the ‘dairy immigrants’, the 
move of several key town supply farmers to lighter land and seasonal supply was 
instrumental in the eventual growth of the present industry (In17). The town milk 
industry was deregulated in 1988. Fluid milk is now sourced from what was 
previously known as factory supply farms for most of the year. Over the winter 
months, a small number of farmers are contracted to provide liquid milk for domestic 
consumption. 
  
In the late 1970s, the factory supply cooperative at Temuka borrowed heavily to build 
a Parmesan cheese plant, but on completion it was only 40% full (In9). A board 
member was dispatched to the Rural Bank (RB) in Wellington to negotiate 3% loans 
for cow purchases to increase production in Canterbury
38
. The Temuka and Tai Tapu 
cooperatives merged to form Alpine Dairy Products in 1987. The company had 
product quality issues and low levels of equity, estimated by several sources at 6% 
(In21, In3 and In4). By the early 1990s the Alpine company was growing at a rate of 
40% per year. A number of informants identified the development of Alpine as 
crucial to the growth of the Canterbury industry (In20, In13, In21, In3 and In6). The 
company developed many innovative programmes to deal with growth (processing 
and financial), product quality and environmental contamination. Growth could only 
continue through farmers contributing additional capital (In11). Several sources 
commented that the need to buy shares and changing company policies caused cash 
flow problems for farmers (In4, In5 and In1). However, the development of Alpine 
                                                 
38
 The head of the Rural Bank said that Canterbury would never be a dairy area because it had the 
highest level of diploma and degree holders in the country and they had too good a lifestyle to become 
dairy farmers (I6). 
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created a more robust industry that attained credibility with the wider industry (In20). 
The survival and success of Alpine is reported in the next chapter. 
 
During the 1990s there were a number of mergers within the New Zealand dairy 
industry. Alpine merged with the Southland Cooperative Dairy Company in 1998 and 
the North Island based New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG) in 1999. Nearly all 
sources identified the mergers as being a positive factor in the growth of the 
Canterbury industry. The merger with NZDG gave Canterbury producers the higher 
milk prices received by North Island producers (In20). A number of sources indicated 
that the mergers increased the value of farms in Canterbury (In3, In19, In13 and In4).  
 
The merger of the New Zealand Dairy Board, NZDG and Kiwi formed Fonterra in 
2001. Informant 3 felt that this had given dairy farmers an advantage over other 
agricultural industries through the ability to work at scale. Putting Fonterra together 
took at least five years, with several approaches to government to gain approval 
(In14, In21). Although Fonterra’s performance received criticism from some sources 
(In2, In7), most informants felt that performance had improved and that a large 
marketer of dairy products was important for farmer’s incomes (In7, In13, In4, In12, 
In3 and In21). The sources who criticised Fonterra commented that it was an 
improvement on the NZDB which was ‘top heavy’ and cost the industry millions in 
bureaucracy. Informant 18 mentioned that Fonterra, as a cooperative, has an 
advantage in securing suppliers as farmers feel vulnerable if they do not have control 
of processing.  
 
 In summary, the past and present industry structure has been important for the 
growth of the Canterbury dairy industry. Informant 12 stressed the importance of 
being able to sell every litre of milk produced, a concept that is not universal in other 
dairy industries. In the case of the Canterbury industry, the creation of production 
backed shares allowed the industry to grow. Mergers led to better prices thus 
increasing the values of farms and making them more financeable (In17). A number 
of respondents suggested that the single seller concept of the NZDB and the market 
dominance of Fonterra have been important (In12, In4, In14). Informant 12 felt that 
the growth of the industry would not have been as fast if all of the processors had 
been proprietary companies. Informant 19 commented an advantage of the dairy 
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industry is the free sharing of information. He added that all members have been 
treated equally with no special arrangements for large suppliers as happened in the 
meat industry. Finally, leadership has been important (In6). The industry has a strong 
link between farmers and directors, with significant pressure put on directors to 
perform (In18). 
7.3.2 Entrepreneurs 
Several early converters gave a variety of reasons for choosing to farm in Canterbury.  
Some (In21, In4, In10) said that they first thought of Canterbury after reading articles 
about farmer/entrepreneurs like Don MacDonald
39
 in the Dairy Exporter.
40
 Another 
(In13) visited an early converter while a student at Lincoln University. Informant 10 
said that for him it was the challenge of farming in a new area. A number admitted 
that they did not analyse the opportunity as deeply as they would now, often doing 
simple budgets (In13, In10) and even entering into purchase agreements written on 
the backs of envelopes (In3). Two converters (In13, In8) purchased in areas where 
there were no dairy farms as they felt there were larger capital gains available and 
fewer prospective purchasers. In the end they were all after the same thing - cheap 
land and water (In14) or, as In8 said, he moved to a new area to get “size, scale and 
the opportunity for growth”.  
 
Informant 11, who was originally from the town supply industry; suggested that the 
‘light land’ dairy farmers in the late 1970s and early 1980s were only 
“experimenters”, but that by the 1990s it was accepted that you could successfully 
milk cows on this land type in Canterbury. 
 
Early growth and development was a “rocky road with not particularly good cash 
flows” said In3. Looking back at the early converters, In1 suggested that they took 
significant risk, “Not only did they have to build their own business, but they also had 
to grow their processing cooperative and often worked without traditional 
                                                 
39
 Don MacDonald was an early farmer who moved from the North Island to Canterbury. He 
purchased 148 hectares (80 hectares irrigated) for $185,000 in 1976 (NZ Dairy Exporter, November 
1978 pp. 12-13).  
 
40
 The NZ Dairy Exporter is a leading periodical for the dairy industry. Founded in 1925, the Exporter 
was formerly owned by the NZ Dairy Board. It was sold to NZX Agri a subsidiary of the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange in 2009. 
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infrastructural support”. An example of the risks undertaken came from In8 who 
drilled a well in a new area not knowing whether he would find water. Farmers were 
“willing to take short term losses if they felt that they could cover them later”, said 
In10. 
 
Informants 4 and 5 felt that the early converters who stayed in the industry have 
achieved the highest gains - although some converted and sold to make a quick profit 
(In4). However, they added that a significant number struggled to cope with leaving 
family in the North Island, dealing with labour, the financial restructuring of the New 
Zealand economy and the effects of drought and poor irrigation systems. A number of 
these farmers eventually sold and left the industry. Informant 2 said that contrary to 
popular belief, the dairy industry has never been “a licence to print money”, but has 
constantly demanded new investment in either the processing companies or on farm. 
Informant 4 commented that dairying is an ideal business to set up and let someone 
else run, either through managers or sharemilkers. Many of the early converters have 
moved into other pursuits such as industry governance, consulting or other businesses 
(In4). 
 
As well as farmers who converted land to dairying, there was also an influx of 
sharemilkers. Many of the early sharemilkers who moved to the province in the 1990s 
were very concerned with wealth creation (In20).  
 
Another entrepreneurial trait exhibited by the early converters was continuous 
adjustments to their systems. Many initially tried to adopt North Island systems of 
being self-contained with minimal supplementation. However they learned that there 
was more profit to be made in using the farm as a milking platform and grazing stock 
off the farm when appropriate. Some tried utilising the by-products of other farming 
systems and most were constantly looking at labour saving technologies (In4, In3). 
 
Informant 13 said that many of the first conversions used less than ideal pasture 
renovation systems (triple disked, 90 kilograms of superphosphate and ryegrass 
drilled into existing brown top). Early conversions were short on fertiliser due to the 
shortage of development funds (In3, In6, In12 and In14). In 1993, In2 converted 128 
ha for $437,743---$125,486 for shares, $204,280 for the shed, $29,182 for laneways 
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and the balance for stock water and power (2010 dollars
41
). He added that his 50-50 
sharemilker spent the same amount to purchase his cows. If he were to convert today, 
he estimated that the conversion would cost $2.5 million (eight times more 
expensive), but the sharemilker would only spend $600,000 (two times more 
expensive). The difference in conversion costs is partially due to the standard of 
conversion that is expected (rotary cowsheds, pivot irrigation). Figure 7.1 confirms 
that the relative cost of a herd has decreased compared to land when comparing the 
national average market value (NAMV) of a Friesian cow as a percentage of land 
prices. 
 
 
 
Source: derived from LIC and IRD statistics 2010 
 
Figure 7.1 National Average Market Value (NAMV) of a Friesian cow as a 
percentage of land values in Canterbury from 1988 to 2010 (real 2010) 
  
 
Although the later converters of the 1990s strived to keep the costs of their 
conversions low, they demolished existing structures, shelter and fencing and the 
farms were developed to suit irrigation and cowsheds (In13, In14 and In4). Most 
sources felt that this was a vastly improved method for converting a farm to dairying 
compared to the methods of the 1980s converters.  
 
With the later converters (late 1990s and 2000s), there were fewer true entrepreneurs 
involved as the converters were generally existing farmers changing farming systems 
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or established farmers expanding their operations. With the relaxed financial 
standards of the banking industry, they were able to source finance more easily and 
hire conversion specialists to oversee the process (In13).  
 
Most of the early informants have expanded their businesses over the years and a 
considerable number admitted that they were currently looking to purchase additional 
farms (In14, In3, In8, In1 and In6). One informant (In15) suggested that the re-
development of farms to incorporate pivot irrigation has boosted early converters 
enthusiasm to farm. 
 
Although the increasing milk prices might be seen as a major incentive to the growth 
in dairying, Figure 7.2 shows that there is not a clear positive relationship between 
milk price and the growth in hectares involved in dairy farming in Canterbury. Thus 
it would appear that the entrepreneurs grew their businesses to capture the 
entrepreneurial profits as detailed in Chapter 3, or for the reasons suggested by 
Schumpeter (1961, pp. 92-93) in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
Source: derived from LIC and Quotable Value NZ data. 
 
Figure 7.2 Relationship of milksolids payout (constant value dollars 2010) and 
hectares in dairy farming in Canterbury  
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7.3.3 Extension 
 When considering how they learned about new technology or innovations, the 
informants generally identified the positive input of consultants (private and industry 
consulting officers) and the effect of the Lincoln University Demonstration Farm 
(LUDF) after it was established in 2001. Informant 7 (with substantial holdings in 
both the arable and dairy industries) felt that an advantage of the New Zealand dairy 
industry is the high level of “home grown technology” available in New Zealand, 
whereas other farming systems such as the arable sector rely on research from 
Europe. 
 
The LUDF was established as a demonstration farm and has been particularly 
successful in demonstrating grazing management techniques (to the point of changing 
the industry in the opinion of In15). According to In16 it was important that the 
concept of the LUDF was encouraged by successful farmers. He added that the farm 
has also been important in performing research on the environmental effects of 
dairying. A number of respondents stated that the farm had been exceptional in 
providing Canterbury grazing management information, stressing the importance of 
farm monitoring and in examining profit (In1, In15, In20, In17, and In10). Informant 
15 felt that the profits achieved by the farm were undersold, as he claimed it is 
probably the only farm in New Zealand producing over 1,600 kg milksolids/ha with 
little supplementary feeding. Consultants have been important in spreading the 
messages from the LUDF (In14). However, In20 mentioned that the LUDF focus on 
grazing residuals and monitoring were pioneered at the Ruakura Agricultural 
Research Centre
42
 many years earlier.  
 
A number of sources (In4, In17 and In6) indicated that private consultants have been 
important to the growth of the industry. In the opinion of In17, traditional extension 
providers were slow to come to the South Island and that growth would have been 
slower without private consultants. There were no specifically private dairy 
consultants in mid Canterbury until 1989 (In20). Informant In6 felt that specialised 
dairy consultants have been more important than the general consultants who were 
                                                 
42
 The Ruakura Agriculture Research Centre in Hamilton, NZ has been a leading agricultural and life 
sciences research centre for over 50 years. 
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available when growth was initiated; the existing consultants did not understand 
dairying and in his opinion did not support the development of the industry.  
 
For many early converters the only consultants available were the Consulting 
Officers provided without charge by the Livestock Improvement Corporation (LIC). 
However since their main area of activity was in organizing discussion groups, they 
seldom had time for individual consultations. A number of sources indicated the 
value of discussion groups (In13, In8, In4 and In6). Informant 8 commented that 
there was more help and guidance from other farmers in the early days than is 
prevalent now. Another early converter (In13) commented that the discussion groups 
were the highlight of his month and the source of a great deal of information—mostly 
learned from each other. Informant 15 felt that the dairy industry has a strong 
succession ethic, dairy farmers believe in training the next generation and giving 
them a chance.  
 
One early discussion group hired a plane each year and travelled to the North Island 
to look at farms (In6). When dairying started to grow, with the help of Ruakura 
scientists they established monitoring programmes for the group on several new 
conversions. Informant 16 commented that discussion groups and demonstration 
farms were appropriate learning tools for farmers as farmers are very good at 
assessing a technology and fitting it into their system. He felt that often they were not 
too worried about the economics, if the technology met other goals. 
 
A number of professionals working in the industry were given credit for seeing the 
potential of Canterbury for dairying and promoting its development. These included 
Ruakura scientist, D. Clayton, Northland consulting officer, H. Kirton, and Lincoln 
University dairy lecturers, M. Hollard and T. Hughes.  
 
In the early development of the industry many problems arose. Informant 17 (himself 
a scientist) felt that most problems were solved by farmers, consultants and their 
tradesmen, as the existing providers of research did not become interested in the 
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Canterbury dairy industry until “late in the piece”.43 Informant 16 commented that 
one of the major research providers was not interested in being a partner in the LUDF 
because they could not see the emergence of a quick technology that they could sell.  
7.3.4 International markets 
The Uruguay round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations was 
important to New Zealand as it placed limitations on the export subsidies provided by 
the European Union. Informant 7 felt that the Uruguay round was particularly good 
for dairy, but bad for arable farming. However, it was the best thing to happen to 
New Zealand agriculture from an overall trade standpoint. Two sources (In7 and 
In12) commented that New Zealand governments have done well in trade 
negotiations having worked to remove distortions and have been able to place 
representatives in key positions within the World Trade Organization
44
. 
7.3.5 Government 
The New Zealand government was not considered to have had a large effect on the 
growth of the industry by most sources. However, government sponsored projects 
such as irrigation infrastructure was eventually important to the dairy industry (In12). 
Additionally, the government formed the New Zealand Dairy Board, which at least 
one informant (In12) thought was important for the development of the industry.  
 
A number mentioned that the economic restructuring of the mid-1980s was good for 
agriculture, as it changed the psyche of farmers away from farming for subsidies to 
farming for profit (In3, In11, In14 and In13). Informant 11 gave credit to two 
Ministers of Finance (Douglas and Richardson) for opening up the economy, 
introducing more fiscal responsibility and reforming the labour market. One source 
felt that the lack of a capital gains tax in New Zealand has been important for the 
growth of the industry (In4). 
 
A number considered the government generally sympathetic to farmers (In12, In11 
and In7). An example of government support was mentioned by In13 in regard to the 
                                                 
43
 However, evidence of some limited involvement at an earlier stage is provided by Rowarth et al. 
(2006).  
44
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that intends to supervise and liberalise 
world trade. 
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government allowing the dairy industry to by-pass the Commerce Commission to 
form Fonterra. Informant 11 commented that government policies needed to be good 
for agriculture, but not necessarily good for individual farmers. 
 
At the local level there were concerns that government driven compliance issues 
surrounding effluent and animal welfare were a problem for dairy farmers (In4, In9, 
In7 and In14). Policies like river conservation orders have added complications to the 
operation of some surface water based schemes (In13). Due to their responsibility for 
managing the environment, Environment Canterbury (Ecan) can have a positive or 
negative effect on farmers’ business growth. Many sources felt that Ecan had not 
stopped growth, but had certainly slowed it down in the past five years through 
moratoriums on issuing water rights and increased compliance costs (In9, In10, In12, 
In2 and In17). Informant 8 mentioned that Ecan did not affect him any more than it 
should, however, at times it has attempted to impose goals through “bullying” the 
farming community rather than through consultation. An informant (In15) who deals 
with a number of councils felt that Ecan has not necessarily been negative and, in 
fact, he considered Ecan the best regional council with which he deals.   
7.3.6 Lack of profit in other sectors 
Canterbury was traditionally dominated by sheep and crop farming (often grain and 
clover for seed). As wool and wheat prices began to decline in the early 1980s (see 
Figure 6.2), the government further increased subsidies for sheep farmers. This 
allowed sheep farmers to continue to farm profitability on dry land, which, along with 
poor irrigation technology, limited the adoption of irrigation (In9). However, a series 
of droughts and better technology (delivery systems and deep wells) encouraged the 
development of irrigation, which changed the pattern of land use (In8). Informant 11 
commented that by 1990 “farmers could see that the government wasn’t going to help 
them out and some could see that the future of sheep and cropping farming did not 
look that good”.  
 
This was confirmed by other informants, with most citing lack of profitability in other 
industries as a major reason for dairy industry growth. Informants 19 and 2 moved 
from the meat industry due to price volatility. Informant 7 has converted a large 
portion of his cropping operation to dairying and commented that New Zealand crop 
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farmers are “amongst the highest paid in the world and always complaining whereas 
dairy farmers have traditionally been amongst the lowest paid, but happy”. He also 
felt that dairy farming is more environmentally sustainable than cropping because of 
lower chemical use and that pasture is better for soil carbon and organic matter levels.  
 
According to Informant 9, dairy farmers only use 10% of the chemicals used by 
cropping farms. Informants 7 and 9 felt that crop farmers could convert to dairying 
easily as it is a simpler system to operate than cropping. However, other sources (In3, 
In8) stated that for some crop farmers the change was difficult due to the need to 
manage the additional labour required in dairying. 
 
Several other advantages of dairying were mentioned. These included: increased 
profitability in dairying due to the formation of Fonterra (In13), the feeling that a 
downturn in the dairy industry was never as long or as severe as in other farming 
systems (In3) and that “once the milk is in the vat, the marketing is over as compared 
to cropping where there are a lot of middlemen” (In7). 
 
Informant 15 observed that New Zealand meat farmers have allowed the processors 
to dictate the farming system so that they can keep their plants full. In other words, 
farmers have adopted expensive systems to finish lambs to heavier weights for ‘out of 
season slaughter’.  Dairy farmers produce at the optimum time for economic 
production with the processing plants operating often at less than full capacity.  
7.3.7 Innovation and technology 
The development of new irrigation technologies was rated as significant by all 
informants. For the industry to move to Canterbury, it first needed to be accepted that 
cows would not destroy the border dykes
45
 already in place (In17). In addition the 
irrigation, which started with the Rangitata Diversion Race (RDR) and borderdykes, 
had to move from ‘sheets and frames’46 in the 1960s, to gates and clocks in the 1970s 
and laser levelling in the 1990s (In9). Informant 11 spoke of “green droughts” where 
                                                 
45
 Borderdyke irrigation is a flood type system, where water is channeled down a ‘border’ between 
earthen ‘dykes’. The system relies on gravity flow and the contouring of land to provide ‘fall’. 
46
 Early borderdyke systems involved the placement of movable frames with canvas sheets attached 
within the water delivery race to direct water. This time consuming process was replaced by permanent 
concrete dams and metal gates in the 1970s using modified alarm clocks to deploy the gates in 
sequence.  
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the pastures were green but not growing due to long rotations (up to 17 days) under 
the initial borderdyke systems. 
 
Equally important was the development in New Zealand of deep well drilling 
capabilities (In22). This allowed new areas that were not serviced by surface water to 
be developed (In20). Along with deep wells was the development of the Brigg’s 
rotorainer, a simple and reliable machine that could handle Canterbury conditions and 
for which parts could be purchased locally (In1, In17 and In20). Informant 20 
commented that the development of wells and rotorainers were more important than 
the move from borderdykes to pivots, as it allowed more land to be converted to 
dairying through the development of the underground water resource. 
 
Centre pivot irrigation has been a major innovation, using less water and growing 
more grass (In7). A change that has accompanied pivots on many farms on the RDR 
scheme in mid Canterbury has been ‘on-farm’ storage. Originally, farms were only 
allocated 5/8 of the theoretical requirement of the farm because most farms had some 
pastures for grazing and seed production and other areas in crop (In9). By carefully 
organizing their farming rotations, the water could be allocated to the species needing 
water and, thus, more farmers could take advantage of the limited resource. Although 
this worked well for sheep/cropping, the allocated water was insufficient for 
borderdyked dairy pastures. The adoption of storage and pivots has increased the 
water available for pastoral farming. Informant 9 commented that pivots were not 
new with the first being installed in 1986, but they were unreliable and the early 
models were often found parked “along a hedge” after a few years. Farmers have 
invested heavily over the years upgrading their systems to better technology (In9). 
Other innovations have been more reliable power supplies, improved underground 
piping and submersible pumps (In17). 
 
Several informants felt that the development of larger, more reliable rotary cowsheds 
was important for industry growth (In20, In17 and In4). However, one older farmer 
felt that the 36 aside herringbone was important as it was cheaper to construct, but 
still big enough to milk herds up to 500 cows (In6). Shed technologies have also 
advanced with in-shed meal feeding, automatic drafting, automatic teat spraying and 
cup removers (In4, In20 and In13). However, several sources spoke of failures with 
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some of these devices (In12, In10). Improvements to the machinery used on farms 
were mentioned by In4 and included four-wheel motorbikes and geared electric fence 
reels. The importance of re-grassing paddocks was stressed by In14 and In4. New 
grass along with urea has allowed for increased production and is necessary if 
farmers are to adopt the low grazing residuals espoused by the Lincoln University 
Dairy Farm (In14). Other improvements include pasture monitoring with plate 
metres, software for the analysis of feed supply/demand and other software for 
financial and production monitoring (In12).  
 
The practice of baling and wrapping silage (baleage), allowed for ease of storage and 
transport. With baleage becoming a traded commodity, it was increasingly used to fill 
feed deficits at the beginning and end of the season (In20, In12). Being able to better 
manage the ‘shoulders of the season’, allowed more days in milk and higher stocking 
rates (In12). An old technology that has been rapidly adopted in the past 10 years is 
grain feeding in the milking shed (In20). This technique is particularly prevalent 
among late converters, many of whom still own grain producing land. 
 
Although a number of the innovations identified by informants were important, their 
availability was not restricted to Canterbury so they did not provide Canterbury 
farmers with a competitive advantage compared to other New Zealand dairying areas. 
However, they did provide an advantage relative to other land uses in the region.  
 
Innovation was also necessary in developing farming systems to handle the new 
industry. Learning to manage large herds and the people operating large farms has 
been important (In14, In13). One multiple farm operation found a human capability 
shortage, so the company developed simple, low cost systems which maximise 
pasture utilisation (In15). In their opinion the use of significant levels of supplements 
makes the management of pasture more difficult. Farm layouts and design have been 
an innovation that has made larger herds feasible (In7). Informant 17 mentioned that 
initially milking sheds were located close to roads, but later converters (particularly 
the corporates) located sheds in the middle of farms which was more convenient for 
cows and staff. New products have been found for the surfaces of walking tracks and 
methods of fencing have changed to suit centre pivot irrigators (In17). Some farms 
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have moved to once-a-day milking (OAD) to provide a more sustainable system 
(In13). 
 
Increased nutrient monitoring to reduce fertiliser usage and manage effluent 
application has been important (In14). When converting a new farm, In14 designs 
disposal systems to apply effluent to as much of the farm as possible. A perceived 
problem with dairying is the leaching of nitrogen from cow urine into ground water; 
however, In12 and In7 felt that nitrification inhibitors can be used to manage the 
problem. 
 
Informant In16 stated that innovations have worked well in Canterbury due to the 
calibre of people involved in the industry and their ambitions and motivations - 
strategic investors and corporates have been important. He added that the industry’s 
farmers set goals and have good governance structures. 
7.3.8 Economic conditions and incentives 
Prior to the economic restructuring of the mid-1980s the New Zealand economy was 
very controlled with import restrictions, tariffs, a managed currency and increased 
subsidies to sheep farmers. Informant 11 referred to the period as “the worst of 
government planning, as sheep/crop farmers had no reason to change and became 
locked in to their system”. He also suggested that the producer boards operating at the 
time were a hindrance. 
 
With the restructuring, land prices fell by 66% in the late 1980s (In9). This drop 
attracted farmers in good financial position to expand and the first large scale dairy 
farmers appeared. With improvements in dairy prices, and company mergers during 
the 1990s, dairy land values increased, which allowed borrowing against the capital 
gain and further expansion (In3). 
 
Increased land prices in the North Island in the early 1990s led North Islanders to 
move south in search of cheaper land and bigger farms. This helped existing sheep 
and crop farmers to sell. Informant 11 felt that Canterbury has been a story of cash 
inflows from the North Island and overseas. Informant 16 suggested that capital gains 
of 9% and operating returns of 4% per annum for the past 15 years had been drivers 
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of growth. Although not mentioned by informants, the lack of a capital gains tax in 
New Zealand may have provided an incentive to farmers to purchase and develop 
land. 
 
With the formation of Fonterra, some farmers expanded production due to a desire to 
purchase Fonterra Fair Value Shares (In22). Since one share was needed for each kg 
of milksolids production, expanding farms needed to buy additional shares. At that 
time shares could only be held in proportion to patronage. Some farmers who were 
planning to expand, increased production early to buy ‘lower priced’ shares while 
others saw the shares as an investment and increased production to acquire more 
shares (In22). The shares were initially offered at $3 and for some farmers became an 
investment option as the value increased to $6.70 over a number of years, before 
being ‘frozen’ at $4.52 by Fonterra in 2009. 
7.3.9 Chance events 
None of the sources identified any chance events
47
 that increased industry growth. 
However, events that slowed growth were identified. A number of informants (In4, 
In11, In17 and In20) suggested that the discovery of high levels of the metabolite of 
the pesticide DDT in dairy products in the late 1980s constrained growth for a 
number of years (see Chapter 8). The development and application of mitigation 
techniques coincided with the sudden growth of the industry in 1993 as shown in 
Figure 1.1. 
 
Informant 11 felt that several events had significant effects on New Zealand and, 
thus, the development of the dairy industry. The first was the rapid rise in oil prices 
which began in the 1970s. This caused inflation and economic problems for an oil 
importing nation. The second shock was the restructuring of the New Zealand 
economy in the mid-1980s and removal of government subsidies to agriculture. These 
events changed the New Zealand economy and ‘set the scene’ for a change in land 
use. For some early converters the timing of the restructuring increased the difficulty 
of getting their conversions fully operational. As an example, In10 was left in a 
                                                 
47
 Chance events can include acts of invention, major technical changes such as biotechnology, 
volatility in input costs such as oil price shocks, shifts in world financial markets or exchange rates, 
surges in world or regional demand, political decisions by foreign governments or wars (Porter 1990, 
pp. 124-126). 
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vulnerable position at the time of the restructuring because the Ministry of Works 
took four years to complete his irrigation development. 
7.3.10  Existing infrastructure  
There was a difference of opinion among informants on the infrastructure available to 
support the developing industry. A number of early converters (In21, In3 and In12) 
spoke of being frustrated when trying to source basic dairy farming necessities like 
calf rearing supplies. One even took a list of needs to a supplier so they knew what to 
order for dairy farmers in the future (In3). However, a number of other sources felt 
that the supply of inputs was adequate (In4, In5 and In10). Later converters did not 
report having problems with finding inputs (In19, In7). 
 
Several sources mentioned a lack of competition, particularly among companies 
installing milking machinery (In12, In17). Two converters felt that the veterinarians 
took some time to adapt their skills to dairy cows (In3, In10) and In3 surprised the 
fertiliser spreading companies with the amount of fertiliser he would apply at any one 
time. Informant 1 mentioned that one input supplier in a new dairying area always 
shut during the lunch hour; however, this had to change with the influx of dairy 
farmers who often rushed to town for supplies over this period.  
 
Perhaps the support industry having the most influence on the development of the 
industry was banking (positive and negative). A number of informants stated that 
banks and other financial institutions had been cyclical in their approach to both the 
industry and irrigation development (In9, In4 and In5). Initially, the difficulty in 
obtaining finance could be attributed to a lack of industry history in the province, an 
outbreak of salmonella in one of the processing plants in 1986 and the economic 
restructuring placing some ‘pioneers’ in a poor financial position due to declining 
land values (In17). He also commented that if one of the high profile early converters 
had been placed in bankruptcy in the late 1980s, the growth of the industry would 
have stopped for a number of years. An early converter was refused finance by the 
Rural Bank to expand from 90 cows in 1981 because they milked Jerseys (considered 
unable to withstand cold temperatures) in an area without a dairying background and 
he was “too young” and his father “too old”, even though they had very little debt 
(In12). Eventually, they were able to obtain funds from an insurance company. 
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Shortly before the economic restructuring in the mid-1980s there was a government 
imposed interest rate freeze which made borrowing money difficult. Consequently, 
both In4 and In11 required vendor finance when they bought their farms. 
 
The conservatism of the Rural Bank was shown in the case of In13 who had an 
application refused that year, even though he had $150,000 in cash and 300 cows to 
buy a farm priced at $350,000. He appealed the decision and eventually received a 
6½% fixed rate loan (three years); this loan and fixed interest rate was very important 
to his success (In13). Although having trouble securing their first loan, a number of 
sources (In13, In5 and In3) were within two years; able to easily obtain finance to 
buy additional properties. 
 
Problems in sourcing finance for the first converters resulted in conversions being 
completed slowly and often to a poor standard. Informant 12 mentioned that it took 
10 years to reach their initial targets because he had to develop using cash flow 
surpluses rather than borrowings. 
 
By the 1990s, finance became less of a problem with nearly all respondents reporting 
little problem in securing funds. Informant 22 felt that the banks could see a declining 
sheep and cropping sector and an opportunity for business growth in the dairy 
industry. This coincided with the advent of corporate farms that raised capital in the 
equity markets (In15). 
 
Informant 8 felt that timing was important for the purchase, conversion and/or 
expansion in the mid-1990s. The profits derived at the end of the 1990s, along with 
increases in farm values due to industry mergers, gave farmers increased equity 
which some leveraged in the new century (In15). 
 
By the end of the 1990s and up to 2008, all respondents stated that finance had been 
easy. Informant 19 noted that in 2001 he was able to purchase his farm with 100% 
bank finance, with only cattle and a leveraged support block for additional security. 
This period coincided with increased milk prices and dairy expansion became an 
expanding source of business for banks (In16). In addition, other institutions (finance 
companies) entered into agricultural lending, often in second mortgage positions at 
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higher than base market interest rates (In20). This was partially fuelled by rapidly 
increasing land values (see Figure 6.3). In the words of In7, “dairying became a very 
bankable industry”. 
 
The increased number of banks and increased competition for farm lending was a 
contributing factor to liberal lending policies. A banker told In14 that they were 
forced to make loans outside their credit criteria; otherwise they would lose the 
customer to another bank. Additionally, the secondary source of funds from finance 
companies allowed farmers to borrow larger amounts than were historically available. 
According to In8, many farmers got into trouble by “borrowing for their wants versus 
their needs”.  Informant 14 added that “a number of young farmers over the 
preceding three years have been wrecked by excessive borrowing”. He stated that the 
banks had broken their own rules in lending more than 50% of asset values, with the 
finance companies compounding the problem. Figure 7.3 details the increase in debt 
servicing levels for New Zealand dairy farmers since 2000-01.  
 
 
 
Source: DairyNZ 2010 
 
Figure 7.3 Debt service as a percentage of gross farm revenue for NZ dairy farmers 
from 2000-01 to 2009-10 
 
7.3.11  New infrastructure developed 
As the industry developed, a number of businesses such as electricians, plumbers, 
engineers, fertiliser spreading and trucking companies, have grown their businesses in 
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association with the dairy farmers (In8, In13 and In17). Cooperatives have been 
important for the provision of nearly all input supplies, particularly fertiliser where 
two large, very competitive cooperatives dominate the market (In15, In14).  
 
7.4 Additional factors impacting on industry growth 
As the interviews developed, a number of new conditions were proposed by the 
interviewees. These additional factors are presented in this section. 
 
7.4.1 New resource developed - Irrigation 
The informants were unanimous that the growth in dairying would not have occurred 
without the development of a new resource, in this case irrigation
48
. Recent statistics 
on irrigation are provided by Rajanayaka, et al. (2010). The greatest use of total water 
consumption at 75% is for irrigation. Canterbury has 33% of the weekly national 
water consumption allocation. Canterbury accounts for 63% of the consented 
irrigated area (680,128 ha), an increase of 70% since 1999. Irrigation uses 88% of the 
weekly consumption in Canterbury. Of the consented seasonal allocation for 
irrigation in Canterbury, 58% is from surface water (997 consents) and 42% from 
ground water (4425 consents); there are 590,202 hectares consented for pasture, 
31,358 hectares for arable and 53,089 hectares for horticulture. However, it is 
estimated by Rajanayaka et al. (ibid) that the actual annual use for irrigation as a 
percentage of consented volume in Canterbury is 57%.  
 
Cameron (2009, p. 6) describes the need for irrigation in Canterbury. “The Southern 
Alps have a major effect on the wind ferocity and moisture content of the prevailing 
westerly winds. As the winds flow up and over the mountains they lose their moisture 
                                                 
48
 At the 1978 NZ Irrigation Association Conference, historian H. A. Morton of the University of 
Otago presented a historical perspective on the effects of irrigation: 
“Throughout history, irrigation economics, if on a large scale, have forced the creation or strengthened 
the powers of central government and often became a bureaucratic maze. In some cases it involved the 
development of new systems to solve problems of title and boundaries and thus new mathematical 
systems.  However most of the problems have surrounded the adjustment to growth both in production 
and in population which arise from a stable production and income base”. Looking towards increased 
irrigation in Canterbury he suggested that “ there would be subtle changes in society which one can 
confidently forecast will arise directly because of  irrigation’s effects on the individual farmer’s 
psychology and only indirectly because of its effect on the area’s production. To put it briefly, security 
of mind breeds different men than does risk. Different men create societies which differ”. 
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and become very strong and exceedingly dry. Humidity of 20% is common and 
rapidly removes further moisture from the soil”.  Prior to the development of 
irrigation, farming was conservative with low stocking rates, low value drought 
tolerant crops and contingency plans for droughts. Farmers carried large amounts of 
conserved feeds, were prepared to sell stock at ‘fire-sale’ prices and buy grazing or 
feed often at very high prices (ibid, p. 79). 
 
The first major irrigation project was the Rangitata Diversion Race (RDR) scheme 
started by the government during the economic depression of the late 1930s, 
becoming operational in 1944. In 2010, it provided water to 64,000 hectares in mid 
Canterbury. Although a number of schemes were proposed over the years, only a few 
became a reality. Research conducted in the 1960s by Lincoln University, showed 
that there was no increase in profitability from irrigation if farmers used this new 
resource in traditional sheep farming systems (Stewart, 1963). Initially, irrigation was 
used for drought proofing, rather than to increase production (Nuthall, pers. comm. 
2011).
49
 Engelbrecht (2011, p. 17) has commented that the benefits of irrigation in the 
early years were likely to be greater for the farm servicing and wider business sector 
than for individual farms. This is due to the need to change production systems and 
the additional debt acquired. “With the significant increases in debt required to fund 
the more modern irrigation technology, the payback period can be many years and is 
frequently inter-generational” (ibid).  
 
More recent community schemes included the Amuri (first water supplied in 1980, 
with considerable government subsidies) and the Opuha Dam in South Canterbury 
(commissioned in 1998, with major funding from farmers)
 50
. Extensive development 
                                                 
49
 Peter Nuthall is an Associate Professor in the Agriculture Management Group of Lincoln University. 
He worked on the research reported by Stewart (1963). 
50
 Cameron (2009, p. 32) described a proposed government scheme in 1956 to irrigate from the Rakaia 
River at a cost of 27.5 pounds per acre.  Although 75% of farmers voted for the proposal, this was only 
60% of the land area. Cameron (ibid) proposed the following reasons that the scheme vote was lost: 
1) farmers lacked the confidence or desire to adopt the vastly new technology; 
2) concern about the perceived economics of irrigation, coupled with the apparent high cost 
of the scheme; 
3) large land owners were probably financially well off and enjoying an easy lifestyle and 
thus did not have the economic need that smaller farmers may have felt;  
4) fears about an increase in weed, foot rot, worms and poorer wool quality; 
5) opposition from Corriedale sheep breeders who felt that irrigation would result in a 
change in sheep breeds.    
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of underground water sources commenced in the 1990s as a consequence of improved 
deep well and submersible pump technology.  
 
Although one informant felt that early irrigators received little incentive from 
government (In9), there were examples of government funding through the RDR and 
Amuri Schemes. Informant 2 was part of a government scheme in the late 1970s that 
had support from the Ministry of Works, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Rural 
Bank.  Headworks for the schemes were half funded by a government grant and half 
by a loan to be repaid by water charges. On-farm work was half paid by the 
government and half financed by a suspensory loan
51
 to the farmer. Informant 2 
quoted his father saying, “look if the government is dishing out money you’ve got to 
be in and you’ve got to be in pronto. You mark my words someone is going to find 
out about how good this is and there will be a bloody outcry in the papers and that 
will be the end of it.”  
 
The Rakaia Conservation Order
52
 was important to the development of irrigation 
according to In18. He added that the order was the conservationist’s first achievement 
and led to the Ministry of Works withdrawing from large scale public irrigation 
schemes and limitations placed on future abstractions. Before the conservation order 
there was no need for storage, as rivers were reliable on a ‘run of river’ basis. A 
catalyst for change in water demand came with the droughts of the late 1980s and 
people looking for water to remain financially viable. “People with 200 ha were 
going nowhere farming dry land systems” said In18; “farmer research by Cameron 
and others proved you could pump deep water” he added. Informant 18 added that 
“with the restrictions on the rivers, farmers started looking to groundwater for 
irrigation - the important part was that the development of wells was under their 
control not government, so the development could be done in a short period of time. 
Permits were easy to get and banks would finance development, which lead to a short 
gestation period. Without the conservation order, people would have waited for river 
water - so the conservation order sped up the process of irrigation development.” All 
development since 1990 has been private. Informant 11 spoke of the 1980s being a 
                                                 
51
 Suspensory loans were loans where the principal was forgiven over time by the government. 
52
 In NZ a water conservation order is a legal ruling to protect aspects of water bodies. It may be to 
protect the quantity of water itself or for any issues relating to the water body as a whole (natural, 
cultural or recreational values).    
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nightmare for his farm due to new restrictions on river takes, however, this problem 
was solved in the 1990s by the creation of a community dam in his area (privately 
funded) that provided reliable water and growth for his business. 
 
Informant 8 stated that the addition of irrigation to a farming system causes land use 
change; what is farmed is a matter of economics; therefore the growth in dairy is not 
really about dairying but about irrigation. In the case of Canterbury, water along with 
land being available led to a new economic model for dairying (In8). Informant 1 
commented that due to the economic advantages of irrigated dairying, once irrigation 
was developed on a farm, a conversion to dairying frequently became the farm’s best 
option. Although dairying has been the major land use change resulting from 
irrigation, Rowe (1982, pp. 111-115) spoke at an early irrigation conference of an 
expanded horticultural sector with irrigation and informant 16 suggested that in the 
future horticulture will supplant dairying due to the production of more food per unit 
of water consumed. 
 
 The increased interest in irrigated dairy farming in Canterbury in the late 1980s and 
1990s was also influenced by a series of droughts in the North Island (In20). He 
added that “visitors to Canterbury were mesmerised by water being applied by 
borderdykes and they wanted it”. But there were also effects on farming practices 
from irrigation; In5 moved to Canterbury from the West Coast of the South Island 
and he commented that in a dry climate with water, a farmer could maximise the 
response of an input - “on the Coast you could put urea on and it might get washed 
away or it could be ineffective due to a dry spell”. Through being able to control at 
least one aspect of the climatic environment, dairy farmers were more likely to 
achieve consistent production and thus could budget more accurately and “push the 
envelope” in terms of acquiring debt (In11).  
 
However, as the groundwater resource became over allocated, further abstractions 
were denied by the regional council Environment Canterbury (Ecan)
53
. In addition, in 
2011 Ecan decreed that wells were to have seasonal allocation limits (In18). The 
advent of seasonal limits on groundwater has encouraged farmers to use surface water 
                                                 
53
 Regional councils were formed in 1989 and replaced more than 700 ad hoc bodies. Their primary 
responsibility is in environmental management. 
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where possible, often with the development of storage ponds. Several respondents felt 
that for dairy growth to continue more reliable water will be necessary which is only 
possible through storage (In7, In1, In18 and In15).  
 
Although irrigation gained some momentum in the 1970s, adoption was slow until 
the 1990s when technology and economic changes were important (In9, In11 and 
In18).  These initial irrigation systems often resulted in inconsistent pasture growth 
(In20); partly due to the schemes coming under stress from long return times and 
adverse climatic conditions. The development of the Briggs rotorainer made 
irrigation a ‘once a day’ job and the rotorainers were not as affected by wind as were 
gun irrigators.. Because of the reduced labour requirement, they were very important 
for the development of dairy farming (In18). Informant 5 agreed that a number of 
irrigation problems have been alleviated by changing to spray from borderdyke 
systems, with further improvements through the development of pond storage and 
pivots. In the Amuri scheme 65% of the 20,000 ha are now irrigated by spray 
irrigation rather than by the original border dykes (In10). Informant 15 estimated that 
the recent change to river water storage and pivots from deep wells has reduced 
power costs from $1200/ha to $350/ha on his properties. From an economic point of 
view an increase in production of 200 kg milksolids/ha pays for a pivot (In2). 
 
 An informant with New Zealand and Tasmanian interests (In14) mentioned that 
without irrigation in Tasmania, his company had struggled to reach 1000 kg 
milksolids/ha compared with much higher levels of production on irrigated New 
Zealand properties. North Islanders who moved to the South Island produced more 
milksolids per cow and per hectare with the same cows due to better feeding and 
having irrigation to combat droughts (In2). He added that “even a 17 day round on 
borderdykes was better than a drought in Taranaki”. 
 
Informant 22 suggested that there was not only a production incentive for the 
development of irrigation, but also since the allocation of water rights by Ecan was 
on a ‘first come, first served’ basis, farmers applied for water and expanded their 
operation to capture the capital gains associated with irrigated land.  
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7.4.2 Human reasons 
For early farmers, who milked just a few cows, the reasons for dairying were quite 
different. Informant 12 recalls his father saying that “everyone milked a few cows to 
survive during the depression and WW2”. In his family’s case, his father ran the 
mixed cropping and sheep operation, while an unmarried sister milked 20 cows—the 
start of their dairy operation.   
 
Early converters in the 1980s did not necessarily have money or business growth as 
their prime objective for moving to Canterbury. A number (In3, In21, In4 and In5) 
moved to Canterbury to get closer to schools, sporting opportunities, airports and 
universities. Informant 20 noted that many of the early converters were moving from 
difficult areas like the West Coast of the South Island or Northland. Rarely did early 
farmers move to Canterbury from an established dairying area like the Waikato 
(In20). Informant 14 felt that farmers were attracted to Canterbury due to irrigation 
and sunshine which allowed consistent production - “people leave Southland and the 
West Coast to get away from rain”. According to In9, for many later converters, 
changing to dairying has changed their lifestyles, adding that without the profit 
provided by dairying they would not have a lifestyle. 
 
Several informants identified the Canterbury dairy development as a story about 
people and their hopes and aspirations (In14, In4). Early converters had to learn to 
deal with staff and droughts - which caused many to leave the Province (In4). In 
addition, most were moving away from family and support networks (In4). In a 
number of cases the tenure of early converters was short for these reasons. Others 
such as In10 listed the challenge of developing a new area as a major motivation. 
Informant 4 said that an attraction was being able to buy a large section of flat land 
and set the farm up the way he wanted, rather than buying the problems associated 
with a farm established many years before in different economic times and with older 
technologies. 
 
The ability to develop larger farms has allowed many early converters to move into 
other areas of interest (In11); however, a number of early converters are still 
expanding (In6, In12, In8, In1 and In14). Expansion for In12 has always had the 
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incentive of pursuing additional profits, but lifestyle objectives like re-modelling a 
house has led to more cows being milked at times.  
 
Informant 6 stated that dairying has always provided an opportunity for everyone; 
truck drivers or factory worker’s sons, could progress in the dairy industry. The 
cornerstone of the industry is farmers working together through industry bodies like 
Dairy New Zealand, Livestock Improvement or other cooperatives to grow the 
industry - the industry is outwardly looking for the good of all (In12). Informant 17 
added that the growth in Canterbury dairying was due to astute people recognizing a 
business opportunity and pursuing it. 
7.4.3 Ability to purchase land at a lower cost  
A number of informants listed the ability to buy lower priced land (In1, In14, In10, 
In4 and In13) as a primary motivation, with the perception expressed by some that 
changing land use has always been the best way to make money in New Zealand (In4, 
In14). Although property values declined during the New Zealand economic 
restructuring and briefly dropped at other points during the period under investigation 
(In1), they have generally trended upwards (see Figure 6.3). Informants 20 and 14 
mentioned that corporates could see the profits available in buying farms and 
converting. However, with the haste to buy as much ‘cheap’ land as possible and 
convert quickly, a number of conversions were done very cheaply, sometimes 
without adequate water allocations (In1, In14). 
 
Other farmers such as In13 purchased in Canterbury due to an inability to buy more 
land in his previous location. This was also the case with many of the sharemilkers 
who arrived from the North Island in the 1990s (In19). 
 
Several converters had sought farms in Canterbury locations considered poor for 
farming, as a less desirable area meant they did not have to compete with other 
farmers for land (In13, In8) - their land was less attractive and thus lower priced. 
 
Figure 7.4 compares the value of a hectare of dairy, arable or sheep fattening land 
over the period from 1988 to 2009 in constant value dollars (2010). The graph shows 
that there have been large increases in land values for all types of farming systems. 
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The chart confirms the informant’s reports of the availability of lower priced land and 
that land has been a good investment. The data would suggest that there was a larger 
increase in value from converting from a ‘fattening’ property to dairy, with a much 
smaller increase when converting from ‘arable’ to dairy. It is proposed that the 
cropping farms which were generally on heavier soil types were providing higher 
levels of returns than the fattening properties which tended to be on lighter soil types 
(stony and sandy, with lower levels of organic matter). These differences were 
reflected in the land price.  
 
 
 
Source: derived from Valuation NZ and Quotable Value NZ 
 
Figure 7.4 Values per hectare (constant value dollars 2010) of Canterbury dairy, 
arable and fattening land from 1988 to 2009 
 
7.4.4 Ability to develop large scale farms 
Although the key factors of water and lower priced land were identified by all 
informants, the ability to develop large farms was also seen as important. Informant 4 
was able to buy twice the hectares of land in Canterbury as he could in Taranaki, 
which allowed him to employ more labour and, eventually, sharemilkers. Large farms 
allowed the adoption of technologies and the ability to “work on the business rather 
than in the business” (In11). A large farming business allowed In13 to hire an office 
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manager and develop better HR programmes, which greatly improved the operation 
of the business. 
 
The downside of large farms was the managing of people (In1). Although all of the 
informants felt they had developed the skills to employ and retain labour, a number of 
dairy farmers have exited the Canterbury dairy industry because they did not like 
managing labour (In4, In5). Informant 1 stated that a certain number of those who 
failed in managing staff had entered the industry solely focussed on business growth. 
 
Informant 4 mentioned that the ability to develop large farms was helped by the dry 
climate allowing higher stocking rates and thus larger herds with less susceptibility to 
pasture damage in most seasons. 
7.4.5 Growth of an irrigated support industry 
The lack of profitability in other farming sectors has seen traditional farmers 
providing services for dairy farms. Informant 6 mentioned that for each hectare used 
for milking cows, a hectare of support land was required. These farms graze the 
calves, yearlings, winter the cows, provide baleage and grow the grain. The ability to 
source off farm grazing and supplementary feeds has allowed the maximization of 
stocking rates on the dairy farm (In3, In11 and In9). Informant 10 stated that the 
development of this industry was very important for dairy growth. Informant 9 noted 
that farmers converting to dairy support have found the move to be profitable. Early 
converter In10 said that winter grazing was initially a problem. The attitude of 
existing sheep/crop farmers was that you were not a good farmer if you had cows on 
your property over the winter. 
 
Informant 15 stated that many farmers were now looking to purchase support blocks 
rather than expanding their milk producing capacity. This is due to the high cost of 
converting farms and a desire to gain control of a vital part of the farming system.  
7.4.6 Influence of corporate farmers 
In the late 1980s, a chance meeting between a town supply dairy farmer who was 
moving to the factory supply industry and an investor resulted in the formation of a 
publicly listed company (In17). This event was quickly followed by dairy 
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investments by another group. Over the 1990s these companies had a major effect on 
the dairy industry in Canterbury and Southland. Eventually the first company 
converted and owned 74 farms with 42,000 cows in New Zealand and 13 farms and 
14,000 cows in Tasmania. The other owned 32 farms in New Zealand. 
 
Initial conversions were completed on what had become unprofitable sheep farms in 
Southland and Canterbury. Canterbury farms usually had borderdyke irrigation 
(In14). The corporates changed the method of completing a conversion, by setting up 
the irrigation first and then locating the sheds, tracks and other buildings to suit the 
irrigation (In4, In17, In14 and In10). Previous conversions had been more piecemeal 
due to lack of finance, equity and experience (In4, In10). As land prices increased in 
Southland and mid Canterbury, the corporates moved to lower priced land in the 
Amuri Basin (In10, In2). Existing sheep farmers tended to sell rather than convert, as 
they wanted to remain sheep farmers and tended to move elsewhere (In10). By the 
mid-1990s the first corporate began to convert spray irrigated cropping farms, 
particularly in coastal areas. They found that production was higher with spray 
irrigation than with borderdykes (In4).   
 
Although the corporate farmers made a significant contribution to the growth of the 
industry, by 2002 the price of unconverted land had risen to the point that there was 
no longer a profit to be made in buying farms and converting to dairying. The 
shareholders in the first group wanted a 10% return on investment which could not be 
received from farming operations (In14). Additionally, these investors were not 
happy that agricultural shares frequently were valued 25% lower than the market 
value of the assets, which was considered a reflection of the risks of farming (In14, 
In15). Informant 15 suggested the largest single investor needed funds and pushed for 
a liquidation of properties for cash flow purposes. The farms were sold and the 
shareholders received a profit on their investment (In14). The first group was 
required to offer the farms to their sharemilkers first (as part of the sharemilking 
agreement). This resulted in many sharemilkers purchasing their first farm (In19). 
The other corporate sold to a variety of buyers due to the need for cash for other 
unrelated farming operations (In1).  Informant 19 commented that corporates 
presented an opportunity for new sharemilkers to enter the industry and grow. When 
looking for a sharemilking job, he targeted the first corporate as a potential employer 
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due to their reputation as a ‘fair’ employer. The accountability demanded by the 
corporate was important for monitoring his business. As well, the personal mentoring 
provided by the managing director (and his wife) and field staff were important to his 
success. 
 
Nearly all sources felt that corporate farmers were important. They stimulated a 
growth in milk production through the purchase and conversion of ‘no frills, but 
sound’ dairy farms. They gave many ‘immigrant’ sharemilkers from other parts of 
New Zealand an opportunity to develop a business and buy their own farms. They 
also were significant contributors to the growth and development of the cooperatives 
servicing the industry (In21, In4). Informant 15 suggested that strengths of a 
corporate can be in compliance and in the ability to ‘stick to a plan’. Farmers learned 
a lot from the corporates about managing staff, finances and purchases (In14).  
 
It would appear that corporates were attracted by the potential to achieve 
entrepreneurial profits from purchasing and developing a dairy farming business. 
They appeared to have been very successful in developing a model for farm 
development which they replicated on multiple properties. However, they were less 
successful in obtaining the desired levels of profit from the developed farms. 
7.4.7 Business structures new to the industry 
Although one of the early converters did have investor partners (In3), the majority of 
early conversions were family owned operations. During the 1990s, farmers began to 
utilise investors (known as equity partners) to provide additional equity to meet the 
credit requirements of the financial institutions. Informant 13 noted that a significant 
number of the conversions since 2000 have tended to take the business structure of 
equity partnerships. The additional financial strength has allowed them to buy or 
convert a larger farm and develop the farm quickly to a higher standard. 
 
In most cases, the farmer operating the business is called an equity manager and 
receives a salary and dividends as well as gains in the value of the property. 
According to In4, equity partnerships have made a significant change to the nature of 
the industry. Historically, a 50-50 sharemilker would move from a large sharemilking 
job (500+ cows) to buy a small farm (150-200 cows). As equity increased, the farm 
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would be sold and the farmer would move to a larger farm. This process might be 
repeated several times in a farming career (Clarke 2008, pp. 1-2). The advent of 
equity partnerships has allowed the sharemilker to partially own a large property 
more quickly, albeit with investors to whom they must report. 
 
The advent of equity partnerships appeared to be associated with a decline in the 
number of 50-50 sharemilking jobs, as equity partnerships have replaced landowners 
with sharemilkers (In4, In5). Figure 7.5 details the decline in the percentage of 50-50 
sharemilkers operating in the Canterbury dairy industry since 2003.   
 
 
 
Source: derived from LIC 2010 
 
Figure 7.5 Percentage of farms with 50-50 sharemilkers in Canterbury 
 
 Although equity partnerships have opened up opportunities for some sharemilkers to 
achieve a form of farm ownership, they needed to obtain a high percentage of the 
ownership to ensure they were treated as equal partners (In7). Two informants (In4, 
In5) stated that many equity managers enter into partnerships where they own less 
than15% of the business, and thus lacked control of the operation. The best equity 
partners are other farmers because they understand the ups and downs of farming 
(In14). Several of the informants were involved in equity partnerships and have found 
them a successful way to grow their business (In1, In7, In8 and In19). 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
years 
% 50-50
150 
 
7.5 Social effects of the new industry 
Informant 4 commented that dairy farming in Canterbury was more a business than a 
lifestyle compared to other dairying areas and this has had social impacts, which 
posed problems for early converters. 
 
A number of early converters mentioned the changes to social systems in 
communities with dairy conversions. Informant 17 commented, that historically, the 
social hierarchy from top to bottom for farmers in Canterbury was high country sheep 
and cattle, intensive mixed cropping, intensive cropping and intensive sheep farming 
with the bottom of the ‘social ladder’ being dairy, pig and poultry farmers. A number 
of sources (In3, In5, In10, In1 and In4) relayed stories of initial antagonism to 
dairying and the effect of the influx of dairy farmers on the social structure of the 
area. Neighbours commented that dairy farmers “weren’t real farmers” (In11). 
Informant 7 suggested that humans disliked change, whether it is cows in Canterbury 
or changing the dry landscape of Central Otago through irrigation. 
 
In recent times, high milksolids payouts have also changed the public’s attitude. 
Informant 6 felt that the payout of nearly $7/kg milksolids in 2008 led to the public 
considering dairy farmers to be multi-millionaires. 
 
Informant 9 mentioned that because dairy farming used fewer chemicals relative to 
sheep and cropping farms and there were no processing activities in mid Canterbury, 
the industry had caused some unemployment. However, he added “Those who have 
witnessed the development of Ashburton Borough, and the district as a whole over 
the past 30 or 40 years would probably not wish the district to return to its earlier 
days of drought crisis, employment losses and erratic stop-start business fortunes”.   
 
On a positive note, most informants mentioned increased school rolls and increased 
population in country districts. 
 
Informant 18 commented that “The social structure of Canterbury has changed due to 
dairy---it used to be that the Land Rover that passed you on the highway was driven 
by a guy in a tweed jacket, now days it will be a guy in a pair of blue overalls”. 
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7.6 Summary and discussion of Chapter 7  
It was apparent that there have been three distinct periods of development, which 
have been named ‘the three Waves’. These roughly encompass the 1980s, the 1990s 
and the 2000s. The differing characteristics of the waves were: 
 
Wave 1 (1980s) farmers tended to be driven more by entrepreneurial motives and 
were often moving from another dairy region that did not appear as favourable to the 
farmers for a variety of reasons. Most saw the ability to farm at scale through 
purchasing lower cost, irrigated land as the main driver of their move to Canterbury. 
For many there was a human element. These immigrants often came for the extra 
feed security available through irrigation - not necessarily for business growth.  
 
Wave 2 (1990’s) farmers tended to be more interested in growing their wealth, often 
sharemilkers from other dairying areas in New Zealand, who were striving to buy a 
farm. This was aided by the conversion of many sheep/crop farms to dairying by 
corporate farmers after the economic restructuring of New Zealand in the mid-1980s. 
The corporate farmers had largely left the industry by the early 2000s. In doing so, 
they sold many of their farms to their sharemilkers, thus creating a new generation of 
farm owners. However, there were also traditional sheep/crop farms starting to 
convert for economic reasons. 
  
Wave 3 (2000s) farmers tended to be established farmers from other sectors, who 
converted to dairy farming for economic reasons. There was also an effect on the rate 
of growth from aggressive lending to dairy farmers by the primary and secondary 
financial institutions. Wave 3 farmers tended to develop large intensive farms. As 
there were other processing opportunities at this time (NZ Dairies and Synlait), a 
number of the third Wave converters did not join the dominant processing 
cooperative. This Wave also saw a larger degree of investment from non-farming 
investors, particularly in equity partnerships. 
 
When comparing this research to Chapters 2 and 3, a number of insights have been 
gained. Most of the farming informants established their farming businesses in 
Canterbury in the 1980s (Wave 1), but the rapid increases did not occur until the early 
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1990s. In the early years the industry’s farming systems were only a reflection of 
established dairying areas, with similar productivity levels but with lower milk prices 
and thus lower profitability. 
 
 However, by the 1990s cows per hectare and farm sizes began to rapidly increase 
(Wave 2). This coincided with conversions by corporate entities, new methods of 
financing growth in processing, more liberal bank financing for farms and the 
development of mitigation technologies for dealing with pesticide contamination of 
land. The capital gains available from converting to dairy from other land uses were 
significant (see Chapter 3 and Figure 7.6) and would have contributed to additional 
conversions. These steps allowed the industry to develop the critical mass necessary 
to become an important segment of the national industry.  
 
By the 2000s (Wave 3) the land in dairying had increased by five times (100,000 
hectares) and productivity had increased in comparison to traditional dairy areas. But 
from 2000, Canterbury increased cows per hectare and milksolids production per 
hectare much faster than the rest of the country. Profitability in Canterbury, and for 
the case study farm, was often considerably higher than the rest of the industry in the 
2000s. 
 
The Wave 1 farmers exhibited many of the characteristics of Schumpeter’s definition 
of an entrepreneur in that they often purchased and converted land in Canterbury for 
the challenge as much as for financial returns. They took on significant risk and had 
to build the infrastructure and industry, as well as constantly adjust their systems for 
the new environment. Some showed evidence of building their ‘own kingdom’. 
 
The importance of extension was confirmed with early converters suggesting there 
was a lack of extension at the industry’s onset. A number of informants stated that 
early problems were usually solved by the farmers, consultants and their tradesmen, 
as existing research providers were not interested in the fledgling industry. Several 
informants suggested that the growth in the 1990s was greatly assisted by specialist 
dairy consultants establishing in the area. Chapters 2 and 3 outlined an advantage to 
Canterbury in terms of productivity and profitability in the 2000s. It was suggested by 
some informants that these gains were due to the establishment of the Lincoln 
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University Dairy Farm. A postal survey of Canterbury farmers described in Chapter 9 
examines this proposition. 
 
Although most informants did not credit government policies with contributing to 
growth, a number appreciated the role of government in trade negotiations. In 
contrast to the informant opinions, Chapter 6 outlined a significant involvement by 
government. However, a great deal of the government support came in earlier 
decades (quality assurance, guaranteed prices, and support for industry 
establishment), whereas most of the informants would have spent much of their 
farming career in an environment when government was exiting involvement in 
agriculture.  
 
Table 6.1 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6 demonstrate changes in relative 
profitability of the prevalent New Zealand agriculture systems. Although most 
informants had always been dairy farmers, several had converted from other sectors 
due to economics. Some considered grassland farming more environmentally 
sustainable than crop farming and most had a strong positive attachment to their 
involvement with a large processing/marketing cooperative.    
 
Innovation and the adoption of new technology played a significant role in the 
development of the Canterbury industry. Rotary cowsheds, supplementary feeding 
and new machinery types were adopted throughout the country. However, in 
Canterbury, changes in irrigation were the most important technology changes. 
Canterbury has led the way from shallow wells or ‘run of river’ water to deep wells 
and the storage of river water. Initial irrigation was ‘hand shift’, which progressed to 
rotorainers and k-lines to centre pivots. A number of informants also mentioned that 
since the new industry participants tended to start with large herds, Canterbury 
farmers had to design farms to handle these large herds as well as the increased 
staffing. 
 
Most informants did not feel that economic conditions or incentives favoured the 
development, although they recognised that the restructuring of the New Zealand 
economy provided opportunities. Likewise, few recognised the effect of chance 
events on growth. As detailed in Chapter 6, the development of Asian economies has 
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led to increased demand and higher prices for dairy products; however, this was not 
mentioned by informants. Perhaps, time had dimmed the memories of the effects of 
war, weather, pestilence, oil price shocks and protectionism. 
 
It is proposed that the growth in Canterbury dairying was significantly affected by 
actions of the local processing cooperative. Alpine Dairy Products faced a number of 
problems based around the annual growth in milk to process. Informants discussed 
problems with processing capabilities; environmental contamination; the financing of 
growth; product quality and governance (see Chapter 8). A history of cooperative 
involvement and farmer investment in their cooperatives has given New Zealand 
dairy farmers strong supply chains. Additionally, informants suggested that the 
creation of Fonterra provided the industry with the ability to have an increased level 
of influence in international markets. The dairy industry provides an interesting 
contrast to the meat industry where a mixture of cooperatives and private companies 
compete for raw material domestically as well as for overseas markets. Although 
there are frequent discussions about meat industry rationalisation and the creation of a 
Fonterra structure, the meat industry has not been able to consolidate activities to the 
same degree as the dairy industry. 
 
Most discussion around the existing infrastructure revolved around the availability of 
finance. Informants suggested that the banks had not initially supported the industry; 
however, those converting in Wave 1 did so during the economic restructuring and 
depreciating land values. The banks were also criticised for lending too freely in 
some periods. Considering the growth in debt levels, there was no doubt that the 
banks involvement has been important. Although some informants suggested that 
there was a lack of support industries initially, the void was quickly filled. Informants 
listed the development of dairy support farms to provide grazing and supplementary 
feed as important. In Wave 1 this industry did not exist and was considered a problem 
for early converters. The growth of this sector was aided by the development of 
irrigation and was often the result of a reduction in the profitability of traditional 
systems.  
 
Besides the development of a support industry, a number of other factors not included 
in Figure 6.4 were identified by the informants. The development of water resources 
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for irrigation was considered the major contributing factor to development. Although 
irrigation had been available since the 1940s, it was initially seen as drought 
insurance rather than as a means to increase productivity. The ability to apply water 
from surface and groundwater to ‘light land’ opened up a large land area to dairying. 
This was only possible through improved technology and innovations in irrigation 
systems.  
 
Also of importance were human reasons, such as a desire to build a larger business, 
improve educational/sporting opportunities or to take on a new challenge. A number 
of informants suggested that the industry offered people from all walks of life an 
opportunity to better themselves. The lower priced land with irrigation in Canterbury 
appealed to farmers, such as the case study farmers in Chapter 3. The data in Figure 
7.4 suggests that there have been significant entrepreneurial profits available from 
converting fattening farms to dairying.  
 
From a business prospective, the entry of corporations to dairy farming was seen as 
positive by informants. Without the financial constraints which affected most Wave 1 
farmers, corporates developed systems that produced standardised, ‘easy to operate 
farms’. The farms were operated by 50-50 sharemilkers and resulted in an influx of 
new, generally younger, farmers to the area. However, the inability to obtain a 
sufficient return for shareholders from operations led the major corporates to exit the 
industry early in Wave 3. As the price of land increased, many farmers (particularly 
in Wave 3) involved investing shareholders or equity partners in their business. This 
has resulted in a farm business structure in Canterbury that at times reflected a model 
more commonly associated with corporates. A number of informants stressed that a 
growing industry brings in new people and creates a positive attitude. 
 
Finally, a number of informants commented on the social impacts of the development 
of the dairy industry. Obviously, the new industry created a situation where the 
composition of communities changed and, as mentioned by I6, humans tend to resist 
and, often, resent change. For some members of the community, there was an effect 
on their jobs or businesses. Others saw the change and additional economic activity 
as an opportunity and adapted to the new industry. It should be noted that the growth 
took place in the context of a restructured New Zealand economy which provided 
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incentives for growth and development through reduced tax rates, coupled with the 
lack of a capital gains tax and the removal of death duties (1992).  
 
A diagram (Figure 7.6) places the factors proposed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the 
form of a timeline of the proposed development of the Canterbury dairy industry.  
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Figure 7.6 Timeline of development for the Canterbury dairy industry (1984-2010) 
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     Chapter 8 
 
The role of the local dairy company in the 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry 
“Cooperatives are a commercial solution to an economic problem of 
market power. Individually farmers are weak sellers, so a cooperative 
is an appropriate business model to give them strength” (Roadley 
2003, pers. comm.).
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8.1 Introduction               
Chapter 7 contained the perspectives of industry participants, consultants and 
commentators as to the reasons that led to the growth in dairy farming in Canterbury. 
All industry participants identified the importance of the local dairy processing 
cooperative to this growth. As discussed in Chapter 6, before the formation of 
Fonterra and the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act (DIRA) of 2001, the cooperatives 
operating in New Zealand were independent, although required to sell their product 
through the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB). The cooperatives had defined 
geographical areas and there were no competing processors.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how this small dairy cooperative managed a 
number of issues including:  high levels of growth, on-farm quality control, dealing 
with pesticide residues and funding growth in processing capacity to handle the ever 
increasing milk supply. Additionally, the discussion will cover innovations in 
cooperative governance, the creation of shareholder wealth and this company’s role 
in creating a unified dairy industry in New Zealand. The chapter does not include a 
discussion on the development of a processor after the DIRA and creation of 
Fonterra, as these developments solved the processing problems for new entrants. 
Thus the potential lack of processing capability was no longer a problem for industry 
development.  
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 John Roadley was an early converter in the Canterbury dairy industry. He was chairman of  Alpine 
Dairy Products and the inaugural chairman of Fonterra.  
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The discussion will further inform Research Questions One, Two and Three, by 
describing a major factor that became a facilitator of growth. Additionally, it will 
contribute to Research Questions four and five through suggesting the importance of 
the processor in the development of an agricultural industry. 
 
8.2 Methods and key information sources 
Information used to produce this chapter was obtained through interviews with past 
directors (8), management (1), employees (2) and consultants (2) of four cooperatives 
in the South Island. These cooperatives included the Temuka and Tai Tapu 
Cooperative Dairy Companies, which merged to form Alpine Dairy Products in 1987. 
The Southland Dairy Cooperative merged with Alpine Dairy Products in 1998 to 
form the South Island Dairy Company. 
 
These interviews took place during the months of December 2006 and January 2007. 
All interviews were recorded with participants’ permission and a draft of the chapter 
was provided to two interviewees for comment as to accuracy. If quoted in this 
chapter, those interviewed, are identified by a code using an ‘S’ plus a number. A 
wide range of printed material (secondary sources) provided financial data and 
commentary. These included company annual reports, merger documents, supplier 
newsletters, research documents and media publications.  
8.3 History of legacy dairy cooperatives 
When the Canterbury dairy industry expansion began in the early 1980s, two 
cooperatives existed to process milk that was not from the ‘town supply’ industry. 
The majority of the resulting products were sold overseas by the New Zealand Dairy 
Board (NZDB)
55
. These cooperatives were the Tai Tapu Central Cooperative Dairy 
Company Ltd (near Christchurch) and the Temuka Cooperative Dairy Company Ltd 
(near Timaru), which merged to form Alpine Dairy Products in 1987. 
 
The Tai Tapu Cooperative Dairy Company was founded in 1888 near the township of 
Tai Tapu with 528 shares. The shares cost ₤256 and farmers collectively guaranteed 
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 most companies did provide a small quantity of products to the domestic market 
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 £2 in 1888 is equivalent to $355 in Quarter 2, 2010 (Reserve Bank CPI Calculator) 
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the milk of 500 cows (Dunstan 1963). In the ensuing years, a number of cooperatives 
emerged within a 50 km radius of Christchurch; however, by 1943 all the 
cooperatives had merged into the Tai Tapu Central Cooperative Dairy Company 
(ibid). In 1949, a new plant was commissioned in Christchurch to produce 4,000 
empirical tons of butter per year and to include a drying operation to produce 
buttermilk powder. By the time of the merger with the Temuka Cooperative in 1987, 
Tai Tapu was handling 59 million litres of milk annually (ibid).  
 
The Clandeboye Cooperative Dairy Company Ltd was formed in 1910 in South 
Canterbury, as a collection facility to send cream by rail to a butter plant in 
Ashburton (50 kilometres). The cooperative began processing its own milk in 1914. 
Several other small cooperatives were formed in the area at Orari in 1919, at Milford 
in 1929 and at Temuka (Cloverlea Cooperative) in 1934 (Blyth, Price 1999, p. 10). 
These factories all produced cheese. A collective cool store for cheese was built in 
1957 at the Port of Timaru. In the 1970s, these cooperatives merged to form the 
Temuka Cooperative Dairy Company and were joined by the butter - producing 
Midland Dairy Cooperative of Ashburton in the early 1980s. In 1980, the company 
built a brine plant for producing parmesan cheese and in 1987 gouda cheese 
production commenced. By 1986-87, the factory was annually handling 169 million 
litres of milk (ibid, p. 51). 
   
By 1987, both companies had problems. The Tai Tapu cooperative had suffered an 
outbreak of Salmonella in its powder plant in 1986. This affected the company’s 
balance sheet, with “Capital and Reserves” [sic] dropping from $5.5 million to $4.6 
million. The annual accounts for 1987 show an increase in accounts receivable from 
$2.4 m to $9.5 m, in creditors from $2.4 m to $9 m and in the bank overdraft from 
less than $100,000 to $1.3 m. The Temuka cooperative had been weakened 
financially through attempts at diversification. These investments included a finance 
company designed to raise funds to finance the company’s growth and to lend to new 
farmers, a transport company, a plantation forest, a cool store and a maritime services 
company. The business model to repay the debt incurred for the new processing plant 
relied on further conversions of sheep/cropping farms to dairying. When the 
conversions did not occur due to the economic restructuring of the New Zealand 
economy, the company was not able to operate the plants at full capacity and 
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struggled to meet debt obligations. Alpine Dairy Products was formed in 1987 from 
the merger of these two companies. As well as company problems, many of the 
Alpine farmers (Wave 1) were in a weakened financial condition due to low levels of 
equity and reduced product prices In addition, a severe drought affected the area in 
1987-88.  
 
At the time of the merger to form Alpine, there were approximately 160 members in 
each cooperative. Several sources (S1, S2 and S8) speculated that at merger, the 
equity of the new company was 6%. When the accounts for each company were 
consolidated, equity appeared to be closer to 20% (Alpine 1987). However, the 
commentators could be correct, as the accounts for the Temuka cooperative appeared 
to overvalue the cool stores (which were sold for $636,000 less than book value in 
1989). Additionally, the value of plant (buildings, plant and equipment) was 
increased from $7.6 m to $21.6 m, but the term debt only increased by $8.7 m. In the 
first year, ex-Tai Tapu suppliers received 30 cents per kilogram of milkfat less than 
Temuka members (Wilson, Russell 1986).  
 
The merger document projected that costs would be reduced by $649,000 annually, 
primarily in the distribution/marketing, laboratory/administration and financial areas. 
It was also predicted that manufacturing costs would decrease and there would be 
future buying advantages for inputs (Wilson, Russell, 1986). The 1987-88 accounts 
stated that “over thirty percent of the group’s turnover came from marketing, 
distribution and value added processing”. Prior to the economic restructuring of the 
New Zealand economy, dairy products such as fluid milk (town milk) and butter were 
highly regulated in terms of licenses to produce and market in New Zealand. After 
partial deregulation in 1988, the smaller companies found that competition with the 
much larger New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative Dairies was difficult in 
the domestic market. By 1991-92, Alpine had withdrawn from domestic marketing 
and distribution activities.  
 
Over the next 10 years, until the merger with the New Zealand Dairy Group, the 
Board of Directors and Management were faced with a wide variety of problems and 
opportunities. As second Board Chairman, John Roadley, stated, “we found a new 
hole in the road each year”. As the company developed, the directors and 
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management instituted a number of programmes and systems that became industry 
standards. But equally important were the activities that created wealth for their 
shareholders - a concept new to the industry.             
8.4 Dairy industry structure in the 1980s 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the New Zealand Dairy Board developed from a number 
of New Zealand government interventions to provide price stability to farmers. The 
NZDB had the statutory powers to compulsorily acquire all dairy products as well as 
the ability to issue domestic and export licenses. It provided leadership to the industry 
and was governed by nominees from the industry and government. It controlled the 
Livestock Improvement Company (herd improvement), the extension services and the 
magazine The Dairy Exporter. The Dairy Board was one of several ‘Producer 
Boards’; these were entities created by Acts of Parliament. The ownership of the 
Dairy Board was passed to the dairy industry by the government in 1996 (New 
Zealand Dairy Group, 1996). 
 
The main advantages to the farmer owned cooperatives of the NZDB, were that the 
NZDB was required to buy all products produced by the cooperatives and pay for it 
on the 20
th
 of the month following manufacture - with no relationship between the 
timing of manufacture and the timing of sales. The price paid by the NZDB to the 
cooperatives was the theoretical cost for an efficient factory to produce the particular 
product and was referred to as the ‘make cost’. This price became the base price paid 
to farmers. If a cooperative could produce their products at a lower price, or had other 
sources of income, they could provide a higher return to suppliers.   
8.5 Problems for the company 
As an undercapitalised company, Alpine Dairy Products struggled financially from 
the time of formation in 1987. The high debt levels, small supply base, large 
collection area and limited product range, made it difficult for the company to pay out 
more than the base payout that they received from the NZDB
 57
. The company was 
                                                 
57
 The North Island companies were often able to pay over 30 cents/kg of milksolids more than Alpine. 
The large companies had the advantage of being able to ‘chase higher paying markets’ through their 
diverse product range. Other income/cost savings for some of the North Island companies were 
derived from owning input supply companies (Anchormart and Town & Country) as well as cheaper 
sources of energy (coal and natural gas) 
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also noted for processing and product quality problems. In addition, the rapid increase 
in supply strained the company’s governance, management and balance sheet.  
 
Those interviewed for this study identified the following problems in the early years 
of Alpine Dairy Products: 
 
1) governance and management,  
2) milk quantity and quality,  
3) finance,  
4) mergers and industry restructuring.  
These areas will be discussed in the succeeding sections. 
8.6 Governance 
When the Alpine Dairy Company was formed, voting rights were based on one vote 
for every 15,000 kg of milkfat produced, up to a maximum of 10 votes. Directors 
were elected by wards based on geographical areas. Directors had to reside within 
their wards and initially the directors from the Temuka Cooperative outnumbered the 
directors from the Tai Tapu cooperative by seven to five. In 1993, the ward system 
was abolished in a move to elect the ‘best directors available’, regardless of where 
they lived.  
 
By the late 1980s, several corporations could see the potential for dairy farming in 
Canterbury, as discussed in Chapter 7. These companies were at first distrusted and 
feared by the traditional ‘family farmers’, particularly when they reached 20% of the 
company’s milk supply in 1994. To allay the farmer’s fears and to keep the corporate 
farmers from taking control of the company, a new system of voting was adopted that 
year. Voting for directors was based on production (with a maximum of 10% from 
any entity), but all other votes were based on ‘one farm, one vote’. Over the years, 
one of the corporates gained the respect of farmers through their business practices, 
the advice they offered to the company and their involvement on the Board (S1, S2 
and S5). The introduction of capital notes (which is discussed in Section 8.8) was an 
attempt to ‘lock’ the corporates into the company. Source 5 commented that the 
corporates changed the mind-set of farmers in that “it was now OK to have more than 
one farm”.  
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In 1987, Alpine Dairy Products appointed one of the first outside directors of a New 
Zealand dairy cooperative. Sources (S2, S5) stated that the outside directors added 
financial wisdom and were a stabilizing influence for the farmer directors. They were 
important to the farmer directors’ understanding of complicated financial matters and 
created a “better business culture on the board” (S5). Introducing outside directors 
was not without its tensions. An outside director (S6) recalled a meeting to discuss 
the final payout for the season. When he suggested that the directors were attempting 
to payout more money than they actually had available, he was told “it’s all well and 
good for you to come down here from Christchurch in your shiny ass suit and try to 
tell farmers how much money they will receive”.  
 
Very few of the directors had experience in other businesses or tertiary qualifications. 
Programmes were initiated to send directors to training courses and an annual 
evaluation process of directors was initiated. A climate was created on the Board 
where directors were encouraged to ask questions until they understood an issue. The 
Board communicated well and learned about milk processing through touring the 
factory regularly (S2). Early meetings tended to concentrate on “micro” issues 
involving individual suppliers, processing issues and milk quality. Most sources 
commented that governance improved when the Board stopped reviewing “nuts and 
bolts” at each meeting and started thinking strategically. During the early years, the 
Board also tended to leave industry matters to the CEO. As the momentum for 
change in the structure of the dairy industry gained strength, the Board members 
became ‘governors’ and management concentrated on processing. 
 
Sources identified that the Alpine Board of Directors was able to generate trust with 
the farmer/owners of the cooperative by being “upfront and honest” about problems 
encountered (S1). Source 2 commented that Canterbury farmers were particularly 
good to deal with as they were mostly “immigrants” to the South Island who wanted 
to grow their business and understood debt. This trust would serve them well as the 
company grew and pursued merger opportunities. However, one informant (S5) 
commented that the early Boards lacked the commercial ruthlessness to compete with 
other farmer cooperatives when deregulation of ‘town milk’ presented the 
opportunity to become more involved in the domestic market.  
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There were a number of key employees over the years from the formation of Alpine 
until the eventual merger with NZDG. One early executive started with the Temuka 
cooperative in 1982. Initially hired to run the finance division, he became the 
Company Secretary/Financial Controller. His contributions to changes in voting and 
capital structure were significant. The second CEO inherited numerous problems 
including rapid growth and a company unable to fund processing expansion. Every 
year the plant had to be pulled apart, expanded and staff had to learn how to run the 
new plant for the next years ‘wall of milk’. This contributed to quality problems in 
the product. To compound matters, the problem with pesticide residues in the product 
surfaced (discussed in Section 8.7). The last CEO arrived in 1996 with a long career 
in the industry and a new $90 m+ powder plant under construction. He understood 
the importance of obtaining high yields of product from the raw material, controlling 
costs and producing high quality products (known as yields, costs, grades). Sources 
(1, 2, 4, 7 and 8) stated that he established a culture of excellence amongst 
employees, combined with financial management skills and an empathy with farmers 
in regard to wealth creation. He commented that a traditional dairy cooperative CEO 
ran a “profit and loss” business, but in the climate of the late 1990s, growth in the 
value of the cooperative was equally important.   
 
The use of outside consultants was also important to the company. One consultant, 
who became associated with the company in 1996, defined his role as one of 
education, training and mentoring of Directors. He immediately identified two 
challenges for Alpine: “1) to get a payout above the dairy board base payout, and to 
2) take industry issues away from management - leave the factory to the manager and 
the strategy to the Board”. Other consultants included a large international firm who 
provided financial projections and analysis which became important to the strategy 
and structure of future mergers. 
8.7 Quantity and quality 
A major challenge for Alpine Dairy Products commencing in 1989-90 was processing 
the ever increasing volumes of milk from a rapidly expanding supplier base (Table 
8.1). Milk volume and milksolids increased more than 4-fold over a nine year period. 
Milksolids production increases ranged from 7% to 39% annually. Production 
increases came from both increasing farm numbers and from increasing production 
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per farm (more than doubling during this time). These levels of growth meant the 
processing systems were constantly under stress to develop new capacity. 
 
Table 8.1 Growth in production and farm numbers of Alpine Dairy Products (1987-
88 to 1997-98) 
 
 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 
Litres 
(000,000) 
181 172 189 220 235 254 348 411 486 598 754 
Litres 
increase 
% 
 -5% 10% 16% 7% 8% 37% 18% 18% 23% 26% 
Kg ms 14.5 13.6 15.2 17.7 19 20.7 28.7 33.7 40.3 49.8 62.4 
Kg ms 
increase 
% 
 -6% 12% 16% 7% 9% 39% 17% 20% 24% 25% 
Farm 
no.’s 
276 276 284 282 276 281 306 348 366 387 466 
Farm no’s 
increase 
% 
 0% 3% -1% -2% 2% 9% 14% 5% 6% 20% 
 
Source: derived from annual accounts of Alpine Dairy Products (1987-1998) 
 
 
An additional problem of rapid growth was that it led to product quality issues. 
Sources commented that processing staff were always under pressure to commission 
new plant and then immediately began planning the next year’s expansion. The 
management of the time considered that ‘on-farm’ milk quality issues were the main 
contributing factor to poor product quality. In 1991, one of the first Total Quality 
Management (TQM) systems in the New Zealand industry was established by Alpine. 
The emphasis of the TQM programme was on education and self-management.  
 
With the TQM programme in place, the company lowered the levels at which poor 
quality milk would attract financial penalties (grades). Raw milk is tested for a 
number of quality measures ranging from several types of bacteria to sediment, 
antibiotics, excess water, somatic cells and other contaminants. All these problems 
can be countered by good management. The TQM was supported by a monthly 
column on milk quality in the company newsletter from the programme manager.  
 
Appendix Table E1 details the percentages of milk grading either finest, first grade, 
second grade or reject grade. The percentage of milk grading finest dropped from 
97% in the 1987-88 season to 95% for several years, however, improvement was 
noted after the implementation of the TQM programme in 1991-92. Because these 
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percentages were reasonably small, S1 and S2 commented that they had felt 
management blamed the quality issue on farmers when it was, in fact, a processing 
plant problem. Another way of looking at milking quality is to analyse grades 
according to the test run on the milk. Appendix Table E2 details the types of grades 
incurred and how the grades relate to suppliers. In some measures such as coliform 
bacteria, sediment and inhibitory substances, marked improvements were seen. Over 
the years the types of grades changed to mostly bacterial problems, which were not as 
problematic for the processor. The reduction in inhibitory substance grades (generally 
antibiotics) was very important to the company’s profitability due to the problems 
these substances cause in processing and marketing.  
 
The issue of DDE in products first became known when cheese sent to Japan in 1986 
was rejected for having levels in excess of the CODEX
58
 recommendation of 1.25 
parts per million (ppm). DDE is a metabolite of the pesticide DDT which was used 
widely in Canterbury in the 1950s and 1960s to control the grass grub insect 
(Costelytra zealandica). The product has a very long half-life and concentrates in the 
food chain. The problem in Canterbury involved farms with high levels of DDE in 
their soil
59
.  
 
An informant (S1) spoke of first learning about the problem when he approached the 
company in 1986 about producing organic milk. The manager at the time laughed and 
said “not with the levels of DDE in your milk!” The first meetings with farmers who 
had high levels of DDE in their soil occurred in1987. The discovery that their 
properties were high in DDE was a highly emotional experience and for many there 
were questions as to whether they would be able to continue dairy farming.  
 
During the 1988-89 season, research was conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries Technology Division (MAF) to determine how the milk supply patterns 
influenced company DDE levels (MAF Technology, 1990a). This was accompanied 
                                                 
58
 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1963 by the FAO and WHO to develop food 
standards and guidelines. 
59
 As part of normal grazing practices, the DDE was ingested by the cows and concentrated in their 
body fat. During the spring it is common for cows to be in a state of negative energy balance which 
results in the mobilisation of body fat for the production of milk. This mobilisation of fat resulted in 
DDE being released into the milk and concentrated in the resulting products. The use of DDT was 
banned in New Zealand in the 1970s due to concerns over issues with human health. 
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by a study on the factors affecting DDE levels in milk (MAF 1990b), followed by 
studies on the seasonal variation in milk DDE levels (MAF 1991a) and the effect of 
autumn management on milk DDE levels (MAF 1991b). The research was jointly 
funded by the government through MAF and the company. In an agricultural sector 
accustomed to the total funding of research by government, the partial funding of this 
research by the dairy company was another step on the road to deregulation of the 
agriculture sector. Additionally, the on-farm research was conducted on the 
chairman’s farm. The results of the trials were a series of recommendations to 
suppliers on how to maintain low DDE levels in their milk and on how to lower the 
DDE levels in the milk if they had high levels in their soil. Source 1 commented that 
the advantage of a cooperative in this type of situation is that the cooperative would 
work with farmers to correct the problem, whereas a corporate would possibly cease 
collection. Another source (S4) said that in the formation of the DDE programme, 
they realised that “education had to come before the stick”. 
 
Initial policies adopted in 1991 were a moratorium on accepting new supply from 
farms with soil levels in excess of 0.6 ppm (reducing to 0.2 ppm in the following 
year), the encouragement of later calving on farms with high DDE levels (early 
season milk had the highest levels), a penalty system to ensure that farmers either 
made the effort to reduce DDE levels or suffered financially and an extension 
programme to work with known problem farms. 
 
From a Canterbury industry growth standpoint, the DDE discovery was a significant 
factor in slowing growth until research uncovered methods for dealing with the issue. 
DDE milk levels have declined over time, with MAF (1991) reporting a reduction of 
7% from 1988 to 1989 and a further 12% from 1989 to 1990. Fonterra personnel
60
 
have reported that from 1987-88 to 1997-98, there was a 38% reduction in DDE 
levels and from 1997-98 to 2005-06 there was a further 44% improvement.  
 
Another first for Alpine was when the levels of thermoduric bacteria in milk (to 
become known as Japanese thermoduric) suddenly rose in the autumn of the 1995-96 
season. Thermoduric bacteria survive the pasteurization process and can result in 
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 Pers. comm. from David Williams, Regulatory Programme Manager of Fonterra, 2006 
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quality problems in brine salt cheese, often months after manufacture. High levels of 
thermoduric bacteria are usually the result of perished rubber ware or poor cleaning 
procedures of the milking plant. However, field staff could not find the usual 
problems in the farm’s milking plant/silo sanitation. Again, company funded research 
(see Appendix E4) found the problem and, based on experience from the DDE 
problem a mitigation programme was quickly adopted. The problem was found on 
farms that had adopted the new technology of baled silage stored under large plastic 
tarpaulins. Usually stacks were made of 50-100 bales. It was found that once these 
stacks were open, bacteria of the thermoduric type developed rapidly and would 
colonise on the cow’s udder when the baleage was fed. A change to individually 
wrapped bales solved the problem.  
 
The quality problems in the finished product were the last to be solved. Sources (S1, 
S2, S3 and S11) stated that the underlying problem was the rapid growth in milk 
supply. Until a large powder plant was built in 1997, manufacturing capacity was 
never ahead of new milk production. Source 5 commented that due to lack of time, 
staff would be forced to clean the plant at a level that was less than optimal so that all 
milk could be processed during peak production on farms (mid-October to mid- 
November). Processing staff often worked 11-12 hours days at this time of the 
season. 
  
 A former Manager (S3) mentioned that when he arrived in 1996, the NZDB stated 
that because Alpine’s product quality was low, they were not selling Alpine products 
to a number of their customers. The NZDB was unwilling to carry the quality risk of 
Alpine products internationally. With the DDE issue under control, a new powder 
plant, a better financial position and improved raw milk quality, product quality 
became the manager’s number one goal. Within a year, 21 cents per kg milksolids 
was added to the NZDB base price. This involved better systems, improved quality, 
higher yields and controlling costs.   
8.8 Financial factors 
From the formation of Alpine Dairy Products in 1987-88 until 1993-94, the company 
had low levels of equity relative to assets and high debt servicing requirements (Table 
8.2). 
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Table 8.2 Comparison of key financial indicators for Alpine Dairy Products (1987-88 
to 1997-98)  
                                                                                                                                                  
 87-88 
 
88-89 
 
89-90 
 
90-91 
 
91-92 
 
92-93 
 
93-94 
 
94-95 
 
95-96 
 
96-97 
 
97-98 
 
Assets($ m) 59 61 56 49 49 51 71 91 113 226 268 
Debt ($ m) 43 45 41 34 34 33 40 54 70 135 142 
Equity ($ m) 16 16.4 15 15 15 17 31 37 44 92 126 
Equity/asset 
% 
27 27 27 31 31 34 43 41 39 41 47 
Interest:  
cents/kg ms 
 
45.2 
 
34 
 
26.6 
 
24.3 
 
11.8 
 
8.5 
 
4.4 
 
3.8 
 
6 
 
8.9 
 
11.4 
Debt in $ per  
per kg ms 
 
3.00 
 
3.32 
 
2.72 
 
1.94 
 
1.72 
 
1.49 
 
1.40 
 
1.59 
 
1.74 
 
2.71 
 
2.27 
 
Source: derived from 1987-88 to 1997-98 Annual Accounts of Alpine Dairy Products 
 
 
In the early years (1987-88 to 1992-93), the company assets ranged from $50 to $60 
million. Liabilities were between $33 and $45 million, leaving shareholder equity 
around $15 million. The decrease in assets and liabilities from 1988-89 to 1991-92 
was primarily due to the sale of non-core, underperforming assets, with the proceeds 
used to repay debt. The equity/asset ratio ranged from 27% to 34%.  
 
Over the life of the company (1987-88 to 1997-98) there was over a 4-fold increase in 
assets and a more than a 3-fold increase in debt. Equity to assets levels consistently 
increased, but never exceeded 50%. Debt per kg milksolids was halved between 
1987-88 and 1992-93, but increased to $2.27 by 1997-98 when the large powder plant 
was built. Interest costs per kg of milksolids decreased dramatically from 45 cents in 
1987-88 to as low as 3.8 cents per kg of milksolids by 1994-95, before increasing to 
11.4 cents in 1997-98.  The company reduced debt through asset sales in the early 
years. However, growth in production, lower interest rates and a new capital structure 
contributed to lower debt servicing.  
 
Although Table 8.2 details improved financial ratios, a number of financial 
innovations were needed to achieve these results. By 1992, the continued growth and 
the resulting financial strain led the Board to place a moratorium on new supply. This 
policy led to a split at the Board level between those wanting to grow the milk supply 
and those who felt that growth was weakening the company’s finances and, hence, 
payout. In the end, the Board members wishing to pursue growth were successful and 
the moratorium was removed after one season (S1, S5 and S7).  
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Under a growth strategy and, with a high demand for conversions in 1993, a new 
method was required to finance growth. As a ‘traditional cooperative’, Alpine 
members had a minimal number of shares that showed very little change in value 
from when the farmer entered the cooperative until they left. The Board adopted a 
programme designed by the Secretary/Financial Controller (with help from the 
Plunkett Society)
61, known as “Growth funding Growth”. The company determined 
the cost to add infrastructure and required farmers producing ‘new milk’ to pay half 
the cost of the infrastructure required to process their production. The balance was 
financed through financial institutions. The concept was sold to farmers as the only 
way that the company (and farmer’s production) could continue to grow.  
 
Under the proposal, each supplier needed to have one share per kg of milkfat 
produced. Shares were initially set at 30 cents per kg of milkfat, becoming 50 cents 
per kg of milkfat by 1994-95. Before the introduction of the growth funding growth 
programme, the company capitalised its reserves and bonus issued them to existing 
suppliers. This meant that existing shareholders were fully shared based on their 
1992-93 production.  
 
A more important debt instrument for adding financial strength than shares were 
capital notes. These were used to not only add greater equity to the balance sheet, but  
also were seen by the Board as a means to “lock” in suppliers (particularly the 
corporates) who otherwise might be encouraged to sell their shares and create a drain 
on capital. The capital notes were priced at 50 cents per kg of milkfat and each 
shareholder was required to have three capital notes per kg of milkfat. They were 
payable over three years in arrears to ease the strain on-farmer’s cash flow. The 
capital notes paid interest, usually around 5% and did not have to be redeemed by the 
company for up to 40 years (S5).  Although some farmers predicted that the 
requirement to invest in the company would be detrimental to their farm growth, the 
programme soon became accepted and the costs of shares/notes were factored into the 
costs of either increasing milk supply or converting non-dairy farms to dairying (S1, 
S2, S9). 
 
                                                 
61
 The Plunkett Society was founded in the United Kingdom in 1919 and has a mission statement of 
“Improving rural livelihoods through co-operative and social enterprises. 
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In July 1997, the shares were converted from a per kg of milkfat basis to a milksolids 
basis (milkfat + protein), making them worth 29.5 cents per kilogram of milksolids. 
A bonus issue was then made to value the shares at 35 cents per kg milksolids.  
Suppliers still needed to own one share per kg of milksolids produced. Capital notes 
based on milkfat were converted to two capital notes of 42.75 cents for each kg of 
milksolids produced. 
 
With additional capital, the company was able to expand their asset base. As the 
expansions continued, the company was re-valued regularly. A ‘mothballed’ cheese 
plant was found in Taranaki in 1994-95, purchased cheaply and bolted onto the 
existing plant. This transaction increased total assets by $10 million, with very little 
additional debt. In 1995-96 a plant was constructed to further process whey. This had 
previously been pumped onto neighbouring farms, but was now to become a source 
of income. In 1996, the decision was made to address the under capacity problem and 
build a large powder plant. This investment was $90 million and resulted in further 
growth in assets and shareholder equity. In one year the company increased total 
assets from $113 m to $226 m, liabilities from $70 m to $135 m and equity from $44 
m to $92 m.  
 
A further boost to shareholder equity came with the acquisition of shares in the 
NZDB by the dairy companies. The industry became aware in the early 1990s that the 
ownership of the NZDB was unclear. Industry leaders at the time were able to 
negotiate with the government for the ownership of the NZDB to pass to the industry 
in 1996 (NZDG Annual Accounts 1996). A total of $39 m in NZDB shares was 
allocated to Alpine during the 1996-97 year.  
 
Further capital ($3 m) was realised by Alpine during the 1997-98 season when the 
NZDB purchased the “reversionary rights” to the Fernleaf Brand from Alpine. 
Fernleaf had been developed by the Tai Tapu Cooperative and was considered an 
iconic brand for marketing New Zealand butter in the lucrative UK butter market, 
thus the NZDB wished to own the brand for the use of the industry. 
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8.9 Mergers and industry restructuring 
Through involvement with the Chairman’s committee of the NZDB, the Alpine 
Chairman became convinced that Alpine needed to merge with other companies to 
get the maximum return for shareholders when the NZDB replaced ‘make 
allowances’ with the Commercial Pricing Model (CPM) milk payment plan (see 
Appendix F1).  He proposed that if Alpine did not take an aggressive stance in 
determining its own future it would be “swallowed up”; probably not under the best 
terms and conditions. 
 
In 1996-1997, a group of other ‘smaller company’ leaders proposed the industry 
combine to form one large cooperative with the associated economies of scale. Four 
companies funded a study on industry structure which predicted that a one company 
model would save the industry $250 million per year. 
 
Drawing upon these factors, the chairman developed a vision for a “one company” 
future for the industry and convinced his own members of the need for mergers. From 
this point until the eventual merger with the New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG), 
Alpine actively pursued mergers with other companies. Although studies financed by 
Alpine showed the benefits of mergers, there was only limited interest by the other 
South Island companies (S1). An initial merger proposed to the Westland Dairy 
Company was rejected (Cox 2003, p. 18). However, by the late 1990s the Kiwi 
Cooperative from Taranaki was making strategic takeovers in the South Island. By 
the time they had acquired Otago Cheese and Canterbury Dairy Farmers, there was 
no longer the possibility of a monopolistic South Island cooperative, with the only 
potential merger partner the Southland Dairy Cooperative
62
.  
       
The Southland Province, as noted in Chapter 6, was an early participant in the New 
Zealand dairy industry. Between 1881 and 1932, there were 80 dairy factories in 
operation in Southland (“Edendale”, 1998) which rationalised to one company by the 
1980s. Products produced by the company included cheddar cheese, anhydrous 
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 The Southland Dairy Cooperative Limited was founded in 1977, the result of the merger of the 
Aparima, Edendale, Seaward Downs, Otautau and Thornbury cheese factories. They were joined by 
the Tisbury suppliers in 1978 and the Mataura suppliers in 1981 (“Edendale”, 1998).  
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milkfat, butter, lactose and whey products. The Southland factory had a reputation for 
quality cheese and was the preferred supplier for several NZDB contracts. 
 
The rapid growth in dairy farms in Southland began in the 1989-90 season with 
growth in supply of 30%. The Southland Dairy Cooperative grew even faster than 
Alpine Dairy Products with milksolids increasing nearly 5-fold from 1991-92 to 
1996-97.  Table 8.3 outlines the growth in suppliers and production for that portion of 
the decade until the merger with Alpine.  
 
Table 8.3 Growth for Southland Dairy Cooperative Ltd. (1991-92 to 1996-97)  
 
 Suppliers % change Milksolids 
(m kgs) 
% 
change 
Cow numbers 
1991-92 194 7.8 8.6 21.1 28,000 
1992-93 226 16.5 12.2 41.9 40,000 
1993-94 286 26.5 19.4 59.0 66,000 
1994-95 358 25.2 25.7 32.5 85,000 
1995-96 414 15.6 35.7 39.0 112,000 
1996-97 438 5.8 42.2 20.1 130,000 
 
 Source: derived from the annual accounts Southland Dairy Cooperative 1994 and 1997 
 
 
As with Alpine, the rapid growth of the 1990s caused problems for Southland, 
although Southland was in a stronger financial position initially and did not institute a 
“growth funding growth” programme until 1994-95. New plants were being added 
each year and milk was, at times, diverted to other factories. The decision was made 
in 1992 to build a $52 m powder plant that was commissioned during the 1994-95 
season. Cost overruns increased the cost to $70 m. By 1995 the new factory was full 
and the decision was made to build a casein plant for $175 million. New production 
and conversions were required to pay $3 per kg of milksolids to help finance the 
factory.  
 
The 1995-96 season was very difficult for the Southland Cooperative as peak 
production was 2.2 m litres per day with processing capacity at 1.9 m litres per day 
(“Edendale”, 1998). This resulted in moving milk to other factories and the dumping 
of milk (300,000 litres) due to plant breakdowns. Additionally, although the new 
casein plant was ready to commission in October of 1995, the company had failed to 
obtain resource consents. Not only did this contribute to the processing problem, but 
it also resulted in $1.5 m in additional costs to receive the permits. The total cost of 
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the oversight was $5 m and resulted in strict conditions being placed on the company 
as part of the resource permit hearings (pers. comm., Christie 2007)
63
. 
 
The share standard was changed in April 1997 following revisions to the method of 
accounting for NZDB shares. The ‘new milk’ share standard was reduced from $3 per 
kg milksolids to $2 per kg milksolids, payable over three years. With growth 
expected to be in excess of 10% in the 1998/99 season, $11.5 m was spent on another 
evaporator for the powder plant and a 223 ha farm was purchased for the disposal of 
wastewater. All of these factors caused debt to grow significantly. The large increase 
in equity in 1996-97 was mostly due to the allocation of shares in the NZDB and 
increased shareholdings by suppliers. The company had a negative surplus in 1996-
97. 
 
Table 8.4 Historical financial details of the Southland Dairy Cooperative Limited 
(1987-88 to 1996-97)  
 
 
 Source: derived from annual accounts of Southland Dairy Company Limited (1987 through 1997). 
 
  
The merger of Alpine Dairy Products and the Southland Dairy Cooperative to form 
the South Island Dairy Cooperative (SIDC) was crucial to the success of the Alpine 
Chairman’s ‘vision’. It was to be very difficult as Southland felt that they were in a 
much better position from a product and financial standpoint. The process was helped 
by a corporate farmer who owned farms in the collection area of both companies. 
Some of the corporates’ associates formed a separate milk supply company to break 
away from Southland and sell milk to Alpine. This tactic along with the corporate-
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 Pers. Communication, Richard Christie (February, 2006). He was formerly the Planning Manager, 
Southland Dairy Cooperative Ltd. 
 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 
Sales $m 15.4 22.4 34.2 30.1 37.0 55.2 81.5 109.5 176.4 191.1 
Surplus $m  1.5 1.5 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.3 4.9 2.9 2.4 -2.4 
Assets $m  11.7 14.5 18.3 17.4 21.6 30.3 70.6 83.4 112.3 199.1 
Liabilities $m  4.2 6.4 9.0 6.0 7.1 12.3 46.7 51.8 75.2 116.6 
Equity $m 7.5 8.1 9.3 11.4 14.5 18 23.9 31.6 37.1 82.5 
Equity/asset % 64.1 55.9 50.8 65.5 67.1 59.4 33.9 37.9 33.0 41.4 
Debt/kg ms 
cents      
0 0 0 0 0 4 118 161 95 169 
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affiliated directors on the Southland Board eventually convinced the other Southland 
Directors of the need for a merger.  
 
In order to investigate the potential benefits to shareholders of forming a new 
cooperative, a steering committee of directors, management, consultants and lawyers 
was formed in mid-1997. The steering committee set up a four stage process, the 
details of the process and proposed benefits are provided in the Appendix E3.  
 
The final proposal called for Alpine suppliers to receive 18 cents per kg of milksolids 
as a ‘one off’ payment to equalise the value of the shareholdings (a surprise to 
Southland members). The method used to determine the necessary adjustments  
was, as follows: 
 
1) the future earnings of Alpine and Southland were forecast on a standalone 
basis, 
2) the assumptions underlying these forecasts were benchmarked to ensure 
accuracy, 
3) adjustments were made to items such as depreciation rates and the ownership 
of on-farm refrigeration and vat washing units. 
 
The analysis predicted that Alpine’s forecast payout would be approximately eight 
cents per annum greater than Southlands for the 4.5 year period selected for analysis 
(the 4.5 year period was selected due to its use in previous industry mergers). The 
reasons listed for this difference were that Alpine would have lower capital 
expenditure, economies of scale with their powder plant and further income from the 
whey processing operation. The projected payout for SIDC was the weighted average 
of the forecast for the two companies plus the merger gains. 
 
A net present value analysis was prepared as listed below (South Island Dairy 
Cooperative 1998): 
 
(Cents per kg milksolids)   Alpine  Southland 
 
Standalone payout                 142       115 
SIDC payout                  143                     143 
Payout gain                     1                        28  
 
Capital Distribution (pre-tax)                             27                         0 
Interest cost of distribution                                (2)                       (2)  
Payout gain                                                        26                        26 
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Therefore, the Alpine Dairy Products suppliers needed to receive an additional 27 
cents per kg milksolids for the 1997-98 season. As the capital distribution was tax 
free, the payment was reduced by the tax rate of 33%; thus, the cash payment was 18 
cents (27 cents x .67).  
 
In terms of shareholdings, Alpine Dairy Products suppliers traded two 50 cent capital 
notes for 1 share in SIDC. The ordinary shares of 35 cents were converted to ordinary 
shares of $1 in SIDC, following a non-taxable bonus issue of 65 cents per share. The 
ordinary shares of 55 cents were converted to ordinary shares in SIDC following a 
non-taxable bonus issue of 45 cents per share.  
 
Southland Dairy Cooperative suppliers were allocated two ordinary shares of $1 in 
SIDC for every $2 share in the Southland Dairy Cooperative. Additionally, 
shareholders received 6 cents for every kg milksolids supplied in the 97-98 season to 
cover a change in the ownership of on-farm refrigeration units. 
 
To put these changes in context, the following describes the wealth creation for a 
hypothetical Alpine shareholder, producing 100,000 kg milksolids at the time of the 
merger. The shareholder probably would have owned 70,000 ordinary 35 cent shares 
and 30,000 in 55 cent shares, plus 200,000 capital notes valued at 50 cents. The 
difference in ordinary shares would be due to the farmer increasing production from 
the time of the introduction of the original 35 cent shares (most farms had increased 
production over this time frame). The effect on the value of shares from the merger 
would be: 
 
              Before    After  
70000 Ordinary shares @ 35 cents             24,500             70,000   
30000 Ordinary shares @ 55 cents             16,500                            30,000  
Ordinary shares @ $1                100,000 
Capital notes                                              100,000                                    0 
          $141,000                      $200,000 
 
In the one year of operation, SIDC had turnover of $566 m with operating expenses 
of $154 m, leaving $412 m to be paid to farmers. Total assets were $530 m, with 
liabilities of $298 m, leaving shareholder funds of $231 m or $249,568 per farm. 
There were 926 farms supplying 1,452 billion litres of milk. Milk grading was 98% 
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finest and 1.5% first. The payout to suppliers was $3.415 per kg milksolids. The 
annual accounts for Alpine and Southland for the 1997-98 season are compared to the 
results for the merged company’s 1998-99 season in Table 8.5. 
 
Table 8.5 Comparison of performance of Alpine Dairy Products, Southland Dairy 
Cooperative and South Island Dairy Cooperative 
  
 Alpine 
1997-98 
Southland 
1997-98 
SIDC 
1998-99 
Milk processed (million litres) 753.9 561.8 1,452 
Milksolids processed (million kg) 62.4 47 119.7 
Group revenue (million $) 286.8 207 565.7 
Total payout ($/kg milksolids) 3.22 3.20 3.42 
Total assets (million $) 268.3 205.1 529.5 
Net borrowings (million $) 142.1 112.8 298.4 
Equity to total assets (%) 44 45.2 43.6 
 
Source: derived from annual reports of Alpine Dairy Products 1998, Southland Dairy Cooperative 1998, South 
Island Dairy Cooperative 1999.  
 
   
From the creation of SIDC, the objective was to make the new company a target for 
the two large North Island companies, the New Zealand Dairy Group (NZDG) and 
the Kiwi Cooperative Dairy Company (Kiwi) and thus promote the formation of one 
‘mega company’ for New Zealand. Cox (2003, p. 16) stated that within two weeks of 
SIDC formation, talks began with Kiwi and NZDG. Consultants were employed to 
analyse the company’s options and a company profile was printed to promote the 
company, entitled “South Island Dairy - A Company with Drive and Momentum” 
(“South Island Dairy”, 1999).  
 
Both companies offered the SIDC members the ability to trade their SIDC shares for 
equivalent shares in the North Island companies. But, SIDC joined the NZDG on 
June 1, 1999. Sources (S1, S2) mentioned that Kiwi had made a more lucrative offer 
(additional cash payment of 10 cents per kg milksolids), but the Board of SIDC felt 
that the goal of a ‘mega company’ was more likely if one of the new players was 
larger, than if there were two equal companies. One informant (S8) mentioned that he 
felt that Kiwi could not afford its offer. 
 
At the time of the merger with NZDG, it was projected that the cost of the merger to 
NZDG suppliers would be 1 cent per kg of milksolids in payout (NZDG 1999, p. 7). 
To partially compensate, a distribution was made to NZDG shareholders of $80 
million and shares in New Zealand Dairy Foods (NZDF), a NZDG subsidiary that 
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traded in the New Zealand domestic market. Fifty percent of the shares in NZDF 
were given to the shareholders, with NZDG retaining the other 50 percent. It was 
estimated that the annual dividend from NZDF of 5 cents per kg milksolids would 
help cover the loss in payout to NZDG members from the merger. These moves 
reduced the NZDG debt to equity ratio by around 2% (Davis 1999, p. 7). NZDG 
shareholders voted 78% in favour of the merger, with SIDC shareholders voting 97% 
in favour. An industry commentator stated that “the merger was the first genuinely 
competitive dairy merger for many years - as most had been effectively takeovers” 
(“Unity calls”, 1999, p. 72). 
 
The annual accounts for NZDG and SIDC for the 1998-99 year were compared to the 
results from the merged company for the year 1999-00 and showed that the combined 
company exceeded the results of the predecessor companies (Table 8.6).  
 
Table 8.6 Comparison of SIDC and NZDG in 1998-99 with the merged NZDG in 
1999-00 
 
 NZDG 
1998-99 
SIDC 
1998-99 
NZDG (merged) 
1999-00 
Milksolids processed (m kg) 386 120 570 
Group revenue (million $) 2,451 566 3,427 
Company payout (¢/kg milksolids) 38 16.5 40 
Total payout ($/kg milksolids) 3.63 3.42 3.75 
Total assets (million $) 1,650 566 2,591 
Net borrowings (million $) 347 298 526 
Equity to total assets (%) 53.1 43.6 56.7 
 
 Source: derived from annual accounts of NZDG and SIDC 
  
For the SIDC farmers, the payout of $3.75 per kg of milksolids was an increase of 
nearly 10% over the previous year’s $3.415. Another advantage of the merger was 
that NZDG historically had a higher payout than Alpine Dairy Products (Table 8.7). 
 
Table 8.7 Alpine Dairy Products/SIDC and NZDG payout per kg of milksolids 
(1987-88 to 1998-99) 
 
 87-88 
$ 
88-89 
$ 
89-90 
$ 
90-91 
$ 
91-92 
$ 
92-93 
$ 
93-94 
$ 
94-95 
$ 
95-96 
$ 
96-97 
$ 
97-98 
$ 
98-99 
$ 
Alpine 
 
2.18 2.88 3.28 2.15 3.05 3.36 3.10 3.25 3.60 3.38 3.22 3.42 
NZDG 2.34 3.26 3.62 2.50 3.39 3.67 3.39 3.50 4.10 3.69 3.51 3.63 
Diff. 
 
 .17 .38 .34 .36 .34 .31 .29 .25 .50 .31 .29 .215 
 
Source: derived from annual accounts of NZDG and SIDC. Note: until the 93-94 season, the payout was in 
kilograms of milkfat, these payouts have been converted to milksolids using a conversion factor of .565 
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The difference ranged between 17 cents and 50 cents, with an average of 29 cents. 
For the hypothetical Alpine farmer producing 100,000 kg milksolids, the merger 
could mean $29,000 extra income per year based on this average difference. 
In addition to the increase in revenue, the mergers had an effect on farm values. Dairy 
farms in New Zealand are often valued on per kg of milksolids. North Island dairy 
farms had for many years been valued at a higher level than South Island dairy farms 
(Valuation NZ, 1987-99). This was based on the cost of production factors such as 
less purchased feed and a reliance on rainfall rather than irrigation. However, up until 
the time of the merger, there was also a further discount due to the lower payout of 
Alpine/SIDC. Upon receiving a North Island payout the value of South Island farms 
increased by $5 per kg of milksolids (pers. comm., Davison 2010)
64
, thus the 
hypothetical 100,000 kg milksolids unit would increase in value by $500,000 ($5 
times 100,000 kg milksolids). 
8.10 Summary and discussion 
Alpine Dairy Products was formed in 1987 by the merger of two small cooperatives 
in Canterbury and North Otago. The companies were not in a strong financial 
position due to the economic restructuring of New Zealand agriculture, drought, 
processing problems, underperforming assets and oversupply in world dairy markets. 
Alpine Dairy Products merged with the Southland Dairy Cooperative to form the 
South Island Dairy Cooperative in 1998. The South Island Dairy Cooperative merged 
with the New Zealand Dairy Group in 1999. The New Zealand Dairy Group became 
part of Fonterra in 2001. 
 
Alpine Dairy Products, acting as a cooperative owned by farmers was vitally 
important to the development of the Canterbury dairy industry. For a new industry to 
develop rapidly, processing capacity has to increase with production. As small 
traditional cooperatives, with low levels of farmer investment, the companies were 
not in a position to handle the massive growth in milk supply that would occur in the 
1990s. Without the backing of the government-sanctioned New Zealand Dairy Board 
(and the marketing strength it provided) it would have been difficult for the Alpine 
Dairy Company to accommodate the growth. It is unlikely that an investor-oriented 
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 Personal communication, J. Davison, CRT real estate, (2010). 
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firm would have responded in a similar manner, as they would not have had the 
incentives to meet the demand for processing nor been willing to accept the problems 
that arose. Thus, an integrated cooperative model was a factor in the growth of the 
Canterbury dairy industry, through providing the processing that allowed 
entrepreneurs the ability to grow their business.  
 
A key factor to the success of the cooperative was governance. The Alpine Board 
tackled a number of governance issues including the removal of representation by 
geographical areas and ensuring that directors were given the opportunity to improve 
their skills. They were also one of the first dairy cooperatives in New Zealand to 
engage outside directors and consultants. One observation made by sources was that 
in a fast growing company you can outgrow the capabilities of board members and 
management on a regular basis. To protect the cooperative from potential corporate 
takeovers, the Board changed the voting rights to a ‘one man, one vote’ method for 
constitutional matters. The Alpine Dairy Company was well served by a strong 
chairman and board and management in the later years. All sources commented on 
the ability of the Board to find solutions to problems, to monitor results and to 
develop a vision for the future. 
 
The 1990s were turbulent times for the South Island industry and the New Zealand 
dairy industry as a whole. The decade started with improved milk prices and financial 
stability after the restructuring of the New Zealand economy of the mid-1980s. As 
shown in Chapter 2, during the 1990s there was a movement towards larger farms, a 
larger national herd, more cows per farm and increased production in the South 
Island. These increases put pressure on many aspects of the industry. As the NZDB 
moved away from ‘make costs’ to the commercial pricing model method of pricing, 
there became very strong economic reasons for companies to produce a wide range of 
products. This in turn led to amalgamations and the eventual dominance of the 
industry by two companies. Active involvement in the evolution of the industry by 
the Board insured that the cooperative’s members were able to take advantage of the 
wealth creation potential of the resulting mergers (see Chapter 3). 
 
Although it appears that the company was unsure how to manage growth initially, the 
implementation of the “growth funding growth” financing mechanism and foresight 
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in the development of new processing capacity allowed the company to strengthen its 
balance sheet while handling growth in supply. The growth potential in the 
Canterbury dairy industry created a positive attitude in the industry and attracted new 
entrants and thus further growth.  
 
A number of quality issues were encountered by Alpine. Management felt that the 
problem was in the quality of milk coming from the farms and instigated an on-farm 
TQM programme and higher penalties for poor quality. However, quality problems 
remained in the processed product due to plant problems. These problems were 
eventually solved by investment in one large processing plant, rather than the ‘add-
ons’ of the early years. The issue of pesticide levels in the milk and products 
restricted higher levels of growth in supply to Alpine, and significantly added to the 
company’s cost structure. The funding of the DDE research was an example of 
farmers taking responsibility for solving their own problems in a deregulated 
environment. The Board learned that ‘good science’ was necessary to gain acceptance 
of proposed measures to mitigate a problem. The experience gained through the DDE 
problem was valuable when the company encountered other quality problems. An 
advantage of a cooperative in dealing with quality issues is the incentive to work with 
producers rather than to set regulatory standards and ‘walk away’ from producers 
who could not comply. 
 
The results in Chapter 7 confirmed and added factors that were drivers of the 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry. However, when examining Alpine 
Dairy Products it became clear that the cooperative was an enabler of growth rather 
than a driver. In other words, the growth was not driven by Alpine, but without the 
enabling effect of the company, growth would have been restricted. Another factor 
for growth proposed by the participants was the Lincoln University Dairy farm. This 
extension exercise in the form of a demonstration-farm will be examined in the next 
chapter.    
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     Chapter 9 
The role of an extension dairy farm in the 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 it was established that there had been significant growth in Canterbury 
dairy farming (Figure 2.1), that Canterbury dairies farmed more cows per hectare 
(Figure 2.5), produced more milksolids per cow (Figure 2.7) and achieved higher 
milksolids production per hectare (Figure 2.8) than other areas in New Zealand. 
Chapter 5 discussed the importance of diffusion/extension of new technologies in the 
agricultural sector. A factor mentioned by informants in Chapter 7 was the extension 
activities of the Lincoln University Dairy Farm (LUDF) in the growth of productivity 
and profitability of Wave 3. To assess whether extension was important as a driver or 
an enabler of industry growth; a survey from the perspective of ‘the farmer-users’ 
was conducted. Clearly, the development of an industry is very dependent on 
productivity and profitability and any function which improves net return needs 
investigating.   
 
In 2001, Lincoln University converted a 185 hectare (ha) dry land sheep property to 
an irrigated dairy farm with a milking platform
65
 of 161 ha. At the same time, the 
South Island Dairying Development Centre (SIDDC) was formed consisting of six 
commercial, education and research partners. Management of the Lincoln University 
Dairy Farm (LUDF) was delegated to SIDDC with the aim of “fostering best practice 
to South Island dairy farmers”. From formation, a number of management techniques 
were trialled and results reported at focus days (field days), in the media and via the 
www.siddc.org.nz website. Financial data and benchmarks have been provided for 
the use of the industry. The LUDF had hosted over 20,000 visitors from its inception 
through to 2010. Focus days are held four times per year and are typically attended by 
between 200-400 farmers and agribusiness personnel.  
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 In NZ the milking platform is defined as the effective area grazed by the milking herd. It does not 
include land used for buildings, fences, roads, other infrastructure or young stock. 
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In the period through to 2010, the farm ran a high stocking rate system with over 4 
cows/ha (versus the national average of 2.8) producing between 1,700 to 1,800 kg of 
milksolids (ms) per hectare from a grass-based, low supplementary feed system. In 
the 2005-06 season, this resulted in the harvesting of approximately 16t dry matter 
(dm) of pasture per ha and an operating profit of $2,240/ha at a $4/kg milksolids 
payout. This compared favourably with the industry’s ‘Dairy Base’ benchmarks 
which showed an average operating profit of $1,406/ha for the 
Marlborough/Canterbury areas (pers. comm., van Bysterveldt and Christie 2006
66
). 
By the 2009-10 season, the dairy operating profit per hectare was $4,980, primarily 
due to higher milksolids payments (SIDDC 2010). This was 33% higher than the 
DNZ Dairybase average for Canterbury of $3,353 per hectare (DairyNZ 2010). 
 
The key objectives for the LUDF - as listed on its website (SIDDC 2007) are repeated 
below. 
1. To develop and demonstrate world-best practice in dairy farm systems and to 
transfer them to dairy farms throughout the South Island.  
2. To operate as a joint research centre with DairyNZ, where the practical 
application of new technologies and on-farm forage production systems can be 
tested and developed.  
3. To use the best environmental monitoring systems to achieve best management 
practices under irrigation, which ensure that the industry’s 4% productivity gain 
target is achieved in a sustainable way and that the wider environment is 
protected.  
4. To continue the environmental monitoring programme and demonstrate 
technologies that will ensure that the 3-year rolling average concentration on 
nitrate-N in drainage water from below the plant root zone remains below the 
critical value [16mg N/L] that is specified in Environment Canterbury's [ECan] 
proposed regional rule as requiring reduction [Rule WQL18].  
5. To operate an efficient and well organised business unit.  
6. To provide a commercial return on adjusted capital value to Lincoln University, 
and a defined benefit to each of the stakeholders.  
7. To create and maintain an effective team environment at policy, management 
and operational levels.  
8. To assist Lincoln University to attract top quality domestic and international 
students into the New Zealand dairy industry.   
 
 
In June of 2008, a postal survey was conducted of dairy farmers in the LUDF’s 
catchment area. The objective of the survey was to determine the demographics of 
farmers in the area and to gauge whether farmers had adopted the technologies 
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 Adrian van Bysterveldt was the DairyNZ Business Developer assigned to the LUDF and Richard 
Christie was the Business Manager of SIDDC 
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demonstrated by the LUDF. The information that was gained is important for this 
thesis for a number of reasons. First, it will provide data on the adoption of 
technology, which the literature suggests is important for new industry development. 
Second, the survey results will help demonstrate the importance of extension to the 
development of a new industry.  
9.2 Methods 
An industry organization provided a mailing list of dairy farmers in the prescribed 
areas. Nearly all farmers deal with this group for herd production testing, herd 
recording and/or artificial insemination of their herds. Initially 689 contacts were 
identified; however, this was reduced to 622 through the elimination of multiple 
ownership farms. A four page questionnaire was prepared and reviewed by SIDDC, 
staff from the Agricultural Management Group at Lincoln University, DairyNZ 
consulting officers and business managers and a select group of dairy farmers. The 
Human Ethics Committee of Lincoln University reviewed the proposal and approval 
was granted on 16 June 2008 (Appendix F1). 
 
A total of 146 responses were received by August 1, 2008 (24%). The data was 
analysed using the software SPPS 15. Reported correlations are significant at p<.05 
unless noted otherwise. Detailed tables are included in Appendix F. Caution is 
appropriate in drawing conclusions relating to the total population of Canterbury 
dairy farmers due to the response rate. 
9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Demographics 
The majority of respondents identified themselves as owner/operators (73%), with 
50-50 sharemilkers constituting 17% and the balance being farm managers. A large 
proportion (43%) had attended university, with a further 24% receiving training after 
high school through polytechnics or the Agriculture Industry Training Organization
67
. 
The mean age was 45 years and 81% lived within 150 kilometres of the LUDF. 
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 The Agriculture Industry Training Organization (AgIto) is a government and industry funded 
organization that provides training for those working in agriculture on a part time study basis   
186 
 
The milking platform ranged from 50 hectares to 1,400 hectares, with 239 hectares 
being the mean. Cows milked ranged from 130 to 5,000, with a mean of 611. The 
average cow, as estimated by farmers, weighed 480 kg, which would indicate that the 
majority of herds were tending towards the Friesian breed. However, 38% of farmers 
believed that their cows weighed less than 400 kg, indicating Jersey herds. 
Production per cow averaged 419 kg milksolids and the farms produced 1,441 kg 
milksolids per ha. This level of production was higher than the Canterbury average of 
380 kg milksolids per cow and 1,240 kg milksolids per ha (LIC 2007-08). 
In New Zealand, it is common to classify dairy farm intensity according to levels of 
supplements imported to the property during the milking season, not including feed 
or grazing for young stock (DairyNZ 2010, p. 5). Most farmers (35%) indicated they 
were a System 3 farm (10% to 20% imported feed). As farm systems intensified from 
System 1 (no imported feed) to System 5 (25-55% imported feed), the farms milked 
more cows, produced more milksolids per cow and more milksolids per ha.  
The number of cows milked and hectares farmed were both significantly correlated 
with level of education, the number of cows milked and hectares farmed. Age and 
lower educational achievements were both negatively correlated with milksolids per 
ha. Milksolids per ha increased with herd size. 
When asked to rate seven possible reasons for farming using a five point scale from 1 
(very important) to 5 (not at all important), the highest rated were ‘cash profit’ and 
‘being their own boss’ (Table 9.1).  
Table 9.1 Reasons for farming expressed by Canterbury dairy farmers (percentages) 
 
Importance rating 1 2 3 4 5 Mean rating 
Cash profit 64 27 7 2 0 1.47 
Own boss 61 27 8 4 1 1.57 
Life style 43 35 17 3 2 1.85 
Family 47 29.9 15.3 6.6 .7 1.85 
Quality stock 42 35 19 3 1 1.86 
Working outside 39 30 23 6 3 2.03 
Capital gain 36 29 31 2 3 2.08 
 1= highly important, 5 = not at all important 
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Those farming for capital gain had a significant negative correlation with the 
aesthetic side of farming (lifestyle, quality stock, or good place for a family). 
The majority of respondents (69%) used the services of a professional consultant.  
At the time of the survey the profitability of dairy farming for the coming season 
(2008-09) looked positive. When asked how they would spend a farming surplus a 
majority indicated that they would pay down debt as their first or second option. 
However, 48% ranked purchasing land in their top three options. Other common 
choices were to make improvements to irrigation systems or re-grass more of the 
farm. Although farmers were given a choice of several personal consumption options 
(holidays, schooling, improved housing), the majority indicated that they would re-
invest in their farming operations. 
 
The significance of these findings to the development of the Canterbury industry is 
that it provides an indication of the ‘people types’ involved in the industry. The 
results show that Canterbury farmers rated all the ‘reasons for farming’ highly, but 
appear to be most driven by cash profits and enjoy being their own boss. The results 
also indicated that profits would be used to pay down debt or further invest in the 
business, with a low inclination to spend proceeds on personal consumption.  
9.3.2 Awareness of the messages of the LUDF 
For the purpose of the survey, staff associated with SIDDC identified a number of 
messages that they felt had been stressed by the LUDF in its extension activities. 
Farmers were asked to identify familiarity with these messages (Table 9.2). 
 
Table 9.2 Percentage of farmers familiar with LUDF extension messages 
 
Low grazing residuals 89% 
Pasture monitoring 80% 
Nutrient and environmental management 64% 
Irrigation monitoring 47% 
Re-grassing of pastures based on monitoring 41% 
Use of reproductive technologies (treating anoestrus cows, 
synchronizing heifers) 
34% 
Once a day milking during calving 21% 
Once a day calf feeding 9% 
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Farmer familiarity was high for grazing and environmental messages, which were the 
messages that had been emphasised when the farm was established in 2001. The 
messages with less than 50% familiarity had been introduced in later years. The focus 
on low grazing residuals was a major system change for many Canterbury farmers 
and thus gained more attention from farmers than other messages that were often 
minor changes to the farms operation.    
9.3.3  Farmer’s interaction with the LUDF and other sources of 
information 
An analysis of LUDF focus day attendance over three seasons (Table 9.3) found that 
in each season over 30% of respondents did not attend any focus days. Between 63-
68% of responding farmers attended at least one focus day over the years 2005-06 to 
2007-08. A very small percentage attended all four focus days in a season.  
Table 9.3 Attendance at LUDF Focus Days (frequency of attendance in percentages) 
 
Year 0 1 Day 2 Days 3 Days 4 Days Mean 
2005-06 32 23 20 18 6 1.4 
2006-07 35 19 24 20 2 1.4 
2007-08 37 32 19 8 4 1.1 
Of those participating in focus days, 80% attended to learn about farming with low 
grazing residuals, 79% to learn how the LUDF is performing, 76% to compare their 
farms to the LUDF, 65% to learn about environmental management at the LUDF, 
61% to learn about the latest animal management techniques, 58% for the financial 
information provided, 36% to meet other farmers and have a day off the farm and 
13% to meet agri-business personnel. 
An analysis of the data pertaining to those who had attended the focus days at least 
once over the three years versus those who had not attended the focus days is found 
in Table 9.4. Dairy farmers attending had larger farms, milked more cows and had 
higher levels of production, although only the difference in MS/cow was statistically 
significant.  
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Table 9.4 Demographic and production levels of farmers attending and not attending 
LUDF Focus Days 
 
 Ha farmed Cow numbers MS/cow MS/ha 
Non-attenders (n=29)  211 686 401 1,370 
Attenders( n=113) 247 856 422 1,454 
difference +36 ha +170 cows +21 kg ms/cow +84 kg ms/ha 
 P=.20 P=.08 P<.03 P=.17 
 
A small number of farmers (23) felt able to comment on the economic value gained 
through the adoption of the LUDF practices. These farmers stated that they had 
increased farm income, with the range being from $50,000 to $1,000,000 with a 
median for respondents of approximately $84,000. 
SIDDC operates a website which provides information on the operation of the LUDF, 
including the weekly farm walk information, data collected and financial 
performance. Farmers (114) reported their usage of the website from the initiation of 
the site in 2004 and the survey in 2008. The Figures listed are the percentage of the 
respondents for each grouping of website visits.  
Not used                     32%  
1-10 times                  42%    
11-20 times                  8% 
20-30 times                  4% 
More than 30 times     15% 
9.3.4 Sources of information for farmers 
Respondents were asked to rate sources of information for their contribution to 
knowledge of technology and innovations using a scale from 1 (very important) to 5 
(not at all important). All sources rated highly except for sales representatives. 
 
Table 9.5 Farmer’s rating of sources of information (row percentages) 
 
Source Responses 
 (n) 
% for each rating Mean rating 
  1   2   3  4   5 
Demo. farms 135 33 40 20 4 4 2.09 
Other farmers 134 31 36 26 6 1 2.10 
DairyNZ 136 32 44 17 1 7 2.10 
Media 135 31 31 26 7 5 2.25 
Consultants 138 28 38 17 9 9 2.36 
Conferences 131 22 33 31 10 5 2.44 
Sales reps. 131 5 16 24 20 36 3.69 
                             
    1 = highly important, 5 = not at all important 
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These findings are relevant to new agricultural industry development as they 
demonstrate that farmer learning is through a number of sources. Although farmers in 
the LUDF survey gave the demonstration farm the highest ranking, a number of the 
other sources were almost equally regarded.  
9.3.5 Have farmers adopted the messages from the LUDF? 
Low grazing residuals as practised by the LUDF had been adopted by 82% of the 
respondents, although 15% of the survey respondents said that they had always 
followed this technique. Ten respondents did not follow the practice as they felt that 
their cows would not be fully fed by grazing to low residuals. 
Re-grassing based on the measurement of poor performing paddocks had been 
adopted by 74% of respondents; however, 25% of respondents included as adopters 
reported that they had always re-grassed. It appeared from the answers provided that 
the question may have been misread as ‘Do you re-grass’, rather than ‘Do you re-
grass based on the measurement of poor performing paddocks’. 
The policy of synchronizing heifers to calve one week before the herd had only been 
adopted by 29%. Those who adopted the process did so to get heifer calving finished 
early and/or to give heifers more time to return to oestrus. The main reasons for not 
adopting were that heifers are grazed off the property and it was considered too 
difficult to operate a synchronisation programme. Furthermore, a number reported 
that they did ‘not believe in the practice’. There were positive correlations between 
synchronizing heifers to calve early and those who use the website, those who use 
consultants and kilograms milksolids/ha.  
For hormone technology treatment of non-cycling cows, 42% followed the LUDF 
aggressive intervention system. Of those following the system, nearly 50% of farmers 
reported that they did so to maximise cycling, conception rates and/or condense 
calving. Of those not following the practice, 10% farmers said it was too expensive 
and 27% did not believe in the practice. Others used methods such as once-a-day 
milking or teaser bulls (14%). A number of farmers felt that they achieved good 
reproductive results through ‘breeding and feeding’ (14%) and 6% said that they do 
not have a reproductive problem in their herd. 
191 
 
The LUDF nil induction policy had been adopted by 36%, with 64% continuing to 
use inductions
68
 as a tool. Of those adopting nil induction, 39% did so because they 
were philosophically opposed for animal welfare reasons. Those continuing to induce 
reported that they used the practice to ‘tidy up’ the calving interval, grow herd 
numbers and reduce cow wastage. A number of sharemilkers pointed out that they 
needed to induce, as retaining cows increased their wealth. 
9.4 Comparison of the Canterbury data to other districts 
An analysis of production statistics (LIC 2000-01 to 2009-10) for Canterbury, North 
Island and South Island dairy farms (Table 9.6) indicates that although production per 
cow has always been higher in Canterbury from 2000-01 to 2009-10, there has been 
no consistent pattern of increased production per cow since the formation of the 
LUDF. However, there was a widening gap in cows per hectare and milksolids per 
hectare since the LUDF was established, which could reflect the main LUDF 
message of higher stocking rates and low grazing residuals.  
 
Table 9.6 Differences in milksolids per cow, cows per hectare and milksolids per 
hectare for Canterbury, the North Island and the South Island. 
 
Year 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 
Milksolids/cow 
          
Canterbury vs NI +38.5 +49 +57 +49 +55.5 +42 +51 +73 +37 +51 
Canterbury vs SI +10.5 +18 +28 +16 +22.5 +6 +8 +19 +5 +10 
  Cows/ hectare 
          
Canterbury vs NI +0.2 +0.13 +0.24 +0.26 +0.33 +0.39 +0.42 +0.43 +0.45 +0.58 
Canterbury vs SI +0.3 +0.24 +0.32 +0.34 +0.38 +0.42 +0.43 +0.39 +0.40 +0.43 
Milksolids/ ha. 
          
Canterbury vs NI +175 +184 +248 +243 +290 +280 +317 +410 +281 +418 
Canterbury vs SI +125 +123 +183 +166 +194 +169 +178 +203 +155 +193 
 
Derived from NZ Dairy Statistics (LIC 2000-01-2009-10).69 
 
9.5 Summary and discussion 
Given the overall response rate of 24% to the mailed survey, some caution is 
appropriate in drawing conclusions relating to the total population of Canterbury 
                                                 
68
 The induction of lactation by hormonally treating cows to calve early to gain ‘days in milk’ has been 
used for a number of years in NZ.  
69
 Production data reported in NZ Dairy Statistics (p. 15) is sourced from NZ dairy companies and is 
estimated to represent nearly 100% of the industry (pers. comm.., S. Harcourt, LIC analyst).  
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dairy farmers. A phone survey of a selection of dairy farmers was considered to 
determine if the survey was representative; however, the industry organization 
providing the addresses would not divulge the names of farmers. 
 
Those who did respond can be characterised as well educated, high performing 
farmers who have a strong focus on cash returns and who access information from 
diverse sources. Among those information sources, the LUDF, DairyNZ events and 
other farmers all rated highly. Focus days and the use of the SIDDC website were 
complementary information sources with 68% using each. It would appear that Focus 
Days were primarily for the appraisal of appropriate technologies with the website 
used primarily for on-going benchmarking of performance. Farmers were 
discriminating in their adoption of technology, with adoption being high for 
technologies that were seen as giving clear economic payoffs (grazing management).  
 
The majority of respondents were aware of the messages given by the farm managers 
around grazing and environmental issues, but fewer than 50% were aware of other 
promoted practices (irrigation monitoring, re-grassing, reproductive technologies). 
The majority of farmers did not follow the reproductive technologies practised at the 
LUDF. 
As farm systems intensified from System 1 to System 5, the respondent farmers 
milked more cows, produced more milksolids per cow and produced more 
milksolids/ha. The operators of more intensive farms were more likely to attend 
DairyNZ events. However, as systems intensified, farmers were less likely to attend 
LUDF Focus Days to learn about grazing and animal management techniques. 
When asked whether the adoption of LUDF technologies had made farming easier or 
harder, 70% felt that it had made management easier with most of the comments 
supporting the adoption of low grazing residuals and pasture monitoring. A number 
of those who said it made management harder commented that adoption was still 
worth the effort. 
The proposal that the LUDF has been a factor in increased productivity in the 
Canterbury dairy industry was partially supported by the survey findings that the 
Canterbury farmers who attended focus days and answered the survey have larger 
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farms, higher milk production per cow and higher production per hectare than non-
attendees. In addition, Table 9.6 shows that there has been an increase in 
cows/hectare and milksolids/hectare from 2000-01 to 2009-10 on Canterbury farms 
as compared to the aggregate of the South Island and the North Island. This could 
reflect the high stocking rates maintained by the LUDF. 
Although the LUDF was identified by informants in Chapter 7 as a driver of growth, 
in reality, it was not a driver like other factors nor was it an enabler such as the 
Alpine Dairy Company. It is proposed that the LUDF was a facilitator of growth. 
This is because growth would have occurred and been enabled by other factors 
discussed, but the LUDF had a positive effect on growth through contributing to 
increases in productivity and profitability
70
.   
  
                                                 
70
 In the 2011-12 season the LUDF adopted changes designed to increase productivity and profitability 
without increasing the farms environmental effects. These steps included a reduction in stocking rate 
from 4.2 cows per hectare to 3.95 cows per hectare, utilising a mower to maintain pasture quality and 
intake instead of a higher stocking rate, the creation of two herds of cows for management purposes, 
with a greater emphasis on attaining higher body condition scores, and the increased use of nitrogen 
and giberellic acid. The adoption of these changes will be the subject of a future research project. 
194 
 
     Chapter 10 
Discussion and conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research findings in relation to the 
research questions posed in Chapter 1. The concluding statements suggest factors that 
will contribute to the development of an industry.  Section 10.2 contains a discussion 
on the proposition that industry development was the result of interconnected drivers, 
enablers and facilitators throughout the waves with the results presented graphically 
in Figure 10.1. A review of Research Question One as to the characteristics of the 
establishment and growth of dairy farming in Canterbury is presented in Section 10.3. 
Section 10.4 details business growth and wealth creation for participants to answer 
Research Question Two. Section 10.5 discusses Research Question Three as to the 
factor conditions that drove growth. Section 10.6 compares the development of the 
Canterbury dairy industry to literature on industry development from Research 
Question Four and Section 10.7 proposes emergent insights from the development of 
the Canterbury dairy industry to answer Research Question Five. Section 10.8 
proposes the contribution to theory of the thesis. Section 10.9, discusses limitations of 
the research and Section 10.9 suggests future research. 
10.2 Drivers, enablers and facilitators 
The review of literature on industry development, extension and industry history led 
to Figure 6.4, which proposed possible factors for the development and growth of the 
Canterbury dairy industry. The case study research of industry participants in Chapter 
7 amended these factors based on the experience of the participants. It was also 
recognised in Chapter 7 that development occurred in three waves, roughly occurring 
in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Chapters 8 and 9 investigated two organisations that 
the Chapter 7 informants suggested were important for the growth and development 
of the industry.  
 
Figure 10.1 proposes that within these waves, the factors would not have all been 
drivers of growth, but could be classified as drivers, enablers or facilitators of growth. 
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In some cases, the factors fit into two categories. Drivers are defined as factors that 
caused the growth to occur, with enablers defined as the factors that were necessary 
for growth and facilitators defined as factors that had a positive influence on growth. 
 
Low land prices in Wave 1 encouraged entrepreneurial dairy farmers (usually from 
other dairying areas) to purchase land in Canterbury to convert to dairy farming. The 
lack of profitability in other farming systems drove sheep/cropping farmers to sell 
their land at low prices. A further driver was the human reasons of establishing an 
often larger farm in an area seen to have social advantages. Although the 
development of the irrigation resource was an enabler, it can also be seen as a driver. 
Informant 1 suggested that once water was added to a property, the highest economic 
use was as a dairy farm. Wave 2 saw the entry of corporate farmers as industry 
drivers. With more secure sources of capital and improved farming systems, the 
corporates converted many farms in pursuit of capital gains. In Wave 3, increased 
profitability in the dairy industry drove further conversions. 
 
Enablers were the factors that were necessary for the growth to occur. In Wave 1, 
these included government policies and economic conditions which, in this case, 
followed the economic restructuring of the New Zealand economy. A further enabler 
was the industry infrastructure already in place which allowed faster growth, by 
removing many of the steps necessary for the development of a new industry. The 
development of the processing cooperatives in Wave 2 was an important enabler, as 
without the ability to process all the milk produced, growth would have slowed. The 
finance industry became an enabler of growth in Wave 2 and a facilitator of industry 
growth in Wave 3 through liberal lending policies. 
 
In Waves 1 and 2 the development and adoption of new technology was an important 
enabler and facilitator. Informants suggested that improved irrigation technology, 
cowsheds, farm layouts and machinery were important. Other than irrigation, these 
technologies were available to the rest of the industry, but were more readily adopted 
by an area ‘starting from scratch’ with larger land areas.  
 
Facilitators, although not driving or enabling growth, had positive influences. Most of 
the facilitators were found in Waves 2 and 3 and included new input suppliers, farms 
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that dedicated their system to supporting dairy farms and new business structures that 
assisted the sourcing of capital for a ‘capital hungry’ industry. The Lincoln 
University Dairy Farm was a facilitator in Wave 3 that provided a forum for 
information and discussion that was one of a number of factors in the productivity 
and profitability increases. A further facilitator was the trend to increasing milk 
prices, particularly in Wave 3, a result of increased global demand. 
 
It could be argued that there were additional factors that should have been covered in 
this thesis. For instance, there are a number of papers on labour in the dairy industry 
(Kyte 2008, Searle 2002, Tipples 2006) and the effect of dairy farming on the 
environment (Baskaran, Cullen and Colombo 2009, Clark et al., 2007, Tait and 
Cullen 2006).  However, these areas did not feature in the literature on industry 
development nor did they emerge from the interviews with informants in Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 8 as being drivers, enablers or facilitators of growth.  
 
Figure 10.1 is a schematic representation of the drivers, enablers and facilitators in 
the development of the Canterbury dairy industry.  
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Figure 10.1 Interrelationships of drivers, enablers and facilitators in the 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry. 
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10.3 What were the characteristics of the establishment and 
growth of dairy farming in Canterbury? (Research 
Question One) 
Analysis of the secondary data in Chapter 2 indicated ‘what’ had happened. The 
information showed that since the late 1980s the area devoted to dairy farming in 
Canterbury has increased from 20,000 hectares to approximately 200,000 hectares in 
2009-10. Production of milksolids increased from 2% of the country’s supply to over 
17% in the same period. Between the years 1984-85 to 2009-10, milksolids 
production increased throughout the country with the North Island increasing 1.5-
fold, but Canterbury increasing by 25-fold. Between 1982-83 and 2009-10, the size of 
farms in Canterbury grew by 4.5% per year (compounded) and these farms in 2009-
10 were twice the size of North Island farms. From 1994-95 to 2009-10, stocking 
rates increased to 3.3 cows per hectare as compared to 2.8 cows per hectare for the 
rest of the country. From the late 1990s, average production per cow and per hectare 
was higher than the averages for the North and South Island. Although an increasing 
real milk price (Figure 2.1) encouraged growth in the entire New Zealand industry, 
the extent of growth in Canterbury indicated that there were other factors involved. 
10.4 How has the development allowed business growth and 
wealth creation amongst participants? (Research 
Question Two) 
The MAF dataset in Chapter 2 showed that the market value (referred to by MAF as 
capital investment) in New Zealand dairy farms on a per hectare basis was similar 
until 2007-08, at which time dairy farms became more expensive in Canterbury. 
However, given the higher level of milksolids production achievable in Canterbury, 
capital investment per kg milksolids has always been lower, e.g. $40 per kg 
milksolids in 2010-11 compared to $48 per kg milksolids for the rest of New 
Zealand. During this time, debt per hectare was higher in Canterbury, but the higher 
production per hectare resulted in debt levels that were similar to industry averages 
on a per kg milksolids basis. Historically, the market value of dairy farms in the rest 
of the New Zealand industry was higher and debt per hectare was lower than 
Canterbury. This resulted in higher levels of equity (net worth) per hectare for the rest 
of New Zealand. But, by 2008-09, the equity levels per hectare were similar, which 
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was a factor of market values per hectare increasing faster in Canterbury than debt 
per hectare. 
 
Profitability data from MAF surveys suggested that common operating measurements 
for the aggregate of the New Zealand dairy industry areas were similar to Canterbury 
until 2000. From 2000, per hectare gross farm revenue increased along with cash 
farm expenditure in Canterbury. However, the cash farm expenditure per kg of 
milksolids and cash farm surplus per kg of milksolids were much the same as in other 
dairying regions and the higher production per hectare caused the cash farm surplus 
per hectare to also be higher in Canterbury. DairyNZ calculations of operating profit 
per hectare using a different method showed Canterbury to be more profitable than 
other areas in years of high milk payments. It is suggested that the ability to rapidly 
increase production through sourcing readily available supplements in Canterbury 
combined with the production reliability as a consequence of irrigation contributed to 
higher profits in high milk payment years. 
 
A leading reason for ‘why’ there has been an increase in dairying is found in Figure 
2.19 which shows that the return on capital has been consistently higher in 
Canterbury since 1999-2000, ranging from 4% to 16%, with an average of  9%. For 
the aggregate of the New Zealand industry, the return on capital has averaged 4%. 
The case study farm analysed in Chapter 3 entered the Canterbury dairy industry in 
late 1987 (Wave 1) and grew real equity (constant value dollars, 2010) at an average 
of 20% per year with a return on capital averaging in excess of 10% per year, from 
entry until 2009-10. These gains were largely due to real estate purchases and 
conversion, but also included growth in other assets such as livestock, cooperative 
shares and machinery. The case study farmers achieved very high returns from the 
investment in their processing cooperative during the mergers of the 1990s and early 
2000s. The entrepreneurial profits for the case study farmers were largest in Wave 1, 
through purchasing lower priced assets and securing water rights. This same pursuit 
of entrepreneurial profits was a factor for the entry of corporate farmers to the 
industry in Wave 2.  
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10.5 What factor conditions drove or constrained growth? 
(Research Question Three) 
Informants in Chapter 7 confirmed the role of entrepreneurs particularly in Wave 1. 
Most informants suggested that the early converters captured significantly more 
entrepreneurial profits than the later waves. This was confirmed by the case study 
farm in Chapter 3, which achieved capital gains in all three waves, but the gains were 
much larger in Wave 1. Several participants stated that the initial analysis of the cost 
of purchase and conversion in Wave 1 was not always rigorous.  
 
Although it would seem logical that productivity could be higher than elsewhere in 
New Zealand due to irrigation, production and profit were similar until the new 
century (see Chapter 2). A number of informants suggested that the major 
research/extension providers were not interested in the industry until the LUDF was 
initiated in 2001 (Wave 3). Although a number of factors would influence 
productivity, informants suggested that there was a positive effect on production and 
profitability from the establishment of the LUDF. 
 
The informants did not appreciate the effects of international trade negotiations or 
changes in international markets, as described in Chapter 6. However, informant 7 
suggested that the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations were very good for the dairy 
industry, but bad for the New Zealand arable sector. If so, then the changes in relative 
profitability could have encouraged increased conversions to dairying. In late Wave 
3, international market prices were influenced by increased demand from Asian 
markets. Additionally, industry participants (from the governance and management 
sectors) interviewed by Conforte et al. (2008, pp. 49), suggested that the industry’s 
success in international marketing could be attributed to the support of government 
through “legislative support and reduced global subsidies”.  
 
Informants did not suggest that there was a large involvement of government in the 
development of the Canterbury industry. Informants could be correct in this regard as 
the growth occurred after the removal of most government support for agriculture in 
the 1980s. But, the removal of price supports (particularly to the sheep and cropping 
industries) meant that these farming systems became less economic and, so were 
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more likely to be sold or converted to other farming systems like dairying. Figure 6.2 
details the decline relative to dairy prices for wool and wheat during the three waves. 
The loss in profitability of the historic sheep/cropping systems was a major driver of 
development.  
 
The economic conditions of the times were also a driver of change. The restructuring 
of the New Zealand economy caused land prices to fall in the late 1980s, which led to 
increased opportunities for established and new land owners. Since the restructuring, 
farmers have not been able to ‘farm’ subsidies and, in the opinion of informants and 
the LUDF survey participants, farmers have focused on production and profitability.  
As well as removing farm price supports, the financial industry was deregulated late 
in Wave 1. A number of informants discussed the difficulty in obtaining finance in 
Wave 1, but were able to source capital more easily in Wave 2 and some suggested 
that the financial institutions were far too liberal in Wave 3. It could be said that the 
finance industry hindered growth in Wave 1, was an enabler of growth in Wave 2 
through more relaxed lending policies and a facilitator of growth in Wave 3 when 
lending policies became more liberal. 
 
A number of informants expressed the advantages of being involved in large 
vertically integrated processing/marketing cooperatives. An informant with a history 
in the cropping industry (I7) mentioned that marketing his milk through a cooperative 
allowed him to concentrate on production. A survey by Forney
71
 (pers. comm.) of 
Southland sheep and beef farmers who converted to dairy farming found that many 
left the meat industry because, “Farmers were sick of what they saw as the incapacity 
of the sheep and beef industries to overcome problems”.  
 
The history of dairy farming in New Zealand and Canterbury meant that there was the 
human capability to manage dairy farming systems, as well as a history of processing. 
In particular, the success of the processing cooperative, Alpine Dairy Products was an 
enabler of growth in Wave 2. The company coped with ever increasing volumes of 
milk, financing growth and dealing with pesticide and quality issues. At a number of 
stages in the company’s history, different decisions would have altered the course of 
                                                 
71
 Jeremie Forney completed a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Otago in 2011. 
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the Canterbury dairy industry. A number of informants questioned whether Alpine 
would have been successful without the support of the state sanctioned New Zealand 
Dairy Board. Several sources interviewed about the Alpine Dairy Company 
suggested that a cooperative was necessary for development of the industry in Waves 
1 and 2, as proprietary companies would not have been as prepared to spend the time 
and money necessary to solve the problems that arose. 
 
Innovation and new technologies are considered enablers and facilitators of industry 
development. In Waves 1 and 2, innovations in irrigation technology enabled deeper 
wells, more labour efficient delivery systems and increased watering efficiency. 
Facilitators that contributed to growth in Wave 2 were improved methods for 
organizing the farm layout and cowsheds, and management techniques for large 
herds. The most widely adopted technology introduced by the LUDF (low grazing 
residuals) was suggested to have been a facilitator of improved profitability in Wave 
3 by some informants and survey participants.  
 
Chance events had negative effects as in the case of DDE contamination, oil price 
rises and inflation, but the industry always managed to adapt through research and 
striving for improvements in productivity. 
 
The more intense use of the irrigation resource was considered an important enabler 
of development. Although irrigation had been part of Canterbury farming since the 
1940s, it was seen as a means of coping with drought rather than as a means of 
increasing farm output. Stewart’s (1963) findings that irrigation in itself did not 
improve farm returns under the farming systems of the time (sheep/cropping) were 
prophetic when the subsidies supporting these farming systems were removed at the 
start of Wave 1. Thus, if a farmer had irrigation he was often driven to convert (or 
more likely sell) his property due to the superior relative economics of the dairy 
industry - either way there was a financial gain and dairy industry growth.  
 
Human reasons were drivers, particularly in Waves 1 and 2. The developing dairy 
industry in Canterbury gave individuals the opportunity to purchase farms with the 
hope of more stable production through irrigation. Informants suggested that Wave 1 
converters often moved to Canterbury for a number of reasons not completely 
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associated with the pursuit of profit. Suggestions were that families moved to 
improve social and educational opportunities, for the challenge of being part of 
something new and to develop larger farms than would be available in other dairying 
areas. The lower price of land was an attraction; particularly for North Island farmers 
who could purchase twice as much land in Canterbury for the same amount of 
money. In reality, farmers in all waves moved for the very human reasons of 
improving their lives and financial position. Further research by Forney (pers. 
comm.) of Southland sheep and beef farmers who had converted found similar human 
reasons, but added that the Southland farmers also saw conversion as a method of 
succession planning. The existing farming systems could not support a second family, 
but a dairy farm could.     
 
The motive of capital gains and profit drove corporate farmers to invest in what they 
considered to be ‘cheap land’. Informants in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 commented that 
corporate farmers developed improved methods for converting farms to dairying, 
were more financially disciplined and instilled in farmers a positive attitude to 
multiple farm ownership. Although the initial entities departed the industry within ten 
years due to low operating profits, they left a legacy of alternative business structures 
to traditional family farms. These included what is described as ‘family corporates’ 
and ‘equity partnerships’. 
 
The availability of land for supporting the dairy industry was an important facilitator 
of industry growth from Wave 2. These blocks allowed a higher stocking rate by 
removing the replacement heifers from the ‘milking platform’. In addition, support 
blocks became important for grazing cows in the winter and for the production of 
supplementary feed. Winter grazing and higher levels of supplementation were an 
integral aspect of the development of a Canterbury dairying system versus traditional 
self-contained systems. 
 
Although there were factors that constrained growth during industry development, 
these were overcome by the enablers.  
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10.6 Does Canterbury dairy growth compare to industry 
development theory and forces? (Research Question 
Four) 
10.6.1 How does Canterbury dairy growth compare to industry 
development theory? 
When compared to the definitions of an industry as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
Canterbury dairy industry does not fit Porter’s definition (1980, p. 5) of “a group of 
naturally selected firms that are producing products that are close substitutes in the 
market place”. The Canterbury dairy industry is a sub-set of a much larger industry 
that competes on the world stage rather than in the domestic market and produces the 
same product rather than close substitutes. Likewise, the growth in all waves was not 
the result of a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Gould and Eldredge 1977, Piore and Sabel 
1984).  
 
The findings of the research tended to confirm the theory of Van de Ven and Garud 
1989, pp. 195-225, that a new industry must develop an instrumental subsystem, a 
resource procurement subsystem and an institutional subsystem, although, in this 
case, not in that particular order. As detailed in Chapter 6, there has been a long 
history of dairy farming in New Zealand (institutional subsystem), which allowed 
rapid Canterbury growth since the subsystem was largely in place. The generations of 
farmers before the development of the Canterbury industry had continually innovated 
to develop pasture-based systems and a processing/marketing infrastructure. 
Individual entrepreneurs who began their careers in the industry in other areas, but 
moved to Canterbury for the reasons listed in Chapter 7, formed the nucleus of the 
innovators who lead the development that was a necessary part of the instrumental 
subsystem. However, since most of these technologies were adapted from other areas 
rather than invented in Canterbury, the instrumental subsystem does not exactly 
match the Van de Ven and Garud model (ibid). The development of the resource 
procurement subsystem was a response to the arrival of the entrepreneurs. However, 
this subsystem did not become fully functional until Wave 2, when the input supply, 
extension and financial sectors became more involved in the industry. The 
instrumental subsystem included the Alpine Dairy Products cooperative (Chapter 8), 
whose success was important for the industry to develop.  
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The Canterbury industry follows a number of Schumpeter’s theories of “new 
combinations” (1961, p. 66), in that the development of irrigated dairy farming was a 
new method of production utilising a new supply of raw material (surface and ground 
water), as established in Chapter 7.  
 
“Clustering”, as suggested by Baptista (1996) was possibly important for growth as it 
resulted in the development of skilled workers, input suppliers and the ‘spillover’ of 
technologies among local farmers through discussion groups, the demonstration-farm 
and consultants. 
 
A number of the problems for new industries as suggested by Van de Ven et al. 
(1989) were identified by the informants in Chapters 7 and 8. The farmers, their 
cooperatives and suppliers were often undercapitalised. Alpine Dairy Products was 
noted for poor quality product and on-farm production was often lower than predicted 
at the time of a conversion. Informants in Chapter 7 mentioned that business plans in 
the early years were either non-existent or wrong. These factors, in addition to the 
human reasons associated with moving to a new district, leaving family, adapting to a 
different climate and farming environment, led a number of ‘immigrants’ to depart 
the area before rapid growth in the industry occurred in Wave 2. 
 
Porter’s comments on the appropriate time to enter a new industry (1998, p. 221) 
were confirmed by the case study farm (Chapter 3), as the partnership was able to 
enter the industry at a time of low land prices. The experience gained during these 
early stages of industry development and the ability to acquire lower priced resources 
(water, land, cattle) was a considerable advantage in later years. However, early entry 
has led to a degree of technological obsolescence for the case study farmers in Wave 
3. The entrepreneurial profits obtained by early entry have provided the equity 
necessary to allow the adoption of new technologies. 
 
Porter’s (1990, p. 72) Diamond of National Advantage (Figure 4.1) provides 
explanations for some of the elements of success in the Canterbury dairy industry. 
Factor conditions such as human resources, physical resources, knowledge resources 
and climate have been important for the development, as outlined in Chapters 6 and 
7.  A long history of farming in the province and dairying in New Zealand have been 
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important for the development of technologies involving farming systems and 
processing, which Porter (ibid) described as “related and supporting structures”. 
Porter’s definition of demand conditions does not fit with the New Zealand dairy 
industry, but Cartwright’s assertion (as quoted by Rugman and Verbeke 1993, pp. 71-
84) that international rivalry is more important for small exporting countries is 
relevant in the context of the New Zealand dairy industry. The strategy of firms and 
their structures have been important as evidenced by New Zealand farmers 
supporting cooperatives and vertical integration for many years. Although the 
informants in Chapter 7 did not state that government input was important, a state 
sanctioned trading monopoly like the NZDB could have only existed with 
government support. However, informants did state that government has recently 
become more involved in the industry through concerns over the environmental 
effects of dairying, which has, subsequently increased compliance costs. 
 
There have been a number of constraints to industry emergence, as predicted by 
Porter’s “five forces of industry competition” (1998, p. 4). In early years the 
Canterbury industry suffered from low product prices due to quality problems and 
oversupply on the world markets (Chapter 8 and 6). In other words, the buyers had a 
great deal of control. In Wave 3, suppliers received higher prices due to increased 
demand, but from a production point of view they faced higher costs due to the 
competition for the basic resources such as water and land as well as increased 
production costs.   
 
Although the Porter literature on industry development is informative, the Canterbury 
dairy industry is different as producers are not competing with each other. Dairy 
farmers are producing an undifferentiated product at the producer level, which the 
major cooperative processes and markets. Additionally, there is cooperation at the 
institutional subsystem level between the cooperatives and the proprietary firms in 
regard to research, extension and industry legitimisation.  
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10.6.2  Has innovation and technology development followed the 
literature? 
The definition provided by Afuah (2003, p. 4) suggests that innovations arise from 
the discovery of a new technology and adoption. However, in the case of the 
Canterbury dairy industry, on-farm problems tended to arise when transferring 
established technologies to a new environment. This was compounded by the need to 
create new technologies to improve and expand irrigation and farm larger herds. 
Informants (Chapter 7) spoke of successes and failures with these technologies. 
 
Schumpeter (quoted by Afuah 2003, p. 14) originally theorised that small 
entrepreneurial firms were the leading sources of innovation, but later stated that 
large firms with monopolistic powers were more important for innovation due to their 
financial strength and lack of competition. In the case of the Canterbury dairy 
industry, the monopolistic powers of the NZDB (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) were important 
in supporting the processing cooperative’s development. However, informants in 
Chapter 7 suggested that entrepreneurial firms (farmers and their suppliers) were 
more important for developing the on-farm technologies required. These findings 
support the contention of Van de Ven and Garud (1989, p. 196) that “seldom can 
such technological innovations be developed by a single firm alone in the vacuum of 
a community or industrial environment”.  
 
Afuah (2003, pp. 37-39) and Van de Ven (1993a, p. 216) have suggested that “people 
types” were necessary for innovation. The Canterbury industry has had a number of 
‘champions’, ‘sponsors’ and ‘project managers’ as detailed in Chapters 7 and 8. The 
development of a “pool of competence” as suggested by Van de Ven has been 
encouraged through training organizations, universities and SIDDC. An informant 
(Chapter 7) felt that dairy farmers in Canterbury were particularly good at adopting 
innovations due to the calibre of people involved. Although this statement may have 
been supported by the findings of high levels of education in the LUDF survey, there 
could have been a bias with more highly educated farmers tending to answer surveys. 
 
An aspect mentioned by informants in Chapter 7 was the social effects of the new 
industry. In a traditional sheep/cropping area, the arrival of dairy farmers was not 
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always viewed in a positive way. This conforms to Van de Ven’s (1986, pp. 592-595) 
comments that humans are inclined to focus on protecting existing practices rather 
than moving in new directions.  However, he noted that people gradually adapted to 
changing conditions as shown by many of the farmers in Wave 3 who converted to 
dairying for purely economic reasons. Perhaps a criticism of the Canterbury industry 
has been a failure to gain “socio–political legitimation”, as discussed by Aldrich and 
Fiol (1994, p. 648). These authors propose that a constraint to an industry can be 
where the industry fails to obtain acceptance from the “general public, key opinion 
leaders and government officials that a venture is “appropriate and right”. Although 
the government has been generally supportive of the dairy industry, mass media 
publications frequently report on concerns in regard to future industry growth.   
 
From this research it appears that new technologies can be developed endogenously 
from within the instrumental subsystem (user innovation) or they can be imported via 
an innovation system of research, development and extension (R, D & E). A third 
alternative is that innovations are imported from overseas either directly by users or 
indirectly through the R, D & E system.   
 
10.6.3  Do Canterbury dairy farmers conform to the literature on 
entrepreneurs?  
Schumpeter (1961, pp. 92-93) defined entrepreneurs as: “individuals who carry out 
new combinations; or the bearers of the mechanism of change”. He expressed the 
view that many entrepreneurs pursue their goals not strictly for financial purposes but 
to “develop a kingdom, to prove oneself superior or to create”.  Chapter 7 identified 
that a number of the Wave 1 farmers fit the description of an entrepreneur in that they 
were inspired by the challenge of dairying in a new area and the ability to develop 
large farming ventures utilising lower priced land and irrigation. The slow 
development of the Canterbury dairy industry until rapid growth in the early 1990s 
agrees with Van de Ven’s assertion (1993a) that there are many innovations and 
entrepreneurs necessary for a new industry. Waves 2 and 3 farmers were more closely 
aligned with Stewart’s (1998) small business owners than the entrepreneurs of Wave 
1, as they were more concerned about income and wealth creation and less likely to 
be involved for the challenge alone. 
209 
 
 
The research found that Canterbury dairy farmers are highly motivated. Respondents 
to the LUDF survey were found to be well educated and high performing with a 
strong focus on cash returns. They enjoyed being ‘their own boss’. Those who took 
advantage of the LUDF programmes (68%) had larger farms, higher milk production 
per cow and per hectare than non-participants. These findings correspond positively 
with the comments of Nuthall (2010, p. 38) and Kanfer and Ackerman (2000, p. 470) 
that motivated farmers have a need for achievement and mastery of an endeavour.  
10.6.4  How does the Canterbury dairy industry compare to other new 
agricultural industries?  
Woodford (1997, p. 21) cites Wollon (1995) who suggested that new industries arose 
from an “irregularity that acts to deconfigure the industries deep structure”. The 
economic restructuring of the New Zealand economy and the effect of changing 
government policies had a profound effect on the profitability of traditional 
Canterbury farming systems (Chapter 6). Informants in Chapter 7 suggested that the 
lack of profit in other agricultural sectors contributed to traditional farmers selling to 
Wave 1 farmers and the continued lack of profitability in sheep and cropping 
encouraged the conversions in Waves 2 and 3. The contention of Hyde (1998, pp 2-3) 
that new industries developed to “improve standards of living and to fulfil an innate 
personal yearning to do something different or better” was confirmed by the 
informants in Chapter 7.  
 
The literature on new agricultural industries also stresses the importance of 
developing markets, managing product quality, developing production techniques, 
establishing research and development infrastructure and the need for adequate 
finance. The establishment of markets was not a hindrance for the development of the 
Canterbury industry, as overseas marketing existed through the NZDB. Although, a 
research /extension infrastructure existed in the New Zealand dairy industry, 
informants in Chapter 7 suggested that the established providers did not become 
involved until Wave 3. However, the informants stated that the LUDF contributed to 
increased productivity in Wave 3 through the demonstration of a farming system 
suitable for the Canterbury environment. Wood, Chudleigh and Bond (1994) 
suggested that an industry champion was not necessary for “high growth rates and 
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gross values”. However, the informants in Chapter 7 identified a history of leadership 
in the industry starting with the first entrepreneurs in Wave 1 who led by example. 
Sources in Chapter 8 suggested that Alpine Dairy Products benefitted from strong 
leadership at the board and management level. Previous authors have commented on 
the importance of managing product quality. An unanswered question revolves 
around the development of leadership in a developing industry – were farmers with 
leadership ability attracted to the new industry or do the events that can affect a new 
industry (DDE, industry restructuring, economic restructuring) build leadership?  At 
the processing level, poor product quality in the 1980s and early 1990s were a major 
issue for the local industry. The creation of TQM programmes and research on 
environmental contamination, along with the incorporation of new processing 
technology by Alpine Dairy Products, solved these problems.  
 
The literature also suggests the importance of capital. Early converters and their 
cooperative were often undercapitalised. Innovative financial instruments were 
required to finance the processor and new business structures have allowed farm 
businesses to growth.  
10.6.5  Has the development of the Canterbury dairy industry followed 
theories on diffusion, adoption and extension? 
Rogers (2003, p. 5) as discussed in Chapter 5 defines diffusion as the process by 
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system. In this case, the innovation of dairy farming in 
Canterbury was proven to be a viable option to sheep and crop farming by the 
Winchmore irrigated research farm in the 1950s. However, the government policies 
and economics of the time allowed traditional farming systems to continue, as 
pointed out by several informants in Chapter 7. A number of Wave 1 farmers initially 
considered Canterbury after reading media articles about the potential for dairy 
farming in the province. A small industry did develop, but several informants in 
Chapter 7 stated that the growth was not completely supported by the existing 
consultants. However, there were a number of opinion leaders who became the centre 
of interpersonal communication networks as outlined in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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The first wave of growth of the Canterbury dairy industry coincided with the exit of 
government from extension activities and the devolution of the Ministry of 
Agriculture to a number of Crown Research Institutes (Chapter 5). Although the 
NZDB operated discussion groups, there were no private dairy consultants 
specialising solely in dairy farming until the late 1980s. However, there was a high 
level of user innovation – facilitated by the NZDB discussion groups. The informants 
in Chapter 7 indicated that once specialist private consultants became involved in 
Wave 2, they were very important to development. Although Lincoln University 
(Chapter 9) had long operated a dairy farm, it was on heavy soils (unlike the 
conversions) and hence was not a successful extension tool according to the 
informants in Chapter 7. In the early 2000s a new farm was developed on land similar 
to many of the conversions of Waves 1 and 2. Operated as a demonstration farm, the 
LUDF extension messages of low grazing residuals, environmental management and 
monitoring could be judged a success according to the Chapter 7 informants and the 
Chapter 9 survey. The involvement of commercial partners in the LUDF was a novel 
method to provide funding, as government support for agricultural extension was 
reduced in the economic restructuring of the New Zealand economy.   
 
The development of the Canterbury dairy industry corresponded with the 
privatisation of the New Zealand economy and the decline of the “linear model of 
extension” (Paine 1997, p. 37). The LUDF survey in Chapter 9 suggested that 
farmer’s sources of information were diverse and included extension personnel, 
demonstration-farms, media and other farmers. However, the key messages of the 
LUDF were driven by scientists and farm management professionals, thus they 
incorporated aspects of the linear model. Scientists and experts were involved in the 
direction of the farm, but because there was also an involvement of farmers through 
the SIDDC business advisory group, the technique could best be described as co-
learning. This ensured that techniques demonstrated were seen as relevant by farmers.   
 
Previous research on the adoption of innovation in New Zealand agriculture has 
found that management innovations requiring nothing more than more intensive 
management were more readily adopted than capital intensive innovations. The 
introduction of a new practice was suggested to be an important motivator of learning 
by Grey, Parker and Kemp (2003, pp. 116-119), and several authors (Nuthall 2010, p. 
212 
 
91, Flett 2003, p. 2) suggested that the complexity of an innovation and the ability of 
the farmer to trial and view the results of an innovation were important. The LUDF 
results (Chapter 9) on the rapid adoption of low grazing residuals confirmed the 
literature. Rates of adoption were lower for reproductive management procedures that 
were more expensive to implement, with results that were more difficult to measure.   
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10.7 What are the emergent insights from the Canterbury 
dairy industry for industry development theory? 
(Research Question Five). 
10.7.1  Changing levels of profitability 
The lack of profit in other farming systems was a driver for dairy industry 
development in Canterbury. As government subsidies were removed in the 1980s, the 
traditional farming system of sheep and cropping became less profitable, primarily 
due to declining prices for wool and wheat (Figure 6.2). Although dairy prices also 
dropped in the late 1980s, they recovered from 1990 and, along with lamb and beef, 
have remained more profitable than the wool and crop sectors. Because dairying was 
more profitable, dairy farmers could pay more for land and with the advent of 
improved technologies for irrigation, an irrigated dairy industry developed. The 
higher land prices encouraged the traditional farmers to sell their land to the 
‘immigrant’ dairy farmers in Waves 1 and 2. In Wave 3, a number of conversions 
were from cropping farms due to the ‘push’ of lower crop prices and the ‘pull’ of 
higher milk prices making dairying a more profitable option. As shown in Chapter 2, 
Canterbury has shown a high return on capital in the 2000s which would be an 
obvious driver of growth. Although dairying was different to traditional farming 
systems operating in Canterbury at the time, a number of basic farming principles are 
shared (e.g. soil fertility), which allowed more rapid conversion to the new system. 
 
Conclusion: Changing levels of profitability between farming systems was a 
driver of land use change. 
 
10.7.2  Development of a resource  
The development of the irrigation resource was initially an enabler of growth as 
farmers learned to operate dairy farms with irrigation. Without irrigation, dairy 
farming on light land was not practical. Not only did irrigation allow dairy farming, 
but it also resulted in increased production. The increased production documented in 
Chapter 2 was largely the result of a stable feed source (pasture), due to irrigation. 
Irrigation became a driver of growth, as the profitability of irrigated dairy farms 
exceeded competing land uses.  
 
Conclusion: The development of a resource will drive change. 
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10.7.3  Entrepreneurs 
Another driver of growth was the entrepreneurial profits obtained from purchasing 
Canterbury land with irrigation potential and converting the existing farming system 
to dairy farming. Figure 7.4 details the differences in prices per hectare for dairy, 
cropping and fattening land since 1988. In nearly all years land devoted to dairy 
farming was valued higher and thus a conversion to dairy farming from other uses 
resulted in gains in land value, which encouraged further investment. Industry 
development was enabled and driven by the development of the water resource.  
 
Conclusion: The ability to increase wealth through the conversion of other 
farming systems to dairy farming was a driver of growth. 
10.7.4  Human reasons 
A number of Wave 1 farmers became Canterbury dairy farmers for reasons other than 
(or as well as) the pursuit of profit and wealth creation. Informants in Chapter 7 
suggested that Canterbury (with Christchurch as an urban centre) provided more 
educational, sporting and cultural options. Additionally, a number stated that they 
were challenged by being part of a developing area and a new farming system 
(irrigated dairy farming). Informants commented that most Wave 1 and 2 farmers 
moved to the area from other parts of New Zealand or overseas. 
 
Conclusion: Human reasons such as the social and educational opportunities in 
a new area as well as the ability to fulfil growth and personal objectives are 
important to drive industry development. 
10.7.5  Innovation, technology and extension 
In a rapidly growing industry, new technologies and their adoption must also be 
rapid. In the case of the Canterbury dairy industry, it was particularly helpful that 
many technologies could be adopted from the existing New Zealand dairy industry. 
However, the Canterbury climate, soils and larger farms required solutions specific to 
the area.  
 
Although a research and extension infrastructure existed in the wider dairy industry 
(Chapter 5), these providers were slow to respond to the growth in Canterbury dairy 
farming. Informants in Chapter 7 indicated that for Wave 1, ‘user innovation’ was 
important. By Wave 2, specialised dairy consultants began to have an effect on 
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industry development. In Wave 3, the existing infrastructure established offices, 
research facilities and demonstration farms in the area. Productivity increased in 
Wave 3 (Chapter 2), which can be attributed in part to the influence of research and 
extension. However, as shown in Chapter 9, farmers obtain information from a wide 
range of sources. The farmer survey established that adoption was higher for clear 
messages that were simple to understand and implement and which had positive 
economic benefits. Extension was an important facilitator of growth, but not a driver 
or enabler. User innovation and the diffusion of those innovations through discussion 
groups and consultants were important for early Canterbury dairy industry growth.  
 
Conclusion: The development and adoption of new technologies are important 
enablers/facilitators for the growth of a new industry. Extension was an 
important facilitator, particularly when the extension methods contributed to 
productivity and profitability increases. 
10.7.6  Cooperatives 
The processing industry must be able to accommodate growth for the industry to 
develop rapidly. It was important for the growth of the Canterbury dairy industry to 
be able to join an established instrumental subsystem. The local processor organised 
as a cooperative, was important as the entity was forced to deal with 
farmers/members and the problems they encountered. It is considered unlikely that a 
proprietary company would have suffered the economic losses necessary to overcome 
many of the problems or been willing to construct the infrastructure to accept all the 
milk produced by farmers. The quality of governance and leadership of the 
cooperative was deemed very important by the sources in Chapter 8. 
 
Conclusion: Properly governed cooperatives are an appropriate structure for 
industry development in agriculture. The ability to join an established 
integrated vertical supply chain was important.  
10.7.7  Industry History 
The institutional subsystem in place prior to the development in Canterbury allowed 
rapid growth. In Chapter 6, it was determined that New Zealand had a long history of 
dairy farming, with the New Zealand government nurturing and supporting the 
industry since the late 1800s. Throughout this history, industry governance, 
legitimisation and regulations/standards had been established. The monopoly position 
of the New Zealand Dairy Board and Fonterra may have been a positive factor in 
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growth. Government activities in relation to trade and market development have been 
important for industry success. The deregulation of financial markets made a positive 
contribution to the availability of capital.  
 
Conclusion: An enabler of industry development in a new area is the 
appropriate political and economic environment. The presence of government 
support in trade issues is important for an exporting industry. 
 
10.7.8  Support infrastructure 
A number of other enablers/facilitators were required as part of the resource 
procurement subsystem. These included input suppliers and other service providers, 
as well as farming systems that supported the dairy industry. The acquisition of 
capital was an important factor in industry development. Chapter 7 informants spoke 
of the difficulty of obtaining finance in Wave 1, but by Wave 3 liberal lending caused 
problems. The entry of corporate farmers was an early source of capital with 
investors becoming involved in Waves 2 and 3. 
 
Conclusion: The development of a resource procurement subsystem is necessary 
to provide the inputs needed for an industry. The acquisition of capital for 
investment in the industry is particularly important.  
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10.8 Contribution to theory 
The theoretical insights that have emerged from this thesis are presented in this 
section within a generic framework that has the potential to assist investigations of 
industry development in other contexts. Some of the insights presented in this section 
emerged directly from the data and others emerged from a process of a comparative 
analysis of data with existing theory.  
 
Given the constructivist nature of this thesis, theoretical insights are seen as giving 
rise to constructs. The value of these constructs is to make sense of complex and 
‘messy’ situations. Accordingly, theory development is seen as a continuous process 
in which existing theory is modified in the light of further evidence (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Since theory is never complete it is expected that the constructs presented here 
will themselves be further developed and modified by further studies. It is hoped that 
the structural framework and associated constructs presented here, can assist the 
process of sensitisation for researchers investigating industry development in other 
contexts. 
 
 A key insight emerging from this thesis is the importance of the resource and 
institutional subsystems as defined by Van de Ven and Garud (1989). Although these 
concepts are not new, they have not received as much attention as the instrumental 
subsystem. For example, Porter, and his successors focus primarily on what is 
essentially the productive and processing sector.  
 
A second key insight that emerges from this thesis is that most of the drivers directly 
influence entrepreneurial and subsequent participants in the instrumental subsystem. 
However, most of the enablers and facilitators lie within the resource procurement 
and institutional subsystems.  
 
The entrepreneurs, and business developers that follow them, typically have little 
direct influence on the institutional and resource procurement subsystems - upon 
which they are dependent. Accordingly, if policy makers wish to influence industry 
development, then consideration needs to be made to removing constraints within the 
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institutional and resource procurement subsystems.  This is achieved by focusing on 
policies that enable and facilitate.   
 
The comparison of the research results with the theoretical framework and literature 
leads to an enhanced generic framework (Table 10.1).  Although influencing factors 
might be found in any of the boxes within this table, the more likely placements are 
denoted with ‘X’s.  
 
The key drivers are essentially economic. These include product prices, factor costs 
(land, labour and capital) and the comparative economics of alternative enterprises. 
The industry initiators are typically entrepreneurial, however, in subsequent waves of 
the development process, the entrants may be less entrepreneurial in nature, and 
therefore respond to drivers in a different way.  
 
The issue of marketing infrastructure is particularly important.  In the case of the 
Canterbury dairy industry the presence of a strong processor together with the 
marketing infrastructure provided by the New Zealand Dairy Board was of major 
importance. Conversely, the failure of many industries to break through the initiation 
phase can be explained in terms of failure of the marketing component of the value 
chain (Wood, Chudleigh and Bond 1994, Hyde 1998, Greer, Greer and Zwart 2000). 
 
The availability of the factors of production such as land, labour and capital, together 
with technology, is important in the resource subsystem to provide the inputs needed 
for a developing industry. These factors are similar to Schumpeter’s theory of “new 
combinations” (1961). Although these factors lie within the resource procurement 
system, their availability is influenced by the institutional system.  
 
The institutional subsystem is dominated by the enabling role of government in 
setting policies that create a supportive economic environment, as well as industry 
structures that legitimise and set standards for the industry. Extension can be a 
facilitator of growth for the instrumental subsystem, with the literature further 
indicating the importance of educational systems. 
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Table 10.1 An enhanced theoretical framework of industry development 
 
  
  Instrumental 
subsystem 
  Resource 
procurement 
  Institutional 
subsystem 
 
          
 driver enabler facilitator driver enabler facilitator driver enabler facilitator 
Economics:          
   product prices X         
   factor costs X         
   comparative economics X         
Processing infrastructure  X        
Marketing infrastructure  X        
Factors of production:          
  land     X     
  labour     X     
  finance     X     
Technology     X     
Trade environment         X 
Finance environment         X 
Physical regulatory environ.         X 
Labour laws         X 
Research         X 
Extension         X 
Education         X 
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It is important to distinguish between key resources, such as finance, and the 
institutional subsystem which determines the availability of these resources. For 
example the changes to the New Zealand financial institutional system in the mid-
1980s had a direct impact on the availability of finance in the resource procurement 
subsystem. Similarly, liberalisation of trade rules within the institutional environment 
can then impact directly on product prices which then flow through as drivers.  
 
The innovation system is essentially part of the institutional subsystem, although user 
innovation may also occur within the instrumental system.  Elements of the 
innovation system include research, extension and education. Industries typically 
emerge without a structured innovation system, but the subsequent development of an 
innovation system can play an important facilitation role. The absence of such a 
system may eventually lead to industry failure due to a lack of competitive advantage.  
 
In summary, this research has built upon existing theory by proposing an enhanced 
framework that integrates a series of developmental waves within closely linked 
instrumental, resource procurement and institutional subsystems. The development 
drivers are economic opportunities that lead to actions by entrepreneurs who initiate 
the industry development largely within the instrumental subsystem. Although the 
focus of these entrepreneurs is often on production activities, there is a fundamental 
requirement for the development of a value chain that integrates production, 
processing and marketing. Further, the success of these initial entrepreneurs and later 
businesses that may follow in subsequent waves of development will be determined 
not only by their own endeavours, but also by the presence of enabling and 
facilitating factors. These business decision makers typically have little direct 
influence over enablers and facilitators; however, these factors can often be 
influenced by policy makers.  
 
In particular, it is policy makers who determine the regulatory environment as it 
impacts upon land, labour, capital and product markets. In addition they establish the 
‘rules of the game’ as they apply to the physical environment and land use changes.  
In terms of enablers, one is not more important than the other, because the absence of 
a single enabler can prevent the industry from developing.  
 
221 
 
 For those concerned with the development of industries, it is important that 
consideration be given to the likelihood that the waves of development will have 
different characteristics and that there is a need for the alignment of the enablers, 
facilitators and drivers within each wave to the specific characteristics and needs of 
instrumental decision makers. 
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10.9 Limitations of research  
The research was a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. Chapters 2 and 3 
were quantitative. Chapters 7 and 8 were qualitative, with some elements of numeric 
data. Chapter 9 was quantitative within the hypothetico-deductive framework.  
 
A problem with the quantitative data in Chapter 2 was the reliance on a series of non-
linked static ‘snapshots’ of the industry at specific points in time. Therefore, results 
were only valid for internal comparison between years and regions within the specific 
data set. In addition, four years data was missing for some of the measures leaving a 
gap in the results. The quantitative information in Chapter 3 was only for one farm 
and although most data can be verified through accountant-prepared reports or 
published secondary sources, at times the chapter relied on data supplied by the case 
study farmer with no form of validation available. 
 
Case study research has been frequently criticised for lack of rigour, often because 
the researcher has allowed ambiguous evidence or biased views to influence the 
findings. Other concerns have been that case studies provide little basis for scientific 
generalisation, that they take too long to conduct and result in large, unreadable 
documents (Yin 2009, p. 10). In this thesis every attempt was made to minimise these 
problems. Chapters 7 and 8 were case studies utilising information provided by 
industry participants, thus comments were the participant’s ‘story’ of their 
involvement. Generic opinions were avoided unless it was in an area where the 
informant had a level of expertise. Some comments were removed during writing 
when they could be proven to be erroneous. The informants in Chapter 7 were 
purposively selected to cover the entire development period Although there were 
fifteen informants farming in Wave 3, only two of these were new entrants during 
Wave 3. Hence, there is a particular limitation surrounding the generalisations 
relating to the motivations of Wave 3 entrants. It is also possible that the leading 
questions asked in Chapter 7 to verify another informant’s statements, influenced 
responses. When available, figures and tables were prepared to support statements 
gathered in the interviews. 
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Chapter 9 was a mail survey of farmers in the catchment of the Lincoln University 
Dairy Farm. The purpose of the survey was to gain information on farmer 
demographics, sources of information, learning styles and their interaction with a 
demonstration farm. The survey suffered from a low participation rate, but 146 
responses (24% of survey) still provided valuable information for understanding the 
role of diffusion in a developing agricultural industry.   
 
The thesis has been influenced by the author’s involvement with the industry since 
1987, as well as providing the base data for Chapter 3. Although every attempt has 
been made to justify all propositions and provide empirical data when possible, the 
thesis, at times, may have been affected by the author’s experiences.  
 
As previously discussed on p. 194, there are additional areas that have not been 
covered in this thesis, as they were not identified by the literature as potential factors 
of growth or by informants as drivers, enablers or facilitators of growth.  These 
include the industry’s effect on the environment and issues around labour 
management. It is recognized that these issues may have been a constraint to growth 
at the farm level, but they did not appear to be a constraint at the industry level. 
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10.10 Future research 
In regard to the Canterbury dairy industry, the insights drawn within this thesis are 
not necessarily exhaustive of the insights that could be drawn, given additional 
fieldwork and investigations that go beyond the limits of one Ph.D. study. Additional 
studies, drawing on specific disciplinary lenses and associated perspectives may find 
further insights. There is also scope for a further study of the LUDF as an extension 
tool, given the change of farm system in 2011/12. 
 
Possible research beyond the Canterbury dairy industry could include: 
1) Applying the findings of this study within other dairy regions of New Zealand 
such as Southland. 
2) Further studies of innovation within the New Zealand dairy industry, with a 
particular focus on source of innovations (NZ research, overseas research, 
commercial technology, and end-user innovation) and their dissemination.  
3) The scope for applying the findings of this study beyond New Zealand in 
relation to innovation and industry development. 
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     Appendix A 
Statistics used to prepare graphs in Chapter 2 
Statistics used for Figure 2.1  
 
Milksolids price (constant value dollars, 2010) 
 
Years Dollars 
1990-91 3.62 
1991-92 4.95 
1992-93 5.34 
1993-94 4.79 
1994-95 4.70 
1995-96 5.41 
1996-97 4.86 
1997-98 4.50 
1998-99 4.73 
1999-00 4.89 
2000-01 6.29 
2001-02 6.54 
2002-03 4.41 
2003-04 5.00 
2004-05 5.24 
2005-06 4.51 
2006-07 4.81 
2007-08 7.96 
2008-09 5.23 
2009-10 6.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
238 
 
 
Statistics used for Figure 2.2                     Statistics used for Figure 2.3 
 
Canterbury dairy hectares                         Trends in milk production 
 
Years Hectares 
  
Years NI SI Canterbury 
1982/83 15,594 
  
1984/85 93% 7% 2% 
1983/84 17,480 
  
1985/86 92% 8% 2% 
1984/85 17,875 
  
1986/87 92% 8% 2% 
1985/86 19,840 
  
1987/88 93% 7% 2% 
1986/87 20,190 
  
1988/89 92% 8% 2% 
1987/88 16,832 
  
1989/90 92% 8% 2% 
1988/89 20,007 
  
1990/91 93% 7% 1% 
1989/90 23,232 
  
1991/92 91% 9% 3% 
1990/91 16,357 
  
1992/93 88% 12% 4% 
1991/92 26,648 
  
1993/94 87% 13% 4% 
1992/93 40,082 
  
1994/95 85% 15% 5% 
1993/94 44,496 
  
1995/96 83% 17% 5% 
1994/95 53,336 
  
1996/97 82% 18% 6% 
1995/96 58,438 
  
1997/98 81% 19% 7% 
1996/97 64,548 
  
1998/99 78% 22% 8% 
1997/98 74,760 
  
1999/00 70% 30% 8% 
1998/99 84,592 
  
2000/01 77% 23% 8% 
1999/00 90,350 
  
2001/02 74% 26% 10% 
2000/01 90,560 
  
2002/03 72% 28% 11% 
2001/02 111,134 
  
2003/04 71% 29% 11% 
2002/03 120,432 
  
2004/05 70% 30% 12% 
2003/04 124,936 
  
2005/06 69% 31% 12% 
2004/05 131,127 
  
2006/07 68% 32% 13% 
2005/06 137,424 
  
2007/08 64% 36% 15% 
2006/07 146,413 
  
2008/09 64% 36% 15% 
2007/08 160,016 
  
2009/10 61% 39% 17% 
2008/09 188,235 
      2009/10 194,862 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
 
Statistics used for Figure 2.4                                 Statistics used for Figure 2.5 
 
Hectares per farm                                                  Cows per herd 
 
Years NI SI  Canterbury 
 
Years NI SI Canterbury 
1982/83 64 70 69 
 
1980/81 131 100 89 
1983/84 65 72 76 
 
1981/82 135 107 99 
1984/85 63 71 72 
 
1982/83 139 112 110 
1985/86 64 74 78 
 
1983/84 142 117 124 
1986/87 64 75 75 
 
1984/85 147 127 150 
1987/88 64 75 74 
 
1985/86 151 135 163 
1988/89 65 75 81 
 
1986/87 152 145 187 
1989/90 66 82 96 
 
1987/88 153 150 183 
1990/91 69 84 95 
 
1988/89 158 151 187 
1991/92 71 87 97 
 
1989/90 160 160 200 
1992/93 72 91 98 
 
1990/91 166 170 209 
1993/94 74 98 103 
 
1991/92 169 173 237 
1994/95 77 109 118 
 
1992/93 179 188 226 
1995/96 78 112 122 
 
1993/94 185 209 244 
1996/97 81 119 132 
 
1994/95 186 249 307 
1997/98 82 123 140 
 
1995/96 190 264 331 
1998/99 84 130 156 
 
1996/97 197 283 366 
1999/00 86 135 163 
 
1997/98 205 311 403 
2000/01 88 137 160 
 
1998/99 212 330 424 
2001/02 93 151 181 
 
1999/00 216 347 453 
2002/03 100 164 193 
 
2000/01 232 354 463 
2003/04 99 166 194 
 
2001/02 246 394 517 
2004/05 102 171 201 
 
2002/03 256 422 561 
2005/06 104 174 205 
 
2003/04 270 449 592 
2006/07 107 179 213 
 
2004/05 280 470 623 
2007/08 110 183 220 
 
2005/06 285 484 645 
2008/09 113 191 223 
 
2006/07 296 505 683 
2009/10 115 194 219 
 
2007/08 305 526 711 
     
2008/09 314 546 719 
     
2009/10 345 565 730 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.6                                 Statistics used for Figure 2.7  
 
Cows per hectare                                                   Milksolids per cow 
 
Years N.Z. SI Cant. 
 
Years N.Z. SI Cant. 
 1982/83 2.20 1.70 1.88 
 
1982/83 252 240 240 
 1983/84 2.25 1.74 1.95 
 
1983/84 270 259 266 
 1984/85 2.40 1.86 2.17 
 
1984/85 266 261 250 
 1985/86 2.40 1.95 2.30 
 
1985/86 275 271 262 
 1986/87 2.42 1.99 2.42 
 
1986/87 242 252 255 
 1987/88 2.46 2.05 2.43 
 
1987/88 270 250 260 
 1988/89 2.38 2.01 2.32 
 
1988/89 250 242 242 
 1989/90 2.40 2.00 2.05 
 
1989/90 257 258 248 
 1990/91 2.40 2.10 2.20 
 
1990/91 259 271 260 
 1991/92 2.45 2.15 2.30 
 
1991/92 274 279 285 
 1992/93 2.50 2.20 2.40 
 
1992/93 259 277 274 
 1993/94 2.50 2.30 2.53 
 
1993/94 265 274 272 
 1994/95 2.50 2.40 2.65 
 
1994/95 271 272 271 
 1995/96 2.50 2.40 2.80 
 
1995/96 283 279 273 
 1996/97 2.50 2.40 2.85 
 
1996/97 301 296 289 
 1997/98 2.60 2.60 2.95 
 
1997/98 292 291 283 
 1998/99 2.70 2.60 2.90 
 
1998/99 256 266 285 
 1999/00 2.70 2.70 2.95 
 
1999/00 288 311 320 
 2000/01 2.70 2.60 2.90 
 
2000/01 310 338 349 
 2001/02 2.67 2.58 2.82 
 
2001/02 307 338 356 
 2002/03 2.61 2.55 2.87 
 
2002/03 315 344 372 
 2003/04 2.75 2.68 3.02 
 
2003/04 322 355 371 
 2004/05 2.78 2.74 3.12 
 
2004/05 308 341 364 
 2005/06 2.77 2.75 3.17 
 
2005/06 325 361 367 
 2006/07 2.81 2.80 3.23 
 
2006/07 330 373 381 
 2007/08 2.83 2.86 3.25 
 
2007/08 307 361 380 
 2008/09 2.83 2.87 3.27 
 
2008/09 323 355 360 
 2009/10 2.81 2.91 3.34 
 
2009/10 327 368 378 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.8 
 
Milksolids per hectare 
 
Years      NZ     SI Canterbury 
1982/83 553 408 453 
1983/84 607 452 506 
1984/85 628 487 541 
1985/86 669 532 600 
1986/87 585 499 617 
1987/88 667 515 644 
1988/89 595 483 557 
1989/90 610 501 513 
1990/91 610 546 592 
1991/92 632 570 619 
1992/93 653 593 647 
1993/94 708 653 741 
1994/95 671 635 707 
1995/96 705 674 769 
1996/97 741 711 822 
1997/98 748 744 833 
1998/99 685 725 820 
1999/00 759 829 945 
2000/01 825 868 993 
2001/02 824 875 998 
2002/03 828 882 1065 
2003/04 889 953 1119 
2004/05 862 940 1134 
2005/06 907 997 1166 
2006/07 934 1046 1224 
2007/08 873 1037 1240 
2008/09 921 1018 1173 
2009/10 920 1069 1262 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.9                              Statistics used for Figure 2.10    
 
Gross farm revenue                                            Cash farm expenditure per hectare 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury Years New Zealand Canterbury 
1988-89 143996 222730 
 
1988-89 2,182 2,227 
 1989-90 154444 193070 
 
1989-90 2,451 1,931 
 1990-91 126653 174212 
 
1990-91 1,863 1,742 
 1991-92 159939 215645 
 
1991-92 2,352 2,156 
 1992-93 139826 259343 
 
1992-93 2,026 2,593 
 1993-94 180033 279506 
 
1993-94 2,572 2,795 
 1994-95 182264 282013 
 
1994-95 2,604 2,169 
 1995-96 
 
420280 
 
1995-96 
 
3,233 
 1996-97 
 
436664 
 
1996-97 
 
2,817 
 1997-98 
 
451990 
 
1997-98 
 
2,916 
 1998-99 
 
527573 
 
1998-99 
 
3,404 
 1999-00 295754 610500 
 
1999-00 3,215 3,591 
 2000-01 406954 937500 
 
2000-01 4,423 5,357 
 2001-02 467380 1090900 
 
2001-02 4,869 6,061 
 2002-03 378527 881100 
 
2002-03 3,711 4,763 
 2003-04 446019 961000 
 
2003-04 4,289 5,005 
 2004-05 486191 1127030 
 
2004-05 4,155 5,780 
 2005-06 536685 1130400 
 
2005-06 4,363 5,797 
 2006-07 566816 1187065 
 
2006-07 4,499 5,848 
 2007-08 1021886 2234002 
 
2007-08 7,801 10,638 
 2008-09 750000 1575300 
 
2008-09 5,556 7,501 
 2009-10 931703 1912800 
 
2009-10 6,751 9,109 
 2010-11 1146118 2212648 
 
2010-11 8,128 10,536 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.10 
 
              Cash farm expenditure per hectare 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury 
  1988-89 1,004 717 
  1989-90 1,111 1,194 
  1990-91 945 786 
  1991-92 1,140 988 
  1992-93 1,098 1,232 
  1993-94 1,369 1,402 
  1994-95 1,397 1,150 
  1995-96 
 
1,955 
  1996-97 
 
1,737 
  1997-98 
 
1,950 
  1998-99 
 
2,049 difference 
1999-00 1,756 1,933 10% 
 2000-01 1,971 2,506 27% 
 2001-02 2,267 3,113 37% 
 2002-03 2,572 3,236 26% 
 2003-04 2,496 3,094 24% 
 2004-05 2,445 3,388 39% 
 2005-06 2,654 3,577 35% 
 2006-07 2,941 3,968 35% 
 2007-08 3,576 5,005 40% 
 2008-09 3,916 5,399 38% 
 2009-10 3,566 5,039 41% 
 2010-11 4,088 5,589 37% 
 
   
32% average 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.11                              Statistics used for Figure 2.12  
 
Cash farm expenditure per kg ms                         Cash farm surplus per hectare 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury  
1988-89 
   
1988-89 1178 1510 
1989-90 1.77 2.19 
 
1989-90 1341 737 
1990-91 1.58 1.38 
 
1990-91 918 956 
1991-92 1.83 1.70 
 
1991-92 1212 1168 
1992-93 1.04 2.01 
 
1992-93 930 1361 
1993-94 1.16 1.85 
 
1993-94 1203 1393 
1994-95 1.21 1.44 
 
1994-95 1207 1019 
1995-96 
 
2.26 
 
1995-96 
 
1278 
1996-97 
 
2.08 
 
1996-97 
 
1080 
1997-98 
 
2.29 
 
1997-98 
 
966 
1998-99 
 
2.28 
 
1998-99 
 
1355 
1999-00 2.13 2.12 
 
1999-00 1459 1658 
2000-01 2.44 2.51 
 
2000-01 2453 2851 
2001-02 2.77 2.99 
 
2001-02 2602 2947 
2002-03 2.89 2.85 
 
2002-03 1139 1527 
2003-04 2.73 2.64 
 
2003-04 1792 1911 
2004-05 2.80 2.78 
 
2004-05 1711 2392 
2005-06 2.77 2.83 
 
2005-06 1709 2220 
2006-07 2.91 3.00 
 
2006-07 1558 1879 
2007-08 3.61 3.68 
 
2007-08 4225 5633 
2008-09 3.86 4.05 
 
2008-09 1640 2103 
2009-10 3.50 3.63 
 
2009-10 3185 4070 
2010-11 3.93 4.15 
 
2010-11 4041 4948 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.13                      Statistics used for Figure 2.14         
 
Cash farm surplus per kg ms                        DNZ operating profit per hectare 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury  Years Waikato Canterbury Taranaki NI SI 
 1989-90 2.14 1.35  2005-06 1,440 1,396 905 1,217 1,303 
1990-91 1.54 1.67  2006-07 1,068 973 835 873 1,085 
1991-92 1.94 2.01  2007-08 2,382 4,708 2,552 2,409 3,876 
1992-93 0.88 2.22  2008-09 689 615 1,077 685 915 
1993-94 1.02 1.83  2009-10 1,684 3,353 2,103 1,708 2,451 
1994-95 1.05 1.27  
1995-96 
 
1.48  
1996-97 
 
1.29  
1997-98 
 
1.13  
1998-99 
 
1.51  
1999-00 1.77 1.82  
2000-01 3.04 2.85  
2001-02 3.18 2.83  
2002-03 1.28 1.35  
2003-04 1.96 1.63  
2004-05 1.96 1.96  
2005-06 1.78 1.76  
2006-07 1.54 1.42  
2007-08 4.26 4.14  
2008-09 1.62 1.58  
2009-10 3.12 2.93  
2010-11 3.89 3.67  
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Statistics used for Figure 2.15                                     Statistics used for Figure 2.16         
 
Total farm capital investment per ha                           Total farm capital investment per kg ms 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury 
 
Years New Zealand Canterbury 
 1999-00              17,451       15,335  
  
1999-00 21.15 16.82 -20% 
 2000-01              17,728       17,685  
  
2000-01 21.98 17.69 -20% 
 2001-02              22,141       23,428  
  
2001-02 27.07 22.49 -17% 
 2002-03              24,561       24,878  
  
2002-03 27.64 21.92 -21% 
 2003-04              30,031       26,523  
  
2003-04 32.78 22.63 -31% 
 2004-05              30,474       30,815  
  
2004-05 34.89 25.28 -28% 
 2005-06              34,303       35,771  
  
2005-06 35.79 28.30 -21% 
 2006-07              38,118       38,120  
  
2006-07 37.77 28.80 -24% 
 2007-08              45,361       44,022  
  
2007-08 45.75 32.32 -29% 
 2008-09              53,111       58,407  
  
2008-09 52.38 43.79 -16% 
 2009-10              48,463       57,366  
  
2009-10 47.52 41.33 -13% 
 2010-11              47,958       54,070  
  
2010-11 46.11 40.11 -13% 
 
     
averages 35.90 28.46 -21% 
  
 
 
Statistics used for Figure 2.17                                                   Statistics used for Figure 2.18 
 
Debt per hectare                                                                         Debt per kg milksolids 
 
Year New Zealand Canterbury               Year New Zealand Canterbury    % diff. 
  1999-00                5,334          4,865  1999-00 6.46 5.34 -17% 
 2000-01                4,617          5,000  2000-01 5.73 5.00 -13% 
  2001-02                4,875          5,306  2001-02 5.96 5.09 -15% 
  2002-03                6,123          9,162  2002-03 6.89 8.07 17% 
  2003-04                8,375          9,883  2003-04 9.14 8.43 -8% 
  2004-05                7,552          9,931  2004-05 8.65 8.15 -6% 
  2005-06                7,769        10,316  2005-06 8.11 8.16 1% 
  2006-07                9,870        15,764  2006-07 9.78 11.91 22% 
  2007-08              12,023        15,524  2007-08 12.13 11.40 -6% 
  2008-09              16,595        24,649  2008-09 16.37 18.48 13% 
  2009-10              19,650        26,044  2009-10 19.27 18.76 -3% 
  2010-11              19,707        26,458  2010-11 18.95 19.63 4% 
  
   
average 
  
-1% 
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Statistics used for Figure 2.19                                       Statistics used for Figure 2.20 
 
Equity per hectare                                                          Return on capital 
 
Year New Zealand Canterbury     % diff. 
 
Year New Zealand Canterbury 
1999-00 12,117 10,471 14% 
 
1999-00 8% 11% 
 2000-01 13,111 12,685 3% 
 
2000-01 8% 16% 
 2001-02 17,265 18,122 -5% 
 
2001-02 6% 13% 
 2002-03 18,438 15,716 15% 
 
2002-03 5% 6% 
 2003-04 21,656 16,640 23% 
 
2003-04 4% 7% 
 2004-05 22,922 20,883 9% 
 
2004-05 4% 8% 
 2005-06 26,535 25,455 4% 
 
2005-06 3% 6% 
 2006-07 28,248 22,356 21% 
 
2006-07 3% 5% 
 2007-08 33,338 28,498 15% 
 
2007-08 2% 13% 
 2008-09 36,516 33,758 8% 
 
2008-09 2% 4% 
 2009-10 28,812 31,322 -9% 
 
2009-10 2% 7% 
 2010-11 28,251 27,612 2% 
 
2010-11 2% 9% 
 
  
average 8% 
  
4% 9% average 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248 
 
     Appendix B 
Additional information for Chapter 3 
B1. Timeline of case study farm growth 
 
A summary of steps in the development of the business are listed below: 
 
1993-94 - property converted to dairying with the construction of a 26 aside 
Herringbone cowshed. The first milk was sold from the property in November and 
25,500 kg milksolids were produced in the partial season. 
 
1994-95 - milked 220 cows for 70,000 (318 per cow), re-bordered, re-seeded, 
increased fertility to new blocks. 
 
1995-96 - drilled well to 73 metres to water 17.8 ha of the ‘new dry land’ block using 
a small Briggs irrigator. Milked 300 cows for 95,000 kg milksolids (316 milksolids 
per cow), leased 25 ha to the west of the farm for winter feed production. 
 
1996-97 - milked 350 cows for 120,000 kg milksolids (342 milksolids per cow), 
changed Briggs irrigator to ‘long line laterals’ to allow spray irrigation to increase to 
39 ha. 
 
1997-98 - purchased 30 ha to the west of the farm (included the 25 ha leased earlier), 
cultivated, increased fertility, re-grassed, deepened well to 93 metres, milk production 
remained the same. 
 
1998-99 - installed K lines
72
 to block west of the farm, production increased to 
140,000 kg milksolids from 400 cows (350 milksolids per cow). 
 
1999-2000 - production increased to 160,000 kg milksolids from 400 cows (400 
milksolids per cow), converted ‘long line’ laterals to K lines. 
 
2000-01 - production increased to 177,972 kg milksolids from 435 cows (409 
milksolids per cow), extended milking shed to 36 aside herringbone. 
 
2001-02 - production increased to 184,119 kg milksolids from 425 cows (433 
milksolids per cow), purchased adjoining 20 ha and installed K lines. 
 
2002-03 - production increased to 195,496 kg milksolids from 450 cows (434 
milksolids per cow), borderdyked 5.9 ha on riverbed. 
 
2003-04 - production increased to 218,320 kg milksolids from 525 cows (416 
milksolids per cow). 
 
                                                 
72
 K lines are an irrigation system consisting of ‘pods’ (generally 10) attached to alkathene hose.  
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2004-05 - sold cows to 50-50 sharemilker, production increased to 238,798 kg 
milksolids from 575 cows (415 milksolids per cow), cleared 30 ha of riverbed from 
gorse/broom, borderdyked another 14.6 ha on riverbed, doubled the number of water 
troughs per paddock.  
 
2005-06 - production increased to 258,700 kg milksolids from 620 cows (417 
milksolids per cow), winter milked 100 cows, developed further 20 ha of riverbed, 
purchased new farm of 145 ha (raised P levels and pH, cleared land, re-fenced, 
applied for water rights).  
 
2006-07 - production increased to 267,142 kg milksolids from 635 cows (421 
milksolids per cow), developed another 30 ha of riverbed to give a total of 80 ha. At 
the 144 ha farm constructed a water storage pond, cleared 15 ha of trees and 29.5 ha 
of an old plantation, more phosphorus and lime to ex-plantations, re-fenced the 
property. 
 
2007-08 - production increased to 284,185 kg milksolids from 693 cows (410 
milksolids per cow), cultivated and drilled 80 ha of riverbed into permanent dry land 
pasture mix. On new farm installed centre pivot and fixed grid irrigation systems
73
, 
built cattle yards, purchased empty cows for future herd and purchased yearlings. 
 
2008-09 - production of 270,070 kg milksolids from 675 cows (400 milksolids per 
cow). At the 144 ha farm built employee houses, built lower order sharemilker house, 
built 50 bale rotary milking shed, planted shelter trees, finished applying capital 
fertiliser, purchased future herd, reared 100 calves. Installed pump, mainlines and 
irrigator for 20 ha of riverbed irrigation. 
 
2009-10 - production of 284,148 kg milksolids on original farm from 650 cows (437 
milksolids per cow) and 197,932 kg milksolids on new farm from 490 cows (404 
milksolids per cow), built water storage pond on old farm and added K lines, built 
bunker to hold feed (palm kernel expeller) and purchased feeding wagons for 
following season for the 144 ha farm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 A fixed grid system consists of posts placed approximately 25 metres apart with a sprinkler attached 
to the top. The advantage of this system is that they do not have to be shifted daily. The system is very 
suitable for use in paddocks where the paddock shape does not suit traditional irrigation systems. 
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Appendix B2. Comparative balance sheets based on per hectare real estate valuations 
(1988-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
251 
 
Appendix B3. Comparative balance sheets based on per kg milksolids real estate 
valuations (1988-2010)  
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Appendix B4. Spread sheet of inputs for return on capital calculation based on a per 
ha valuation 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B5. Spread sheet of inputs for return on capital calculation based on a per 
kg milksolids valuation 
 
 
 
 
 
Real net worth was calculated from the operations net worth at June 1, 1988 and adjusted as per the 
Consumer Price Index provided by the Reserve Bank of NZ. As this was the initial investment it is 
shown as a negative number. 
 
WOM (wages of management) was set at $50,000 per year.  
 
Off farm salaries were the dollars received by the primary partner for services rendered to a number of 
companies. Off farm salaries were annually converted to 2010 dollars.  
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Appendix B6. Spread sheet of inputs to determine wealth generation from investing 
in cooperatives. 
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     Appendix C 
Statistics used in Chapter 6  
Statistics used to produce Figures 6.1 and 6.2 
 
Year Wool $ Index 
 
Lamb $ 
Lamb 
weights $/kg Index 
 
 
per kg 
  
per head 
    1980/81 225 1000 
 
16.30 13 1.24 1000 
 1981/82 293 1299 
 
21.48 13 1.62 1298 
 1982/83 293 1302 
 
20.86 13 1.58 1266 
 1983/84 291 1291 
 
22.04 14 1.62 1301 
 1984/85 338 1501 
 
23.63 13 1.89 1517 
 1985/86 313 1386 
 
13.19 13 0.98 791 
 1986/87 370 1641 
 
20.12 13 1.56 1253 
 1987/88 404 1790 
 
16.13 14 1.18 946 
 1988/89 454 2016 
 
18.73 13 1.45 1167 
 1989/90 406 1800 
 
30.43 14 2.22 1785 
 1990/91 308 1366 
 
26.96 14 1.94 1559 
 1991/92 281 1248 
 
27.26 14 1.93 1554 
 1992/93 279 1237 
 
40.14 15 2.68 2151 
 1993/94 266 1179 
 
38.98 15 2.53 2034 
 1994/95 354 1570 
 
29.61 15 2.00 1608 
 1995/96 321 1424 
 
33.60 16 2.17 1742 
 1996/97 281 1244 
 
41.46 16 2.61 2096 
 1997/98 277 1228 
 
35.94 16 2.32 1864 
 1998/99 259 1150 
 
38.02 16 2.41 1934 
 1999/00 270 1197 
 
47.20 17 2.84 2285 
 2000/01 318 1409 
 
63.25 17 3.79 3044 
 2001/02 328 1455 
 
70.20 17 4.15 3338 
 2002/03 346 1537 
 
63.11 17 3.71 2984 
 2003/04 305 1352 
 
63.28 17 3.64 2923 
 2004/05 285 1263 
 
65.45 18 3.74 3006 
 2005/06 259 1148 
 
54.27 17 3.17 2551 
 2006/07 266 1178 
 
53.79 17 3.18 2558 
 2007/08 260 1155 
 
55.95 17 3.39 2725 
 2008/09 258 1146 
 
85.85 18 4.85 3898 
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Year 
Milksolids 
$ Index 
 
2.5 yr steers Steer weights $/kg Index 
    
$/head 
   1980/81 1.52 1000 
 
344 268 1.29 1000 
1981/82 1.95 1283 
 
359 260 1.38 1074 
1982/83 2.11 1388 
 
402 257 1.57 1218 
1983/84 2.09 1375 
 
514 277 1.86 1445 
1984/85 2.33 1533 
 
628 281 2.23 1735 
1985/86 2.29 1507 
 
505 290 1.74 1357 
1986/87 2.03 1336 
 
530 281 1.88 1465 
1987/88 2.34 1539 
 
482 291 1.66 1290 
1988/89 3.28 2158 
 
580 267 2.17 1690 
1989/90 3.59 2362 
 
715 280 2.56 1988 
1990/91 2.42 1592 
 
758 282 2.69 2091 
1991/92 3.34 2197 
 
788 283 2.78 2163 
1992/93 3.66 2408 
 
843 277 3.04 2366 
1993/94 3.32 2184 
 
856 291 2.95 2291 
1994/95 3.4 2237 
 
682 289 2.36 1834 
1995/96 3.99 2625 
 
536 287 1.87 1451 
1996/97 3.63 2388 
 
505 296 1.71 1328 
1997/98 3.42 2250 
 
566 291 1.95 1513 
1998/99 3.58 2355 
 
658 288 2.29 1779 
1999/00 3.78 2487 
 
845 293 2.88 2240 
2000/01 5.01 3296 
 
1074 295 3.64 2831 
2001/02 5.35 3520 
 
1155 290 3.98 3095 
2002/03 3.66 2408 
 
938 288 3.26 2533 
2003/04 4.25 2796 
 
918 291 3.15 2451 
2004/05 4.58 3013 
 
963 292 3.29 2563 
2005/06 4.1 2697 
 
952 301 3.16 2462 
2006/07 4.46 2934 
 
1020 298 3.42 2660 
2007/08 7.67 5046 
 
984 276 3.57 2777 
2008/09 5.14 3382 
 
1060 276 3.84 2987 
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Year 
Wheat 
cents/kg Index 
 
Inflation 
rate Index 
 
       1980/81 18.3 1000 
 
15.65 1000 
 1981/82 20.3 1109 
 
15.55 1157 
 1982/83 22.7 1240 
 
12.325 1336 
 1983/84 27.4 1497 
 
4.175 1501 
 1984/85 24 1311 
 
11.45 1564 
 1985/86 20 1093 
 
13.05 1743 
 1986/87 19.5 1066 
 
16.725 1970 
 1987/88 29 1585 
 
9.8 2300 
 1988/89 31 1694 
 
5 2525 
 1989/90 29 1585 
 
7.625 2651 
 1990/91 27.6 1508 
 
4.3 2853 
 1991/92 29 1585 
 
2.275 2976 
 1992/93 29 1585 
 
1.925 3044 
 1993/94 28.5 1557 
 
1.65 3102 
 1994/95 28.8 1574 
 
2.375 3154 
 1995/96 31.7 1732 
 
2.175 3229 
 1996/97 28.5 1557 
 
2.05 3299 
 1997/98 26 1421 
 
1.7 3366 
 1998/99 25.5 1393 
 
1.25 3424 
 1999/00 26.5 1448 
 
1.525 3466 
 2000/01 30 1639 
 
3.325 3519 
 2001/02 32.5 1776 
 
2.4 3636 
 2002/03 31.5 1721 
 
2.325 3724 
 2003/04 29.5 1612 
 
1.775 3810 
 2004/05 28.5 1557 
 
2.725 3878 
 2005/06 31.5 1721 
 
3.475 3983 
 2006/07 35 1913 
 
2.65 4122 
 2007/08 47 2568 
 
3.1 4231 
 2008/09 39.7 2169 
 
3.35 4362 
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Table C2 Selected statistics for the NZ sheep industry from 1985-86 to 2008-09 
 
Year Wool 
(tonnes  
greasy) 
Wool price 
(nominal 
cents/kg) 
 
Lamb 
weights 
(kg/head) 
Tonnes 
lamb 
exported  
% 
Lambs 
per 
ewe 
# of 
ewes 
(000) 
Kg of 
lamb 
per ewe 
85-86 358 344 - 413,754 103 47,491 9.5 
90-91 305 317 13.9 297,822 102 36,631 9.8 
95-96 269 372 15.5 297,961 104 33,447 11.1 
01-02 229 385 17 286,556 113 26,785 14.9 
05-06 225 298 17 311,641 122 26,905 16.5 
08-09 205 315 17.7 305,199 113 - 16.9 
 
Source: derived from Meat and Wool New Zealand Economics Service NZ (Gonzalez-Macuer 2010)   
and Statistics NZ 
 
 
Table C3 Percentage of gross income of a model NZ sheep/cattle farm from normal 
enterprises, 1985-86 to 2008-09 
 
 Wool Sheep meat  
 
Cattle Dairy 
grazing 
Deer + 
velvet 
Cash 
crop 
other 
85-86 40% 23% 18% 0% 1% 15% 3% 
90-91 30% 30% 26% 0% 1% 9% 2% 
95-96 26% 34% 20% 2% 3% 10% 4% 
01-02 14% 48% 25% 1% 2% 6% 3% 
05-06 14% 47% 25% 2% 1% 8% 3% 
 
Source: derived from Meat and Wool New Zealand Economic Service (Gonzalez-Macuer 2010) 
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C4. Statistics used to prepare Figure 6.3 (2009 constant value dollars) 
 
Year 
farm 
values 
 
$/hectare 
  
1990/91 9877 
1991/92 11185 
1992/93 13680 
1993/94 17697 
1994/95 19477 
1995/96 18790 
1996/97 17458 
1997/98 15347 
1998/99 14962 
1999/00 14646 
2000/01 18437 
2001/02 18844 
2002/03 20907 
2003/04 22629 
2004/05 25359 
2005/06 29281 
2006/07 31800 
2007/08 38323 
2008/09 32976 
2009/10 29528 
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     Appendix D 
Additional information for Chapter 7 
D1. Opinions of informants as to the future of the Canterbury Dairy Industry 
 
At the conclusion of the interviews, each source was asked for their opinion on the 
future of the dairy industry in Canterbury. Their responses were as follows: 
 
Future farms will need to be concerned with the timing of nitrogen, develop 
overwintering systems, adopt nitrogen mitigation practices, improve cow efficiency 
and use different plants to achieve goals (In16). Informant 13 felt that the 
environmental effects of dairying have become prominent. Farmers will need to be 
more concerned about effluent usage, plant trees, use nutrient budgets and fence off 
rivers. 
 
Several sources commented on the attitude of other NZers to dairy farming. 
Informant 7 had noticed that NZers seem to want a reversion to wilderness, whereas 
Europeans subsidise farmers to prevent a reversion to wilderness. Informant 14 felt 
that there is a very big difference in attitudes between districts towards future 
development. Whereas mid Canterbury is very supportive of the new Barrhill-
Chertsey irrigation scheme, the areas encompassing Christchurch appear antagonistic 
to the Central Plains irrigation scheme. 
 
A number of interviewees commented on the trend to feeding grain to dairy cows. 
Although some question the ability to produce enough grain, In9 said that at current 
grain production levels only 30 hectares in grain would be required to feed a herd of 
500 cows, two kilograms per day during the milking season. Informant 20 mentioned 
that if farmers move to larger Friesian cows (as has been proposed by some 
researchers to reduce stocking rates and, therefore, excess nitrogen from urine), that 
grain feeding will be required due to the higher energy requirement of the cow. 
Several sources (In14, In15) felt that the trend to grain feeding will require farmers to 
develop new skills for when to feed or not to feed, so as to avoid pasture wastage. 
 
Informants 6 and 8 feel that there will be increased pressure on the dairy industry 
from the NZ government to allow investment in the industry by the public of NZ. 
However, most of the sources prefer to retain their cooperative as they do not trust a 
publicly listed country to look after their interests. Informant 4 said, “Farmers don’t 
trust the rest of the country to be business partners, because they have made short 
sighted and bad decisions in the past”. Another statement was “the strength of NZ 
agriculture is the family farm—agriculture needs motivated people and the people 
must be in control of the action to get the motivation” (In6). 
 
A major constraint to growth will be the availability of irrigation (In7). Informant 18 
commented that changes in irrigation technology will have a big effect on the future 
of the dairy industry and it will be critical to the industries environmental footprint. 
I16 suggested that crops and processed foods could very well over take dairy farming 
as they will give a better return for the litres of water used. 
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D2. Statistics used to prepare figures in Chapter 7 
 
Statistics used for Figure 7.1 
 
NAMV of a Friesian cow as a percentage of land values in Canterbury. 
 
Year $namv/$ha 
1988 8.8% 
1989 14.1% 
1990 9.9% 
1991 14.0% 
1992 10.5% 
1993 8.7% 
1994 9.9% 
1995 9.1% 
1996 9.9% 
1997 7.0% 
1998 7.5% 
1999 8.0% 
2000 11.0% 
2001 9.2% 
2002 5.6% 
2003 4.2% 
2004 3.6% 
2005 3.7% 
2006 4.6% 
2007 4.2% 
2008 6.1% 
2009 4.1% 
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D.3 Statistics used in preparation of Figure 7.2 
 
Relationship of milksolids payout and hectares in dairy farming in Canterbury. 
 
Years Canterbury land (ha)  Milk price (real $) 
1982-83 15,594 6.21 
 1983-84 17,480 5.87 
 1984-85 17,875 5.61 
 1985-86 19,840 5.00 
 1986-87 20,189 3.72 
 1987-88 16,831 4.04 
 1988-89 20,007 5.43 
 1989-90 23,232 5.51 
 1990-91 16,357 3.61 
 1991-92 26,647 4.94 
 1992-93 40,082 5.34 
 1993-94 44,496 4.79 
 1994-95 53,336 4.69 
 1995-96 58,438 5.40 
 1996-97 64,548 4.86 
 1997-98 74,760 4.50 
 1998-99 84,592 4.73 
 1999-00 90,350 4.90 
 2000-01 90,560 6.29 
 2001-02 111,134 6.53 
 2002-03 120,432 4.40 
 2003-04 124,936 4.99 
 2004-05 131,127 5.23 
 2005-06 137,424 4.51 
 2006-07 146,413 4.81 
 2007-08 160,016 7.94 
 2008-09 188,235 5.23 
 2009-10 194,862 6.37 
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D4. Statistics used in preparation of Figure 7.3 
 
Debt service as a percentage of gross farm revenue for NZ dairy farmers 
 
 Year                 Interest and rent % GFR 
2000-01 13% 
 2001-02 12.3% 
 2002-03 18.4% 
 2003-04 18.3% 
 2004-05 18.4%
 2005-06 23.5% 
 2006-07 24.3% 
 2007-08 17.6% 
 2008-09 30.4%
 2009-10 25.5% 
  
Statistics used in preparation of Figure 7.4 
 
D5. Values per hectare of Canterbury dairy, arable and fattening land from 1988 to 
2009 
 
Years Arable Dairy Fattening 
1988 4351 6852 1833 
1989 2647 4301 2931 
1990 4544 7947 1897 
1991 4505 6307 2072 
1992 5415 6947 2085 
1993 5937 15349 2684 
1994 6761 14668 3448 
1995 7750 12598 4116 
1996 8476 11841 3416 
1997 8132 13105 3650 
1998 7631 11386 2782 
1999 7799 12732 3898 
2000 8574 10190 2514 
2001 9528 17950 4257 
2002 13087 26947 3800 
2003 13645 23833 6087 
2004 16580 26445 7982 
2005 19162 33441 8847 
2006 21284 28246 8065 
2007 24819 32075 8930 
2008 31254 36771 13024 
2009 33295 32150 11757 
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D6. Statistics used in the preparation of Figure 7.5 
 
Percentage of 50-50 sharemilkers in Canterbury 
 
 
   50-50          lo 
total          
farms 
2003 132 73 643 
2004 127 69 652 
2005 121 78 672 
2006 128 85 688 
2007 126 92 704 
2008 130 117 793 
2009 136 135 891 
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     Appendix E 
Additional information for Chapter 8 
Table E1 Raw milk quality results for Alpine Dairy Products (in percentages) 
 
 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 
Finest 97.1 95.2 96.6 95.7 98.2 98.4 97.9 98.4 98.1 97.9 98 
First 1.85 .88 1.1 1.1 .48 .38 1.79 1.14 1.15 1.31 1.36 
Second 1.05 3.90 2.3 3.33 1.37 1.23 .27 .43 .64 .68 .62 
Reject 0 0 0 0 0 0 .04 .05 .11 .08 .03 
% 
increase 
in finest 
  
-2.0 
 
1.0 
 
-1.0 
 
3.0 
 
0.2 
 
-0.5 
 
0.5 
 
-0.3 
 
-0.2 
 
0.1 
 
Source: derived from annual accounts of the Alpine Dairy Products (1987-1998) 
 
Table E2 Table of the number of grade types, problems and suppliers 
 
 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 
Total # grades 
in season 
1190 1153 1394 1538 1852 2221 2562 
APC/bacteria 451 501 557 520 779 1320 1026 
Thermodurics 322 179 471 595 354 394 927 
Coliform 199 192 208 117 145 130 137 
Inhib. sub. 79 116 43 77 93 72 34 
Somatic cells   40 140 419 237 311 
Senses 46 16 21 21 34 32 70 
Colostrum  16 20 4 8 7 2 
Sediment 90 119 34 15 20 8 15 
supplier  4.09 4.66 4.54 5.09 5.77 5.58 
Grade free 
suppliers 
39 44 55 63 45 46 71 
Greater than 10 
grades 
28 22 31 40 44 59 67 
Greater than 20 
grades 
3 7 8 8 14 18 20 
No. of 
suppliers 
271 281 299 339 364 385 459 
 
Source: derived from Alpine Supplier Newsletters 1997 and 1998 
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E3. Proposed benefits of the merger of Alpine Dairy Products and the Southland 
Cooperative Dairy Company 
 
The Business Development Project (BDP). The BDP of the NZDB was based on 
the Commercial Pricing Model (CPM), which replaced the standard cost model 
approach for payment to dairy companies. Under the standard cost model, the NZDB 
set a price that would be paid to the cooperatives based on the NZDB’s assessment of 
the cost of manufacturing a particular product. However, the CPM used international 
commodity prices for the eight major product groups to determine returns to dairy 
companies. It was felt that through the CPM returns to dairy companies would be 
more closely linked to market prices which, in turn, would increase market 
responsiveness at the dairy company level. The advantage of this change for SIDC 
would be that the company would have a more diverse product mix, which would 
allow it to better “chase” improvements in the market price for specific commodities. 
 
Security. The newly formed South Island Dairy Cooperative (SIDC) would be the 
third largest company in the NZ dairy industry, thus being better able to protect the 
interest of its shareholders. The merger would allow economies of scale and 
increased financial strength. The new entity with a projected turnover of $485 m 
would be the fourth largest company in the South Island of NZ, behind Foodstuffs 
(groceries), Alliance (meat) and Christchurch City Holdings. 
 
Enhanced Returns. It was proposed that there would be “significant synergies and 
capital and operational efficiencies”. Cost savings were estimated to be 1 cent/kg 
milksolids in 1998/99, 3 cents in 1999/00, 7 cents in 2000/01 and 3 cents in 2001/02 
or about $20 m. Milk growth was forecast to average 8% for the ensuing five years. It 
was proposed that there would be additional capital efficiency through the ability to 
transfer milk and secondary products between sites, so as to delay or eliminate 
additional building projects. 
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E4. Dealing with Japanese Thermoduric Bacteria 
 
The Dairy Research Corporation (DRC) found the following. 
 
-the problem was caused by environmental contamination with mesophilic 
bacteria 
 -75% of suppliers did not experience any rise in thermoduric levels 
-the problems with the spores were largely seasonal and occurred in the 
autumn when silage was fed to extend lactation as grass growth slowed 
 -entry of the spores into the bulk milk tank was via the teat 
 -spores are spread on the ground and pasture via cow faeces 
 -teat washing made the problem worse 
 -silage made and held in a pit or stack had a 10-fold increase in the spores 
 -the length of time that silage is uncovered influences the spore levels 
 
A letter to suppliers from Supplier Liaison Officer Nadine Smith during the winter of 
1998 (Smith 1998), noted the following points of importance: 
 
-“You will increase spores in milk (thermoduric count) if using a high-pressure hose 
to wash cows without proper teat cleaning and paper towel drying.” 
-“The only way to reduce the level of spores being ingested by the cow is to remove 
the top layer off the pit/stack and any mould off the baleage.” 
-“White mould can contain more spores than the top layer gunge.” 
-“Some pit/stacks appear to have a visually excellent top layer, but, in fact, may not. 
If you are experiencing thermoduric problems with no obvious plant/silo 
problems and appear to have good silage—your silage may still have high spore 
levels.” 
-“In my experience with spores, the silage that is left uncovered for a period of time 
or poorly covered is almost certain to cause an increase in thermoduric levels in 
milk.” 
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E5. Scoping report for the merger of Alpine Dairy Products and the Southland 
Cooperative Dairy Company to form the South Island Dairy Company 
 
Stage 1—Preparation of Scoping Report 
 
- Credit Suisse First Boston was appointed to provide independent advice 
regarding the ownership structure that would allow the maximum level of 
identified benefits to be captured for the companies and their shareholders. 
- The scoping report concluded that significant benefits would arise from 
closer co-operation and that a merger was the most effective means of 
realising these benefits. 
- Each board reviewed the report in August 1997. The boards then approved 
the Steering Committee to commence the formal merger process. 
 
Stage 2---Due Diligence Investigation 
 
-    Each company carried out a due diligence investigation of the other 
company which comprised: an engineering audit, an environmental 
assessment, an audit of financial accounts by Price Waterhouse and a legal 
inquiry by Buddle Findlay. 
  
Stage 3---Stand Alone Valuation of Alpine and Southland 
 
- Each company was valued by Credit Suisse First Boston. 
- The assumptions underlying the forecasts were benchmarked to insure that 
they were consistent. The management of each company then reviewed the 
other company’s financial forecasts. 
- Based on the standalone valuations of each company, Credit Suisse First 
Boston recommended that a distribution be made to Alpine shareholders. 
 
Stage 4---Negotiations of Final Merger Terms 
 
- Subcommittees of each board were established to negotiate the final merger 
terms and conditions based on the recommendations of Credit Suisse First 
Boston.  
- The negotiation process was delayed by the announcement of the NZDB’s 
Business Development Project which included the proposal for the 
Commercial Pricing Model. The potential effect of this project on the 
proposed merger terms and potential merger benefits was assessed by each 
company. It was felt that the new pricing system would have a similar 
impact on each company and that the previously agreed financial forecasts 
were a reasonable basis for agreeing to merger terms. 
- The subcommittees agreed on the merger terms and conditions presented. 
These terms were then ratified by the Boards. 
-  
(from Proposal for the Merger of Southland Cooperative Limited and Alpine Dairy 
Products Limited to South Island Dairy Cooperative Limited 1998). 
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     Appendix F 
Additional information for chapter 9  
F1. Human Ethics Committee Approval 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
F2. Specific objectives of the LUDF for the season 2007/08 
 
 
1. To deliver an Operating Profit of $6,844/ha and Return on Dairy Assets of 
15.3% from a $6.40 payout - with budgeted milksolids production of 294,700 kg 
with Cash Farm Working Expenses of $2.85/kg milksolids.  
2. To improve water use efficiency for better integrating the technologies currently 
existing on the farm by ensuring useable decision making data is accessible to 
the farm management in a timely manner.  
3. To increase the land area that effluent is applied to so that nutrients are better 
distributed and there is an increased range of contingency plan options. Also, 
ensure that nitrate losses are not greater on effluent areas than on non-effluent 
areas, and that there is no significant microbial contamination of the shallow 
aquifers.  
4. To manage pastures and grazing so milkers consume / harvest as much 
metabolisable energy [ME] as practicable, with a target of 200 GJ/ha ME, using 
less than 200 kg of N/ha applied. For example, this could be achieved by 
consuming / harvesting 16t DM/ha with average ME 12.5.  
5. To optimise the use of the farm automation system [Protrack] and demonstrate / 
document improved efficiencies and subsequent effect on the business.  
6. To achieve an in-calf rate of not lower than 88% [i.e. 12% empty] after 12 weeks 
mating, i.e. nine weeks of AM mating plus three of natural mating. All AB 
matings to result in crossbred replacements including replacements from 
yearlings.  
7. To continue to document and measure LUDF's influence on changes to defined 
management practices on other dairy farms.  
8. To ensure specific training is adequate and appropriate to enable staff members 
to contribute effectively in meeting the objectives of the farm.  
9. To actively seek labour productivity gains through adoption of technologies and 
practices that reduce labour requirements or make the work environment more 
satisfying.  
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F3. Letter to farmers for survey participation 
 
To Canterbury and North Otago Dairy Farmers 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
In 2001 Lincoln University converted a 185 ha dry land sheep property to an irrigated 
dairy farm. The South Island Dairying Development Centre (SIDDC) was formed 
consisting of six commercial, education or research partners. Management of the 
Lincoln University Dairy Farm [LUDF] was delegated to SIDDC with the aim of 
fostering best practice, using the LUDF as a commercial demonstration-farm of high 
relevance to SI dairy farmers. 
 
Over the past seven years, a number of management techniques have been trialled 
and results reported at Focus Days, in the media and via the www.siddc.org.nz 
website. Financial data and benchmarks have been provided for the use of the 
industry. The LUDF has had over 13,000 visitors. We would like to invite you, as a 
dairy farmer, to inform us of your perceptions of the LUDF. 
 
The enclosed survey is being conducted by SIDDC in conjunction with the 
Agriculture Group of the AGLS Division of Lincoln University. The objective of the 
survey is to determine whether you have benefitted from the LUDF work, whether 
these technologies have been adopted on your property, and any suggestions you may 
have for future activities on the LUDF. The survey is being sent to all dairy farmers 
in Canterbury and North Otago 
 
We hope the enclosed questionnaire will only take a few minutes of your time. A 
self-addressed and stamped envelope has been enclosed for your convenience. The 
results of the survey will be available on the SIDDC website in late spring. All 
answers will be confidential and the researchers will not be able to identify any 
respondents. Your contact details were obtained through the cooperation of the 
Livestock Improvement Corporation. 
 
Thank you for your time in considering this request and in completing the form.  
Your answers will be vital to measurement of the LUDF’s past performance and 
future direction. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the writers at 
the numbers listed below. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
   
Richard Christie, Executive Director                      Marv Pangborn, Lecturer 
South Island Dairying Development Centre            Lincoln University 
(03) 325 3884                                                      (03) 325 2811 ext. 8363  
  
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the Lincoln University Human 
Ethics Committee. 
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F4. LUDF QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
CANTERBURY DAIRY QUESTIONNAIRE  -  JUNE 2008 
 
Part 1  Demographics:    
 
Please circle one for each question. 
  
1.1  Position of person answering questions: 
 Owner/operator     50/50 sharemilker     Lower Order Sharemilker     Manager     
Other 
 
1.2  Highest level of formal education 
 High school                  AgIto/Polytechnic                   University 
 
Please enter the number in box at right: 
 
1.3  Age of person answering questions (years):                                                                    
 
1.4  Approximate distance from Lincoln University Dairy Farm (kms. one 
way):               
 
1.5  Size of milking platform (hectares):      
   
 
1.6   Number of cows milked at peak:                                            
 
1.7  Average cow weight (kg):                                                                                                   
 
1.8  Production per cow (kg milksolids):                                                                                                    
 
1.9  Production per hectare (kg milksolids):                                                                                              
 
 
1.10 DairyNZ has identified five types of farming systems, please circle the one 
that best describes your operation: 
 
System 1:  All grass, self-contained. 
 
System 2:  Feed imported either as supplement or grazing off and fed to dry cows 
(4-14% of feed imported). 
 
System 3:  Feed imported to extend lactation and for dry cows (10-20% of feed 
imported). 
 
System 4:  Feed imported and used at both ends of lactation and for dry cows (20-
30% of feed imported). 
 
System 5:  Imported feed used all year (30-40% of feed imported). 
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1.11  How often do you attend DairyNZ events?  (excluding LUDF Focus Days)      
                  - times per year in box            
               
1.12 Do you use a private consultant?                                            Y or N in box           
 
1.13 Assuming you have a farming surplus in the coming year, please rank the 
top five areas in which you would like to spend your surplus. (1 being the 
first choice) 
 
___   paying down debt ___   improving irrigation systems 
___   increasing the herd ___   remodelling or building new cowshed 
___   purchasing more land ___   other buildings 
___   upgrading machinery ___   holidays 
___   upgrading effluent systems ___   more or improved housing 
___   more fertiliser to increase farm fertility ___   fencing waterways 
___   increased re-grassing ___   education for children or self 
___   Others (please list)____________________________________________________ 
 
1.14  Please indicate the importance of the following in regards to your personal 
priorities in farming (1 is very important, 5 is not at all important):   
                                                                                  1           2         3        4       
 5 
  Cash profit                                                                    
   Life style 
    Potential for capital gain                                      
    Quality stock                                                        
   Like being own boss                                            
    Like working outside                                          
    Good place to raise family                                         
    Other, please detail       ____________________________________________                                
 
 
Part 2  The Lincoln University Dairy Farm (LUDF) and the South 
Island Dairy Development Centre (SIDDC) 
 
2.1  How often did you attend any of the four LUDF Focus Days in these 
seasons?   
 
 2005/06                  2006/07                                        2007/08                      
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2.2  If you have attended a LUDF Focus Day, why do you attend?  Please tick 
any or all. 
___  to meet other farmers and have a day off of the farm 
___  to learn about latest grazing management techniques 
___  to learn about the latest animal management techniques 
___  for the financial information provided 
___  to visit with Agri business people (bankers, suppliers, etc.) 
___  to learn how the LUDF is performing 
___  to learn about environmental management at the LUDF (irrigation, 
effluent, fertiliser, etc.) 
___  to compare your farm to the LUDF  
___  other reasons, please detail   
__________________________________________ 
 
2.3  When you think of the LUDF farming systems, what comes to mind? 
(please tick any or all) 
___    Low residual grazing 
___    Nutrient and environmental management 
___    Reproductive technologies - treating anoestrus cows before start of  
           mating 
        ___     Synchronisation of R2yr heifers before start of mating 
___    Once per day milking during calving 
___    Once per day calf feeding 
___    Pasture monitoring and feed wedge 
___    Irrigation monitoring 
___    Re-grassing of pastures 
___Other________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.4  If you can put an economic value on any of the changes in question 2.3, 
please list with your estimate of $ value 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___________________ 
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Some key findings from the LUDF are listed below.  Indicate your use of them 
by putting a “Y” or “N” in the box, and comment why, or why you haven’t, 
adopted these technologies. 
 
2.5  Low grazing residuals                                                                                               
Reasons:  
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
2.6  Re-grassing based on measurement of poor performing paddocks                       
Reasons: 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
2.7  Synchronising of heifers to calve one week before herd                                                          
Reasons: 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
2.8  Aggressive use of hormone intervention non-cycling technologies                                                         
Reasons: 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
2.9  Nil induction policy                                                                                                  
Reasons: 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
2.10  If you have made any changes, have they made your farm management 
easier or more difficult?   
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___________________________________ 
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2.11 How important are the following sources to learn about the results obtained 
at the LUDF? (1 is very important, 5 is not at all important): 
                                                                            
  1 2 3 4 5 
Focus Days 
Consultants 
Discussion Groups 
Website 
Dairy News (Dairynewz) 
The Dairy Exporter 
Other Farming publications 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Other Farmers      
 
      
 
2.12  If you have used the LUDF website, how often do you visit the site in a year 
(times)?   
 
 
2.13  When you think of learning about new technology or innovations, please 
rank the following as sources of information by ticking the relevant box in 
each row: 
(1 is very useful, 5 is not at all useful) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Media (TV, magazines, newspapers) 
DairyNZ events (inc. discussion groups) 
Demonstration-farms 
Conferences 
Other farmers 
Sales representatives 
Consultants 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
2.14  Do you have any suggestions for areas to investigate, or future projects, for 
the LUDF? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
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F5. Results of LUDF Survey 
 
Part 1 Demographics 
 
1.1 Position of person answering questions: 
 
                                         Per cent 
Owner/Operator                 73.4     
50/50 Sharemilker              16.8 
L.O. Sharemilker                 1.4 
Managers                             7.0 
Other                                    1.4 
 
1.1 Highest level of formal education  
 
                               Per cent  
High School             33.1      
AgIto/Polytechnic    23.9 
University                43.0 
 
1.2 Age of person answering questions: 
 
Mean: 44.6 years 
Range: 22 to 72 years 
 
            Per cent in each group 
20’s                  7.6    
30’s                24.0 
40’s               38.4 
50’s               23.4 
60’s                 7.0 
70’s                 1.4 
 
1.3 Approximate distance from Lincoln University Dairy Farm 
 
Mean: 104.65 
Range: 6 km to 350 km 
 
                          Per cent 
Under 50 km          31       
51-100 km           28.2 
101-150               22.2 
151-200                 4.2 
176-200                 3.5 
201-250                 7.1 
250+                      3.5 
 
81.4 % live within 150 km of the LUDF 
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Size of milking platform 
 
Mean: 238.47 
Range: 50 to 1400 
 
                          Per cent 
Under 100 ha        9.6      
100-200 ha          45.2 
201-300 ha          26.0 
301-400 ha            8.9    
400-500 ha            4.1 
Over500 ha           6.2 
 
1.4 Number of cows milked at peak 
 
Mean:  611 
Range: 130 to 5000 
 
                     Per cent 
Under 220        4.8    
221-320  5.5 
321-420  6.1 
421-520 10.3 
521-620          16.5 
621-720          11.6 
721-820          11.0 
821-920            6.8 
921-1020          6.2 
1021-1120        3.4 
1121-1220        5.5 
Over 1221       12.3 
 
1.5 Average cow weight 
 
Mean: 479.95 
Range: 400 to 750 
 
                      Per cent 
Under 350        7.1    
351-400 30.5 
401-450          43.3 
Over 450        19.1  
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1.6 Production per cow 
 
Mean: 418.5 
Range: 300 to 525 
 
                                 Per cent 
Under 350 kg ms        7.1    
351-400                     30.5 
401-450 43.3 
450 +                         19.1 
               
1.9 Production per hectare 
 
Mean: 1441.4 
Range: 698 to 2180 
 
                         Per cent 
Under 1100          3.6      
1101-1150 12.3 
1151-1200            5.1 
1201-1250            5.1 
1251-1300            3.6 
1301-1350            4.4 
1351-1400          10.1 
1401-1450            5.8 
1451-1500            8.7 
1501-1550            5.1 
1551-1600            7.9 
1601-1650            4.4 
1651-1700            8.7 
1701-1750            4.0 
1751-1800            4.7 
Over 1800            6.5 
 
There was a highly significant negative correlation between age and business 
structure (-.377**) - as age decreased there were less owner/operators. There was also 
a highly significant negative correlation between age and education (-.260**). 
milksolids/ha were negatively correlated to increasing age (-.225**). 
 
There were significant positive correlations between increased education and hectares 
controlled (.185*) and cows milked (.189*). Milksolids/ha increased with cow 
numbers (.220**) and milksolids/cow increased with cow weight (.296**). 
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1.10 The Five Farming Systems 
 
                                                               Per cent 
System 1     (no imported feed)                 8.5     
System 2     (0-10% imported feed)        22.5 
System 3     (10-20% imported feed)      35.2 
System 4     (20-30% imported feed)      28.2 
System 5     (over 30% imported feed)     5.6 
 
As farm systems moved from System 1 towards System 5, there were positive 
correlations to cow numbers (0.185*), milksolids produced (0.261**) and 
milksolids/ha (0.484**). There was a significant correlation (0.174*) between the 
higher input systems and attendance at DairyNZ events. 
 
There was a negative correlation between those who farmed for capital gain and 
higher input systems (-0.225**) and for those who attended LUDF Focus Days to 
learn about LUDF grazing management techniques (-0.189*) and animal 
management techniques (-0.221*). 
 
1.11 How often do you attend DairyNZ events (excluding LUDF)? 
 
Mean = 2.78 events/year 
 
Number of attendances           Per cent 
0                               21.5    
1                               13.2 
2                               24.3 
3                               13.9 
4                                 7.6 
5                                 4.9 
6                                 5.6 
 7 or more                                 9.0 
 
Attendance at DairyNZ events were negatively correlated to age (-0.217**) and those 
farming for capital gains (-0.177*). Those who attend DairyNZ events were less 
likely to use the LUDF website (-0.226*). 
 
There was a positive correlation between attendance at DairyNZ events and 
milksolids/ha (0.204*) as well as those using higher input systems (0.174*). There 
were also positive correlations between those who attended DairyNZ events and 
those who attended  LUDF Focus Days in all three years surveyed (0.189*,0 .218** 
and 0.268**).  
 
1.12 Do you use a private consultant? 
 
No      31.5 % 
Yes     68.3 % 
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There was a positive correlation of dairy farmers using consultants and production of 
milksolids/ha (0.238**) and a positive correlation to those who ranked farming as a 
lifestyle highly (0.170*). There were further positive correlations between consultant 
use and low grazing residuals (0.224*) and heifer synchronization to calve a week 
before the herd (0.350**).  
 
1.13 Assuming that you have a farming surplus in the coming year, please rank 
the top five areas in which you would like to spend your surplus (1 being the 
first choice).  
 
#1 use  (130 responses) 
 
                                 Per cent 
Pay down debt             43.8   
Purchase more land     16.9 
Improve irrigation        15.4 
 
 
#2 use (129 responses) 
 
                                  Per cent 
Purchase land               17.1   
Improve irrigation        14.7 
Pay down debt              12.4 
 
#3 use  (125 responses) 
 
                                   Per cent             
Purchase land               14.4   
Improve irrigation        14.4 
Re-grass                          10.4 
Holidays                        10.4 
 
#4 use (119 responses) 
 
                                  Per cent      
Re-grass                       16.8   
Improve irrigation      10.9 
Increase herd size         8.4 
 
#5 use (108 responses) 
 
                                   Per cent 
Upgrade machinery      13.9    
Holidays                       12.0 
Improved housing        10.2 
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1.14 Please indicate the importance of the following in regard to your personal 
priorities in farming (1 is very important, 5 is not at all important)  
 
Responses were 146, results shown in percentages  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Cash profit 63.7 27.4 6.8 2.1 0 
Life style 43.2 34.9 17.1 2.7 2.1 
Capital gain 35.6 28.8 30.8 2.1 2.7 
Qual. stock 42.1 35.2 18.6 2.8 1.4 
Own boss 61.0 26.7 7.5 3.5 1.4 
Working 
outside 
39.3 29.7 22.8 5.5 2.8 
family 47.4 29.9 15.3 6.6 .7 
 
Being their own boss was positively correlated with all other reasons for farming. 
However, those farming for capital gains were less inclined to be positively 
correlated to the other reasons for farming. 
 
Part 2 The Lincoln University Dairy Farm (LUDF) and the 
South Island Dairy Development Centre (SIDDC) 
 
 2.1 How often did you attend any of the four LUDF Focus Days in these 
seasons? 
 
Responses were 142, all results shown in percentages 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 
2005/06 32.4 23.2 20.4 18.3 5.6 
2006/07 34.5 19.0 23.9 20.4 2.1 
2007/08 37.0 31.9 18.8 8.0 4.3 
 
2.2 If you have attended a LUDF Focus Day, why do you attend? 
 
Responses were 118; results are the % who gave an affirmative answer to the reason. 
 
Per cent                                           Reasons 
   36.2                To meet other farmers and have a day off of the farm 
   79.7                To learn about latest grazing management techniques 
   61.0                To learn about the latest animal management techniques 
   57.6                For the financial information provided 
   12.7                To visit with Agribusiness people (bankers, suppliers, etc.) 
   78.8                To learn how the LUDF is performing 
 65.3              To learn about environmental management at the LUDF (irrigation,                                
effluent, fertiliser, etc.) 
   76.1                To compare my farm to the LUDF 
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2.3 When you think of the LUDF farming systems, what comes to mind? 
 
There were 141 responses; results are the % who gave an affirmative answer. 
 
Per cent                              Responses 
   89.4                 Low grazing residuals 
   79.4                 Pasture monitoring and feed wedge 
   63.8                 Nutrient and environmental management 
   46.8                 Irrigation monitoring 
  41.1                  Re grassing of pastures 
  34.3                  Reproductive tech.—treating anoestrus cows, synchronizing heifers 
  20.7                  OAD milking during calving 
    9.3                  OAD calf feeding 
 
2.4 If you can put an economic value on any of the changes in question 2.3, 
please list with your estimate of $ value. 
 
Responses = 23, results are number of respondents in each category     
 
                                         Responses 
Lost money                              1 
up to $50,000                           5 
$50,001 to $100,000                8 
$100,001 to $500,000              7 
up to $1,000,000                      2 
 
Some key findings from the LUDF are listed below. Indicate your use of them by 
putting a “Y” or “N” in the box, and comment why, or why you haven’t, 
adopted these technologies. 
2.5 Low grazing residuals (129 responses) 
82.2%    have adopted (106) 
17.8%    have not (23) 
19 respondents have always followed this practice 
43 respondents felt that the practice gives better quality pasture and better utilization 
  6 respondents felt it was a more profitable way to farm 
10 respondents did not adopt the practice, because they felt that their cows would not 
be fully fed 
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2.6 Re-grassing based on measurement of poor performing paddocks (130 
responses) 
 
73.8%    have adopted (96) 
26.2%    have not (34) 
32 respondents have always re-grassed 
16 respondents felt that the practice results in improved pastures 
14 respondents felt that the practice increased production and quality 
 
6 respondents did not re-grass due to being a new conversion 
 
2.7 Synchronizing heifers to calve one week before the main herd (135 
responses) 
 
28.9%     followed practice (39) 
71.1%     did not (96) 
 
18 respondents followed the practice to get the heifer calving over early 
12 respondents followed the practice to give heifers more time to cycle 
16 respondents did not follow the practice due to logistics (heifers away from farm, 
lack of facilities, etc.) 
6 respondents felt that it was too expensive 
3 respondents synchronise their heifers, but not to calve before the main herd 
12 respondents calve heifers early, but do not synchronise 
15 respondents do not believe in the practice of synchronizing heifers 
2.8 Aggressive use of hormone intervention non-cycling technology (135 
responses) 
 
42.2% use aggressive technologies 
57.8% do not 
 
29 respondents used the technologies to maximise cycling, conception and compact 
calving 
8 respondents said the practice is too expensive   
23 respondents said that they did not believe in intervention12 respondents felt that 
they achieved good results through breeding and feeding10 respondents used 
other methods like OAD milking, teaser bulls, etc. 
5 respondents said that they do not have any reproductive problems 
2.9 Nil Induction policy (138 responses) 
 
36.2% (50) indicated that they followed the nil induction policy 
63.8% (88) indicated that they did not 
 
3 respondents felt that the practice of induction was too expensive 
9 respondents were philosophically opposed to inductions 
11 respondents felt that inductions violated animal welfare 
20 respondents induced for reasons including: tidying up the calving pattern of a new 
herd and to grow the herd numbers   
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28 felt that it was too costly to waste cows through not inducing late calvers 
  5 respondents were share milkers who felt that they could not afford not to induce  
There was a negative correlation (-0.243**) between the adoption of the nil induction 
policy and milksolids/ha. 
2.10 If you have made any changes, have they made your farm management 
easier or more difficult? (57 respondents) 
 
70.2% said easier (40) 
24.6% said harder (14)---however, some said it was worth it though 
  5.3% said no effect (2) 
2.11 How important are the following sources to learn about the results obtained 
at the LUDF (1 is very important, 5 is not at all important) (137 
respondents)   
 
Results in %’s 
 
 Responses 1 2 3 4 5 
Focus days 137 45.3 22.6 15.3 6.6 10.2 
Consultants 137 20.4 27.0 29.2 9.5 13.9 
Disc. Group 128 20.3 34.4 23.4 10.9 10.9 
Website 123 29.3 22.8 21.1 12.2 14.6 
DairyNewz 127 21.3 27.6 35.4 7.9 7.9 
Exporter 138 31.9 29.7 28.3 6.5 3.6 
Other 
publications 
127 18.9 22.8 36.2 14.2 7.9 
Other 
farmers 
125 23.2 33.6 29.6 7.2 6.4 
 
2.12 If you have used the LUDF website, how often do you visit the site in a year 
(times)? (114 responses) 
Not used                    31.6% 
1-10 times                  42.1% 
11-20 times                 7.9% 
20-30 times                 3.5% 
more than 30 times    14.9% 
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2.13 When you think of learning about new technology or innovations, please 
rank the following as sources of information by ticking the relevant box 
in each row: (1 is very useful, 5 is not useful at all) 
Results in percentages 
 
 Responses 1 2 3 4 5 
Media 135 31.1 31.1 25.9 6.7 5.2 
DairyNZ 136 31.6 44.1 16.9 .7 6.6 
Demo 
farms 
135 32.6 39.3 20.0 3.7 4.4 
conferences 131 22.1 32.8 30.5 9.9 4.6 
Other 
farmers 
134 31.3 35.8 26.1 6.0 .7 
Sales reps 131 4.6 16.0 23.7 19.8 35.9 
consultants 138 27.5 38.4 16.7 8.7 8.7 
 
Responses to Question 2.14: Do you have any suggestions for areas to 
investigate, or future projects, for the LUDF?  
 
These results are transcribed as written: 
 
Communication comments: 
 
- more field days away from LUDF 
-better communication with farmers who are “not on your back door” 
-more focus days in the wider region 
-set up a subscription service for focus day hand outs for those who can’t attend 
 
Feeding comments: 
 
-dry cow feeding systems (grass/straw, kale/straw, kale/grass silage, kale/cereal 
silage, green feed crops/straw) 
-higher production through imported feed 
-trials on grain feeding, OAD, robots 
-work on transition feed pre and post calving 
-meal feeding 
-grain feeding in autumn 
-investigate the feasibility of putting in a meal feeding system into the shed to 
maximise milksolids/ha and maybe reduce supplementary feeding costs 
-I think it would be good to investigate the effects of increasing grain or meal feeding 
to cows in a well-managed pasture based system. Can pasture production be 
maintained? What are maximum cow capacities? What are the financial parameters? 
286 
 
-milking on brassicas. Can the cows be fed 100% before tainting occurs? Will grain 
feeding reduce the risk - what else would help? 
 
Suggestions for Systems research: 
 
-put “young herd” on OAD for a whole season 
-how would this farm perform if all animals came home on August 1
st
 
-look at growing supplementary crops on the farm 
-feeding silage in early spring being part of a defined plan 
-look at rotation length to staying at 20 days until February, then use supplements to 
extend rotation. Rely on irrigation for summer grass 
-on-farm winter crops or maize silage to mitigate effluent 
-development of profitable, self-contained dairy using summer/winter crops on 
milking platform 
-how can new technology be used to increase productivity 
-the extrapolation of information gathered on centre pivot irrigated farms to non-
irrigated farms  
-pre-wilting of summer grass when dry matter content is low 
 
Reproduction: 
 
-better reproductive performance---this farmer added that he follows the LUDF 
grazing system, but has to induce because he feels that the LUDF hasn’t got on top of 
reproductive problems 
-getting cows in calf 
-trial sexed semen 
-work on high fertility cows that recover quickly and produce 400 kg milksolids on 
grass 
-be honest about fertility in LIC bulls and what bulls you select. How can you be 
honest when the companies sponsor you? 
-improving cow fertility 
-look at reproduction vs. production 
-increase reproductive work 
-cow fertility 
-link Jim Gibbs’ lameness work with in-calf rates 
-trial a limited induction policy vs. the current nil induction policy 
-keep up the very good work. I still tend to think your aggressive/obsessive approach 
to pasture management compromises your ability to get cows in calf—it is good for 
everything else, i.e. profit, production, etc.—but it is no good blaming the cows that 
were purchased or anything else to do with the cows except maybe the national 1% 
yearly decline in fertility 
-need to look closer at LUDF system to explain foetal losses and feet problems  
 
Fertiliser: 
 
-look at farming without fertiliser 
-use of liquid fertilisers through a fertigation system 
-due trials with 250 and 300 kg N to check leaching under best practice application 
technology 
-investigate a low or nil N system 
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-look at lower inputs of N due to cost 
-application of eco-n thru pivot 
-investigate fine lime or fertiliser 
-why use chemical fertilisers? Trials away from this would be very useful - biotech 
and use of effluent, fertiliser and how cows can give out less greenhouse gases 
-stop the silly nonsense about using low rates of urea and instead reconcile N use 
with actual water nitrate levels in conjunction with eco-n and/or other nitrification 
inhibitors 
-soil sodium levels in relation to bloat 
 
Labour and automation: 
 
-automation of the milking process and labour 
-labour efficiency 
-areas in saving labour or making better use of expensive labour 
-OAD milking 
-dairy shed automation, particularly robotics 
-automated heat detection 
-robotic milking 
-robotic milkers 
-human resources - hours, housing, training 
-use of technology and the refining of efficient work place practices 
 
Environment: 
 
-continue environmental research to counter negativity to dairy industry (2 similar 
responses) 
-keep profile of good dairy farming in the media 
-carbon sequestration in soils 
-help improve dairy farmers understanding and use of irrigation 
-managing with less irrigation water 
 
Compliments: 
 
-please do not get into research, maintain the accent on-farm systems 
-keep up the good work, it’s great for benchmarking 
-work to date has been hugely valuable 
-keep up the good work - it’s nice to see the road frontage tidied 
-several nice comments about Adrian van Bysterveldt 
-keep farm simple, look at profitability not production/ha 
 
Others: 
 
-ways to maximise net profit 
-animal management 
-animal health 
-integrated pest management 
-trial grasses from other firms 
-mastitis 
-heifer mastitis 
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-You need to look seriously at your dry matter calculations of growth and cover 
because they do not stack up with the information provided, e.g. growth rates about 
60+ (maybe was t) and overall farm cover and production achieved with the farm 
covers available. I have regular information on growth and production and the Farm 
Right consultant agree it cannot be fact 
-look at wealth creation 
-soil compaction in relation to dry matter production  
-investigate 1700/2700 grazing technique worked back to kg me/ha and compare with 
LUDF grazing technique and measure the actual ME intake possible for a dairy cow 
without compromising intake. How much does that last .5 ME cost as in lost 
intake/mating performance, etc. You might find that eating not so hard and bringing 
in that extra ME is cheaper, plus you will grow more ME/ha (reply #27, a system 5 
farmer) 
-perform research on Pro-Gibb 
 
